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Preface
I have long been fascinated by the Pacific. As a child, I grew up in Seattle 
during the s and s, decades noted for the dominance of the Boeing 
Company in the Pacific Northwest. During those years, my father captained 
a fishing vessel that pioneered in the opening of Alaska’s king crab industry, 
and I had the opportunity to visit the north on several occasions. I attended 
college and graduate school on the Pacific Coast, mainly in northern Califor-
nia, during the s and early s, a time when Silicon Valley was boom-
ing, beefed up by Cold War defense contracts. My interest in Japan dates 
back to the s. Trawling in the North Pacific, my father came into close 
contact with Japanese fishermen, trading American cigarettes for Japanese 
curios. Later, in the s, I spent two years living with my family in southern 
Japan, where I taught in Fukuoka and Hiroshima as a Fulbright Lecturer and 
learned about Japanese society. Traveling to and from Japan, I stopped over 
in the Hawaiian Islands, and during the s I had the opportunity on sev-
eral occasions to teach on Maui for the University of Hawai‘i—experiences 
that brought me into close contact with a broad range of Pacific Islanders, 
including Chamorros transplanted from Guam and American Samoans.
 My professional work, including this volume, has allowed me to com-
bine interests in business, environmental, and urban history with an abiding 
concern for the history of the American West and the Pacific. Many of my 
books have explored intersections of these fields. There have been, we shall 
see, commonalities in the development of the United States’ Pacific posses-
sions. Those commonalities have been perhaps nowhere more striking than 
in interactions in economic and environmental decision making. However, 
there have also been marked regional patterns of development within this 
vast area; after all, the Pacific covers one-third of the globe and has always 
been complex. Yet, especially with several forms of economic and geopoliti-
cal integration that have taken place since World War II, it is possible to 
begin thinking of the Pacific, including American possessions there, as one 
region.
 It would be easy to romanticize developments in the Pacific. I remem-
ber many wonderful moments spent living there: sailing part of the Inside 
Passage to Alaska in a small open boat as a teenager, a voyage cut short, 
however, by a summer gale; eating Dungeness crabs from the shell in north-
ern California; and swimming in ocean swells off white-sand beaches near 
Fukuoka. There is another side to the Pacific. Until very recently, and even 
now in much of the region, the economy evolved as a boom-and-bust affair 
based on extractive industries, just as that of the American West did in the 
s. I am one of those who can recall, during a recession in the early s, 
a billboard on Interstate Highway  on the eastern outskirts of Seattle that 
read, “Will the Last Person Leaving Please Turn Out the Lights?”
 It is on the interactions between economic developments, environmen-
tal issues, and political decision making that this volume focuses. My study 
casts a wide net. Ranging from the sun-kissed beaches of the Hawaiian archi-
pelago to the snow-swept shores of the Aleutian Islands and from congested 
Silicon Valley to rural Guam, it looks at contests over the exploitation of 
natural resources, land-use issues, and urban planning, among other mat-
ters. Beyond individual regional topics lie general debates and decisions over 
quality-of-life concerns. By looking at this array of issues, my book captures 
both the commonalities and the complexities of the changes that have oc-
curred throughout the Pacific possessions of the United States.
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Few scholarly studies are truly individual efforts, for most build on the works 
of others, especially in the field of history. I would like to take this opportu-
nity to thank the many people who helped bring this work to fruition. David 
Lincove, the history librarian at The Ohio State University, aided me in track-
ing down many elusive sources, as did librarians at the Hamilton Library at 
the University of Hawai‘i, Mānoa and librarians at the Suzzallo Library at 
the University of Washington. Dirk Ballendorf, James Bartholomew, William 
Childs, Stewart Firth, Hal Friedman, James Kraft, William McCloskey, Lucy 
Murphy, Daniel Nelson, Darrin Pratt, Dorothy Pyle, Robert Rogers, Mark 
Rose, Randy Roth, David Stebenne, Tetsuo Taka, William Tsutsui, Richard 
Tucker, and Judy Wu read and commented on earlier drafts of all or parts of 
this study. More generally, I would like to thank my colleagues at Ohio State 
for providing a stimulating and collegial environment in which to work. I 
am indebted to the College of Humanities of The Ohio State University for 
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released time from teaching, which allowed me to conduct research on this 
project and for a publication subvention for this resulting book. Finally, I 
would like to thank Masako Ikeda, Acquiring Editor for the University of 
Hawai‘i Press, and the two anonymous readers for the press, for their valu-
able comments and help in bringing my manuscript to publication.
 I presented earlier versions of parts of Chapters  and  as papers at 
meetings of the American Society for Environmental History in  and 
 and part of Chapter  as a paper at the annual meeting of the Busi-
ness History Conference in , and my work benefited from suggestions 
made at those gatherings. An earlier version of Chapter  was published as 
“Environmental Justice, Native Rights, Tourism, and Opposition to Mili-
tary Control: The Case of Kaho‘olawe,” in the Journal of American History  
(September ): –; and part of Chapter  was published electroni-
cally as “Tourism, the Environment, and the Military: The Case of Guam, 
–,” in the  Proceedings of the Business History Conference at 
<http://www.thebhc.org/publications/BEHonline/beh.html>.
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Finally, I must say a few words about languages. I have followed standard 
practices in including diacritic marks in words wherever they are called for, 
but I have not added them when they did not appear in the original, as in 
quotations or book titles. I have chosen to write Japanese names with the 
given name first and the surname second, adhering to English-language 
practice, which is the reverse of that in Japanese.
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Introduction
 Writing in his diary on May , , Dr. Paul Nobuo Tatsuguchi of the Japanese Imperial Army observed, “All the patients in the hospital were made to commit suicide. I am only  years old and 
am to die. Have no regrets. Banzai to the Emperor. I am grateful that I have 
kept the peace of my soul which Enkist [Jesus Christ] bestowed on me at 
 o’clock.” The medical officer stationed with the Japanese occupation force 
on Attu, one of Alaska’s far-western Aleutian Islands, Tatsuguchi correctly 
foresaw his future. He tried to surrender to American soldiers who were 
retaking the island on May , shouting to them in English, “Don’t shoot! 
Don’t shoot! I am a Christian!” His actions were misunderstood. The Bible he 
waved in one hand was mistaken for a weapon, and Tatsuguchi was killed.¹
 By the time of World War II, Tatsuguchi and his family had moved back 
and forth across the Pacific Ocean on numerous occasions. Native to Hiro-
shima, Tatsuguchi’s father had emigrated to California in . There the 
elder Tatsuguchi converted to Christianity and attended Heraldsburg Col-
lege, specializing in dentistry. In , he returned to Hiroshima as a medical 
missionary for the Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) Church, where he married. 
Paul was one of six children. He attended college in California, graduating 
from Pacific Union College in . When his parents died a year later, Paul 
returned to Japan to settle family affairs. In , however, he went back to 
California to enroll in the College of Medical Evangelists at Loma Linda 
College, graduating four years later. In , he returned to Japan with a bride 
who was the daughter of a SDA pastor in Honolulu. In Tokyo, Tatsuguchi 
concentrated on medical work in a tuberculosis sanitarium and, with his 
wife, on SDA church activities. Drafted in , he found himself on Attu 
with Japan’s invading forces a year later.²
 The Tatsuguchi family story, nonetheless, was not one of unmitigated 
tragedy. At the close of World War II, Tatsuguchi’s wife found employment 
 Pathways to the Present
with American forces occupying Japan. In , she moved with her two 
daughters to Honolulu to work as a translator, with the three of them be-
coming naturalized American citizens. Still later, the three moved to Califor-
nia. One of the daughters followed in her father’s footsteps, graduating with a 
degree in nursing from Loma Linda College and then returning to Japan as 
the wife of an SDA church member who served as the temperance secretary 
for the Japan Union Conference in Tokyo. The other daughter, also a regis-
tered nurse from Loma Linda College, married a California businessman 
and settled in the Golden State.³ Although unusual in the frequency of their 
movements across the Pacific, members of the Tatsuguchi family typified 
the growing mobility of Pacific peoples. In their travels between California, 
Hawai‘i, Japan, and Alaska, the Tatsuguchis illustrated the increasing mili-
tary, economic, and social integration of the Pacific.
 Dealing with the Pacific as a distinct region, not simply looking at the 
Pacific Rim or the Pacific “donut” empty in the middle, my study analyzes 
relationships among business developments, cultural changes, and environ-
mental alterations in United States’ possessions across the Pacific created by 
that integration.⁴ World War II militarized most of the Pacific, and after that 
conflict the affected areas had to chart new developmental courses, which 
often differed substantially from both prewar and wartime situations. The 
result was several trajectories. Still, there were commonalities.
 My thesis about those developments is simple, at least in outline. World 
War II, building on alterations often already under way, accelerated and in-
tensified major changes in the Pacific, among the most important of which 
was increased geopolitical and economic integration.⁵ That integration—
especially the trade ties and, in some areas, the rise of tourism—brought 
faster economic development. The growing presence of the American mili-
tary, as American policy makers came to view the Pacific as an American 
lake, also brought some forms of economic growth to the region and, of 
course, eliminated domination of areas such as Micronesia by the Japanese 
military. While American military spending became an important source 
of economic expansion and rising standard of living for many people, not 
all benefited from it equally. Many of the profits went to handfuls of devel-
opers, often outsiders. Moreover, growth impinged on traditional lifestyles, 
especially for indigenous peoples. Not surprisingly, there arose considerable 
resistance to some forms of American military and economic developments, 
especially, as time progressed, on environmental grounds. That opposition 
set the stage for conflicts, from which compromises usually emerged, and 
with agreements came the creation of important parts of today’s Pacific.
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 My book explores how and why people worked in the ways they did to 
influence their economic, social, and physical environments, and what the 
consequences of those labors have been. The question was never whether 
America’s Pacific possessions were going to be developed. Rather, questions 
included: In what ways would they be developed? Within what limits? For 
whose benefit? And, of course, it is important to bear in mind that con-
siderable development had occurred in earlier times. Individuals, the many 
organizations they formed, including businesses, and governmental agents 
emerge as key actors in answering these questions. In examining the actions 
of individuals and groups throughout the Pacific, I hope my work will con-
tribute to our knowledge of environmental history, business and economic 
history, Pacific history, and the history of the American West.⁶
 Environmental historians have created a field of study over the past gen-
eration. Environmentalism has assumed various forms, and developments 
in the Pacific illustrate well the movement’s complexity. Historians have in-
creasingly related the development of modern environmentalism to alter-
ations in society, politics, and culture. For example, Adam Rome has found 
the wellsprings of American environmentalism in the s in “the revital-
ization of liberalism, the growing discontent of middle-class women, and 
the explosion of student radicalism and countercultural protest.”⁷ Similarly, 
in her  presidential address to the American Society for Environmental 
History, Carolyn Merchant observed links among environmentalism, social 
and cultural changes, and the writing of environmental history. As she has 
pointed out, a growing number of scholars have become involved in docu-
menting America’s environmental justice movement, a campaign begun in 
the s and s to address the placing of garbage dumps, hazardous-
waste sites, power plants, and other nuisances in neighborhoods populated 
mainly by poor people of color.⁸
 Developments in the Pacific resonate with environmental efforts else-
where. As my study shows, much of what took place in the Pacific connects 
especially with America’s environmental justice movement. Not all wanted 
to rid the Pacific of Americans. Exactly how Pacific peoples viewed trade-
offs between economic development and environmental protection matters 
varied from place to place and from time to time, but one common denomi-
nator was their dislike of outside influences and, as many viewed matters, 
colonial oppression. In the post- era, that determination meant for 
many trying to lessen or end American dominance in the region, especially 
as memories of World War II waned. Issues of sovereignty were involved.
 Some scholars looking at the development of environmentalism have re-
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cently stressed its origins in colonial possessions. In his pathbreaking work, 
Richard H. Grove has cogently argued that much of modern environmental-
ism has its sources not in the United States or western Europe, but rather in 
experiences in the colonies. “As colonial expansion proceeded,” he has stated, 
“the environmental experiences of Europeans and indigenous peoples living 
at the colonial periphery played a steadily more dominant and dynamic 
part in the construction of new European evaluations of nature and in the 
growing awareness of the destructive impact of European economic activity 
on the peoples and environments of the newly ‘discovered’ and colonized 
lands.” He concludes, “Any attempt to understand the foundations of western 
environmental concerns actually involves writing a history of the human 
responses to nature that have developed at the periphery of an expanding 
European system.” Similarly, Peder Anker has traced concerns about ecology 
to experiences in the British Empire in the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries, observing that “broad ecology owes its success to its patrons in 
the economic administration of the environmental and social order in the 
British Empire.”⁹ Like these studies, my work looks beyond the “center” to 
the “periphery” to find some of the origins of modern environmental actions 
in the work of indigenous peoples as well as in that of colonizers.¹⁰
 My study seeks to contribute to business history as well as environ-
mental history. Business historians have been slower than many scholars 
to examine environmental issues. Focusing especially on the business firm 
and its management, they have not probed deeply into the externalities that 
helped frame business actions. As historians Christine Rosen and Christo-
pher Sellers have observed, “Business history has never paid much attention 
to the environment” and in fact has given “little attention to the effects of 
resource extraction and use on plants, animals, land, air, or water, much less 
entire ecosystems and climate.” That situation has begun to change, as busi-
ness historians increasingly look at connections among business firms, their 
societies, and their cultures. Such an approach is a fruitful way to understand 
many Pacific developments, including relationships among tourism, envi-
ronmental changes, and cultural alterations.¹¹
 While some of the findings of my study connect with those of the works 
of business and environmental historians, they also illuminate efforts by 
scholars to deal with the Pacific as one large region of the globe, thus in-
creasing our understanding of Pacific history. Although it is difficult to speak 
just yet of a trans-Pacific community in quite the same senses that Fernand 
Braudel has written of the Mediterranean Sea or as Bernard Bailyn and many 
other scholars have written about a transatlantic community, there have long 
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been extensive linkages throughout the Pacific, and those connections have 
increased since World War II. My study contributes to work done by histo-
rians, geographers, anthropologists, and others in rethinking Pacific history 
over the past generation.¹² There is tremendous diversity in the approaches 
and conclusions of these scholars, but several major themes stand out: a need 
to view Pacific history through non-western eyes; a need to see the Pacific 
as a major unified region of the world; and a need to examine interactions 
among Pacific peoples, their natural environments, and their economies. 
Some connections have been mainly economic in nature—trade and tour-
ism, for example. Others have been more social and cultural in orientation—
such as the movement of peoples, often called a “Pacific diaspora.” Standing 
behind many of the linkages has been the military presence of the United 
States in the Pacific, which has motivated transnational protests by Pacific 
peoples.¹³
 The United States’ Pacific possessions shared major elements of history 
in common with other parts of the Pacific. Because they were American-
owned or American-controlled, however, their histories also diverged in 
some ways from those of other sections of the Pacific. Historians have long 
looked at parts of the Pacific as an American frontier, sharing developments 
with those of the evolution of the trans-Mississippi West. As Americans 
moved across the North American continent and then traveled farther west 
into the Pacific as explorers, whalers, traders, and fishermen, they took with 
them familiar patterns of thinking and acting.¹⁴ Capitalistic development 
based on the rapid exploitation of natural resources was the norm in Alaska, 
Hawai‘i, and Guam. Extractive industries, which tended to create boom-and-
bust economies with little thought for the future, dominated developments 
in the American West and in the American Pacific.¹⁵ In the twentieth cen-
tury, especially after about , tourism seemed to offer a chance for eco-
nomic diversification and stabilization at little cost to the environment in 
the West and in the Pacific. Tourism became the leading industry in Guam 
and Hawai‘i and was important in the other regions as well. Leaders in Hiro-
shima considered leaving the ruins of their city intact as a form of nuclear 
tourism. Yet, tourism brought neither economic stability nor unadulterated 
environmental progress to either the West or the Pacific. Still other themes 
connect western American history to the history of America’s Pacific: the im-
portance of federal government and military spending in both regions (and, 
conversely, local attitudes that were often hostile to that government); and 
the fact that economic growth was very uneven, usually benefiting indige-
nous peoples—Native Americans, Alaskan Natives, native Hawaiians, and 
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the Chamorros of Guam—less than other groups. After enduring repression 
or neglect for decades, members of indigenous groups became important 
actors in the decision-making process on economic and environmental 
issues.¹⁶
orn
Six chapters compose my study. To set the stage for the rest of the volume, 
Chapter  offers a brief survey of the history of the Pacific. The chapter shows 
that a considerable degree of integration existed before the coming of Euro-
Americans to the region but looks in most detail at connections forged after 
World War II. It focuses especially on postwar changes caused by Ameri-
ca’s growing Pacific presence. Taking the Hawaiian Islands as the center of 
American activities in the Pacific, Chapter  looks at interactions among 
native Hawaiian, developmental, military, and environmental issues in the 
archipelago after World War II.¹⁷ The chapter examines land-use matters 
concerning Kaho‘olawe, one of the eight major Hawaiian Islands. Environ-
mentally degraded by western ranching, the island was further damaged by 
the U.S. Navy, which used it as a shelling and bombing range until . Most 
recently, Kaho‘olawe has been partially restored by native Hawaiian groups. 
Viewing their efforts as having broad implications, some native Hawaiian 
leaders took what they saw as their anticolonial campaign to other parts of 
the Pacific. The chapter closes by comparing developments on Kaho‘olawe to 
conflicts about naval live-fire ranges elsewhere in the Pacific and Caribbean, 
for the Kaho‘olawe controversy had trans-Pacific and transnational ramifi-
cations.
 Moving to the United States’ Pacific Coast, Chapter  examines explosive 
growth in the Seattle region and the San Francisco Bay area, especially Sili-
con Valley. High-technology developments have often been seen as “green,” 
having minimal environmental downsides. However, events on America’s 
Pacific Coast, my study shows, belie this easy assumption. As in the Hawai-
ian Islands, specific land-use and water-use matters intersected with more 
nebulous quality-of-life concerns to generate policy controversies in north-
ern California and the Puget Sound region. Environmental-justice matters 
surfaced, as immigrant workers, often Hispanic and Asian women, suffered. 
Then, too, Native Americans were hurt by high-technology developments, 
particularly in the Seattle region. Chapter  also compares efforts to create 
high-technology districts in the San Francisco Bay area and Seattle to at-
tempts to construct them in South Korea and the Hawaiian Islands.
 Chapter  looks at economic development and environmentalism in 
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Alaska through the lens of changes occurring along the Aleutian Islands. 
Because their state remained particularly dependent on extractive resources, 
Alaskans faced controversies that revolved mainly around how those re-
sources should be exploited and who should benefit from that exploitation. 
In the Aleutians, heated conflicts pitted groups of fishermen against each 
other, and fishermen against oil prospectors. Still, even in Alaska general 
quality-of-life matters were of significance, as revealed in efforts to create the 
Beringia Heritage International Park. Until recently, Alaskan Natives found 
themselves pushed aside in efforts to develop Alaska’s resources, including 
parks used for tourism, much as happened to native Hawaiians in the rush 
to develop their islands.
 From Alaska, my study moves southwest. Chapter  examines develop-
ments in Hiroshima after its destruction by the atomic bomb in , looking 
at why residents chose a new type of future for their city and how they im-
plemented their wishes. Americans were very influential in Japan for about 
a decade after World War II, and their ideas helped to reshape Hiroshima. 
Hiroshima’s residents tried to combine urban-planning concepts, includ-
ing environmental protection measures, with economic development. How 
they resolved conflicting goals resonates with urban developments in the 
The Pacific, one-third of the globe.
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San Francisco Bay and Seattle regions. In the resolution of their conflicts, 
Hiroshima’s citizens generally ignored the wishes of minority groups, again 
raising environmental justice concerns. Chapter  also investigates efforts to 
recreate Hiroshima as a high-technology city in the s, attempts inspired 
by the perceived success of Silicon Valley. Finally, the chapter describes post-
war planning efforts on Okinawa, where American influences were particu-
larly strong, and compares them to those in Hiroshima. 
 Chapter  examines developments in Guam, particularly issues raised 
by the growth of tourism and the use of Guam for military purposes. Spe-
cific questions arose about where to place a new ammunition dock for the 
U.S. Navy, how to construct a national park to commemorate the Pacific 
campaigns of World War II, where to locate a national seashore, and how 
to deal with the brown tree snake, an alien species accidentally introduced 
by the American military. Questions on these matters intersected with con-
cerns about what kinds of lives the residents of Guam, including Chamor-
ros, wanted to have and the roles the American government might play in 
turning those desires into reality. Chapter  also compares what occurred on 
Guam to developments in the Philippines to the west and American Samoa 
to the south.
 Common themes permeate my work. The study’s chapters focus on 
twentieth-century developments, especially on economic and environmen-
tal choices made since . As historian John McNeill has shown in his 
remarkable global environmental history, the pace of change greatly accel-
erated in the twentieth century, making that time period “something new 
under the sun.”¹⁸ Change was certainly the case for the Pacific possessions of 
the United States. The chapters of my study look at varied areas of the Pacific 
in an attempt to see whether there has been something unique to economic 
and environmental developments in this region. All examine American ter-
ritories or American-dominated regions in the Pacific. Even Japan was such 
an area between  and , and Okinawa for an additional two decades. 
The chapters probe relationships among American military desires, eco-
nomic development, environmental issues, and peoples’ rights, the last espe-
cially as defined by indigenous groups. The areas dealt with in this volume 
were chosen to represent the many aspects of America’s postwar presence 
in the Pacific: in urban and rural regions, parts of the eastern and western 
Pacific, near-tropical to near-arctic areas, and mainland and island regions. 
Still, this work does not examine all of the many places in America’s Pacific 
in detail, probably omitting as much as it includes. The book is not meant to 
be fully inclusive. Indeed, it is my hope that this work will stimulate future 
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research about the United States’ developmental and environmental impacts 
on Pacific areas. More generally, I also hope that my study will encourage 
research into the interactions between economic development and environ-
mental protection issues globally, for many of the changes occurring in the 
Pacific have, of course, been taking place elsewhere in the world. Throughout, 
my work differentiates among local, regional (that is, pan-Pacific), and global 
developments.
 To foreshadow my arguments a bit, let me close this introduction with 
a listing of my study’s major findings. First, the Pacific, at least American 
territories in the Pacific, may be considered as composing one major region, 
especially in modern times. Second, within this region World War II and the 
Cold War acted as major catalysts for changes, but those alterations occurred 
within the long scope of earlier regional developments. Third, many of the 
changes resulted from the reactions of local residents, including indigenous 
peoples, against western political and economic colonialism and, more spe-
cifically, against America’s massive postwar military presence in the Pacific. 
Fourth, the state was often the arena within which actions were worked out. 
Politics and governmental policies mattered.
 We begin our voyage by examining in Chapter  the development of 
the Pacific from pre-contact times to the present. Several themes stand out 
in this investigation: first, that large parts of the Pacific have long contained 
elements of integration; but, second, that since World War II the degree of 
integration has increased; and, third, that even now that integration is in-
complete. It is essential to look at the degrees and types of integration in 
various time periods, because it was these connections that formed the plat-
forms on which people made decisions about economic development and 
environmental protection.


C HA P T E R  
Pacific Developments
 In , native Hawaiians and others sailed the Hōkūle‘a, a replica of a Polynesian twin-hulled voyaging canoe, using only traditional naviga-tional techniques, to and from Tahiti, two thousand miles in each direc-
tion. In doing so, they demonstrated the feasibility of earlier large-scale mi-
grations by canoe throughout the Pacific. Equally important, their actions 
helped unite many indigenous Pacific peoples in a consciousness of their 
common heritage. Some fifteen thousand celebrants met the Hōkūle‘a when 
she entered Tahiti’s Pape‘ete harbor the first time. “Now you have returned,” 
observed one orator addressing the canoe’s crew members in a reference to 
the ancient Polynesian origins of Hawaiians. “The people of Polynesia have 
been overjoyed to hear of your voyage,” he concluded, “you are brothers.” On 
her return voyage to the Hawaiian Islands the Hōkūle‘a carried represen-
tatives from New Zealand, Samoa, Tahiti, Tonga, and the Marquesas. After 
another roundtrip between Hawai‘i and Tahiti in , those in charge of the 
Hōkūle‘a undertook a still longer trip, which they labeled a “voyage of redis-
covery.” In the mid-s, the Hōkūle‘a traversed twelve thousand miles of 
the Pacific, bridging seven archipelagos from the Hawaiian Islands to Tahiti, 
Tonga, and New Zealand. The Hōkūle‘a set sail from the fishing village of 
Miloli‘i on the southwestern coast of the island of Hawai‘i on January , 
, and returned to Kualoa, a sandy point on O‘ahu, over two years later 
on May , .¹
 Hawaiians were not alone in their movements through the Pacific. In 
, far to the north, Russian and American officials permitted Alaskan 
Natives to pay ceremonial visits to their counterparts across the Bering Sea 
in the Chukotka region, where they were, according to reporters, “welcomed 
enthusiastically by hundreds of Soviet adults and school children.” Their 
trip was part of a movement toward visa-free visits by Russian and Alaskan 
Natives across national boundaries.² Since World War II, there has been an 
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increasing integration—perhaps “reintegration” is a more accurate term—of 
the Pacific, in part through the migration of people.³
 Integration has taken other important forms as well: economic integra-
tion, especially through trade; social and cultural integration, encouraged 
among other means by the expansion of tourism; and growth in unity among 
Pacific peoples as they threw off what they viewed as the repressive yoke of 
western colonialism. Overarching much of the integration was the new and 
immense military and economic power of the United States in the Pacific. 
That strength was both a legacy of the increased presence of the United States 
in the Pacific during World War II and a result of recognition on the part of 
American officials of the importance of the Pacific for the Cold War. Ameri-
ca’s growing Pacific presence must, in fact, be seen as part of the development 
of a cold war with the Soviet Union (which, like the United States, greatly 
increased its Pacific military forces after World War II) and the People’s Re-
public of China, with the vast region of the Pacific caught between the Great 
Powers.
 While focusing on the post–World War II development of the Pacific as 
an “American lake,” this chapter begins by examining earlier developments. 
Before contact with westerners, many Pacific peoples lived in oceanic asso-
The voyages of the Hōkūle‘a helped reunite parts of the Pacific. Here the Hōkūle‘a sails off Hono-
lulu in 1995. (Courtesy of the Polynesian Voyaging Society)
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ciations and empires. To some extent, they inhabited in an integrated Pacific. 
Colonization of the Pacific by western nations, including the United States, 
disrupted native associations by dividing the Pacific into European territo-
rial possessions. Only later, with changes wrought by World War II, the Cold 
War, and other developments, did reintegration occur. The long history of 
the Pacific played important roles in influencing how people regarded eco-
nomic development matters and environmental protection issues and how 
they fought and cooperated with each other to make their visions realities.
Early Indigenous Integration and Later Colonial Disintegration
The Pacific Ocean is the largest geographical feature on Earth, covering one-
third of the globe, host to more than twenty thousand islands,  percent of 
the world’s total. It is a “water continent.” With each square mile of land come 
 square miles of ocean.⁴ Scholars have emphasized the importance of the 
Pacific Ocean and its peoples to world history for at least a generation now. 
They have stressed how long-term trends have affected recent developments 
and have highlighted that those developments need to be seen through non-
western eyes. Geographer Gerard Ward expressed the views of many schol-
ars when he observed in  that, while the Pacific seemed empty to most 
Europeans, it was anything but vacant for the people living there at the time 
of contact, “They were skilled navigators for whom the Pacific was neither 
trackless nor empty.”⁵ Writing in , anthropologist Ben Finney, who had 
spearheaded work on the Hōkūle‘a, called on scholars to focus on more than 
just the rim of the Pacific by looking at interactions among peoples of the 
islands and relationships between island peoples and those living beyond 
the islands.⁶
 Scholars examining the Pacific have been keenly aware of difficulties in 
considering the Pacific as one region. After observing in  that the Pacific 
is “a hard place to identify with—so much ocean, too many islands,” Greg 
Dening stated that he would have “fewer qualms about the term ‘Pacific his-
tory’ if by it we meant history in the Pacific rather than history of the Pacific, 
and if by history in the Pacific we were much more tolerant of all the vari-
eties of histories there are.”⁷ Similarly, Arif Dirlik has stressed the diversity 
of cultures in the Pacific. After rejecting such conceptions as the Pacific Rim 
and the Pacific Basin because they leave out the Pacific Ocean and most of its 
islands, he has claimed that the “Pacific region is an idea,” with political and 
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economic structures coming from both Asia and America.⁸ Jocelyn Linnekin 
has also observed that “Clearly there can be no single, seamless history of the 
many peoples who inhabit the Pacific Islands.”⁹
 Increasingly, however, scholars have seen the Pacific Ocean as a com-
prehensive region, in much the same ways that they have viewed the Medi-
terranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Atlantic Ocean. As early as , 
Kerry R. Howe, the editor of Pacific Studies, urged scholars to look at “the 
Pacific islands within the much wider geographic, economic, and political 
framework of the Pacific Ocean involving, as it must, its adjacent shores—the 
Americas, Russia, Japan, Korea, China, Southeast Asia, and Australasia.” Such 
would be, he observed, “an Oceanic as opposed to insular orientation.”¹⁰ In 
, Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giraldez, the editors of a book series on 
the Pacific World, stated that their premise was “that the Pacific represents as 
coherent a unit of analysis as the Atlantic Ocean, the Indian Ocean, and the 
many seas throughout the world.”¹¹ Typical of the scholars taking broad ap-
proaches to the Pacific have been historians Paul D’Arcy and John McNeill. 
Their recent works have contributed greatly to reconceptualizations of the 
Pacific.
 D’Arcy has been a leader in showing that the Pacific was “no empty quar-
ter” before the entrance of the first Europeans. People probably moved, he 
has noted, into “the western margins of Oceania . . . around , years ago,” 
when ocean levels were low because water was locked up in glaciers and ice 
sheets in this cool time. People may have also crossed into North America 
via a land bridge across the Bering Strait called Beringia. Warm tempera-
tures brought oceans to near their current levels about ten thousand years 
ago, by which time “human settlement had spread to Australia, New Guinea, 
and some of New Guinea’s more accessible offshore neighboring islands in 
Island Melanesia.” The rest of Oceania, D’Arcy has observed, “seems to have 
been colonized in a ,-year period beginning around , years ago by 
what appears to have been a relatively coherent culture that is associated with 
the distribution of the Austronesian family of languages, a highly developed 
maritime culture based on outrigger sailing canoes, and a distinct style of 
pottery known as lapita ware.”¹²
 D’Arcy has cogently argued that the “seas of Oceania were bridges rather 
than barriers” and that “mobility was integral to the yearly cycle for most 
Oceanic communities.” The Tongan scholar Epeli Hau‘ofa made much the 
same point when he observed in  that “Oceania denotes a sea of islands 
with their inhabitants.” Further, he noted, “The world of our ancestors was a 
large sea full of places to explore, to make their homes in, to breed generations 
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of seafarers like themselves.” Associations, even empires, held together by 
long-distance canoe voyaging, partially integrated large sections of Oceania 
before contact with Europeans. “The Pacific world was not one of isolated 
island worlds that were suddenly opened up by the arrival of European and 
American explorers and traders,” D’Arcy has concluded.¹³
 While voyaging never completely died out in Oceania, it decreased 
with the acquisition of much of the region by European powers, especially 
in the nineteenth century. It may have been in some decline even earlier, 
as local societies matured and less in the way of voyaging was needed be-
tween them. Colonial prohibitions on long-distance travel and European 
control of the islands further broke up much of the earlier native integration 
of Oceania. Only much later, from the s on, was long-distance canoe 
voyaging partially reestablished. With that reestablishment came some sense 
of unity among indigenous peoples of the Pacific. A peak was reached in 
, when a Pacific Festival of the Arts was held in Rarotonga, with sail-
ing canoes converging on the island from throughout Oceania to celebrate 
canoe voyaging.¹⁴
 Like D’Arcy, McNeill has looked at relationships among people, flora 
and fauna, and environmental changes. In a seminal article published in 
, McNeill observed, “The pattern of environmental history of the Pacific 
Islands exhibits eras of calm interrupted by spurts of torrential change,” with 
the pace of change “governed primarily by spurts and lulls in human trans-
port and communication throughout the ocean.” For McNeill, the important 
stages in settlement and development were “the ages of the outrigger, the 
sailing ship, and the steamship.” He has emphasized the instability of island 
environments and the “transforming power of intrusive species, including 
Homo sapiens.” He has stressed that “Isolation over millions of years caused 
Pacific ecosystems to become labile, that is, prone to sudden change.” People 
moving into Oceania, perhaps especially Polynesians, “significantly changed 
the fauna of the islands they settled” by hunting birds and animals to extinc-
tion and by introducing new species. Similarly, their cultivation, which in-
cluded the use of fire to clear lands, greatly altered the flora of the islands, as 
did the importation of chickens, pigs, dogs, and rats. “Some people,” McNeill 
has noted, “fondly maintain that islanders lived in harmony with their envi-
ronments,” but he has concluded that “the weight of the evidence suggests 
that this is romantic exaggeration.” In fact, he has further observed, “Pacific 
islanders, wherever they were numerous, strongly shaped their environ-
ments and frequently degraded them,” for “they were people not ecological 
angels.”¹⁵
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 The coming of westerners to the Pacific further altered environments, 
especially after Captain James Cook entered the region for a decade of ex-
ploration in . The Spanish were the first westerners to reach the Pacific, 
hailing land at Guam in , but they had relatively little impact initially. 
Spanish galleons traveled back and forth between Acapulco on the west coast 
of New Spain and Manila in the Philippines from  to  without stop-
ping elsewhere except at Guam. Captain Cook and those Europeans who fol-
lowed him caused more extensive alterations.¹⁶ “The s were to the Pacific 
what the s were to Atlantic America,” McNeill has written. “Europeans 
brought to the Pacific a new portmanteau biota, and new economic prin-
ciples and possibilities, all of which eventually combined to disrupt biotic 
communities, not the least human ones.” Following exploration, Europeans 
and Americans moved into the Pacific to exploit its natural resources, which 
they treated in an extractive, nonrenewable manner: sandalwood, sea slugs, 
fur-bearing animals such as sea otters and seals, and whales. Meanwhile, dis-
eases unintentionally carried by westerners decimated indigenous popula-
tions of Pacific islands. The initial death rate was often – percent.¹⁷
 European colonization followed hard on the heels of exploration. His-
torian Steven Fischer has aptly summarized the situation: “Britain assumed 
control of most of the southwestern Pacific, France dominated most of 
Eastern Polynesia, while Germany extended its authority over most of the 
equatorial and northern regions of the Western Pacific.” Australia came to 
exercise control over New Guinea and Nauru, and during World War I New 
Zealand took over control of German Samoa, which became Western Samoa. 
Many motives enticed Europeans into colonization. Trade in some items led 
to the acquisition of land for plantations to produce cotton, sugarcane, and 
coconuts for coconut oil. Worldwide imperial rivalries played important 
roles, especially after Germany emerged as a united nation in . Then, too, 
Pacific islands were sought as coaling stations for naval ships and as stations 
for communications cables.¹⁸
 The division of the Pacific into European empires shattered, or at least 
greatly eroded, earlier ties among indigenous peoples. Only Tonga and the 
Kingdom of Hawai‘i remained independent in the late nineteenth century, 
and Hawai‘i’s days were numbered. Hau‘ofa has been most eloquent on this 
point, observing, “Nineteenth-century imperialism erected boundaries that 
led to the contraction of Oceania, transforming a once boundless world into 
the Pacific Island states and territories we know today.” As a result, “People 
were confined to their tiny spaces, isolated from each other. . . . No longer 
could they travel freely to do what they had done for centuries.” Instead, 
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“They were cut off from their relatives abroad, from their far-flung sources 
of wealth and cultural enrichment.”¹⁹
 Nor were these changes limited to Oceania, as the arrival of Euro-Ameri-
cans led to major alterations throughout the Pacific. Inspired by notions of 
Manifest Destiny and economic gain, Americans crossed the North Ameri-
can continent, displacing Mexicans in California. The Gold Rush brought 
hundreds of thousands of newcomers to California. In , California’s 
population, exclusive of Native Americans, was about ,. By , that 
population had exploded to roughly ,, and by  it stood at ,. 
The world rushed into California, as historian J. S. Holliday has written; and 
California became a state of the Union in . Disease, small wars of ex-
termination, and other factors decimated the Native-American population. 
There were about , Native Americans in California in , but a scant 
, remained in , and just , in . Early San Francisco be-
came an American town and soon a city. It already had close to , 
inhabitants by  and , by .²⁰
 Much the same story was played out farther north. Americans pushed 
aside the British in the Pacific Northwest. Retired British and American fur 
trappers had jointly occupied the Oregon country for decades, but the move-
ment of American farmers overland to Oregon tipped the balance in favor 
of the United States, and the nation acquired the Oregon Territory in . 
Founded in , Portland had , residents by  and , in . 
Seattle was founded in  and boasted , inhabitants by ; twenty 
years later it had ,.²¹ Still farther north, Russians moving eastward 
across their nation’s frontier of Siberia in the s and s crossed the 
Bering Sea into the Aleutian Islands and southwest Alaska. (They also moved 
southward into Japan’s northern islands.) Their hold on Alaska was, how-
ever, always tenuous, and the United States acquired the region in . With 
the discovery of gold in parts of Alaska in the mid-s, the non-native 
population of the territory rose from  in  to about , in . 
Conversely, the number of Alaskan Natives dropped from , in  to 
, in .²²
 Americans also moved beyond the North American continent into the 
Pacific, taking their cultural baggage and economic ideas with them. As a 
consequence of its victory in the Spanish-American War, the United States 
acquired Guam and control over the Philippines in . The Hawaiian 
Islands became American in the same year and were organized as a terri-
tory in . Even earlier, Americans had forced open trade with Japan. In 
the mid-s, ships of the U.S. Navy steamed into Tokyo Bay to end Japan’s 
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isolation from most western nations. As Japan successfully modernized in 
succeeding decades, it became as imperialistic as the United States and the 
nations of western Europe, taking much of Micronesia from Germany dur-
ing and after World War I and integrating those islands into its growing em-
pire in the s and s. With its defeat in World War II, however, Japan 
forfeited those islands to the United States, whose officials were active in 
their postwar reconstruction. Americans also took part in significant ways 
in the rebuilding of Japan’s home islands.²³
 Americans thus played important roles in Pacific developments well be-
fore World War II, to the extent that some historians have considered the 
Pacific to have been a maritime frontier for Americans. American ships 
carried New England trade goods to the Pacific Northwest and Russian 
Alaska, where they were exchanged for furs, especially sea otter pelts. From 
Alaska, those ships sailed to the Hawaiian Islands to pick up sandalwood, 
which they then took, along with the furs, to China. The traders in turn 
carried Chinese tea, porcelain products, and other goods back to Philadel-
phia, Boston, and New York. By the early s, about  percent of the fur-
nishings of Philadelphian houses came from China. Slightly later, American 
whalers hunted in Alaskan waters, periodically putting into the Hawaiian 
Islands to refit. In the s and s, hundreds of the whaling ships win-
tered in Hawaiian ports. This trade lasted into the s, when petroleum 
products replaced whale oil in many uses, especially lighting.²⁴
American Reintegration after 
Although Americans had long been involved in the Pacific, their engage-
ment with the region increased during and after World War II. The American 
presence provided much of the impetus for regional economic growth and 
reintegration. Throughout much of the Pacific, trade and economic develop-
ment came to revolve around American actions. Increased economic activity 
brought higher standards of living to many people in the Pacific. However, 
just as globalization has had many critics, so has development sponsored 
by the United States in the Pacific. America’s military activities at times also 
seemed overwhelming. Most Pacific peoples were glad to be rid of Japanese 
militarism and thanked Americans for that. However, by the s memories 
of World War II had begun to fade, and opinions about the American mili-
tary’s impacts on the Pacific to change. Despite positive contributions made 
by the military to economic development in some areas, a growing number 
 Pacific Developments 
of local residents came to resent the American presence. Groups arose to 
oppose, for example, nuclear and thermonuclear testing in Micronesia and 
the Aleutian Islands, leading to the formation of transnational antinuclear 
movements, themselves integrating forces in the Pacific.²⁵
 In summarizing the impact of World War II on Pacific Islanders, his-
torian Stewart Firth observed, “The outside world—above all the American 
military machine—came to the Pacific in prodigious proportions, dwarfing 
anything that had ever come before.” In its impact on the Pacific, World War 
II resembled the importance of the Gold Rush to California. Echoing Firth 
and other scholars, Fischer concluded of Oceania, “Nothing in the region 
would ever be the same again.”²⁶ Much the same can be said for the other 
areas: Japan, certainly, but also the Hawaiian Islands, the Philippines, Guam, 
Alaska, and America’s Pacific Coast. World War II was a major watershed in 
the history of the Pacific. Changes were occurring well before the conflict, 
but the war altered economic and social systems in ways that changed how 
people thought about and sought to deal with issues of economic develop-
ment and environmental protection. For instance, the perceived abundance 
brought to Oceania by Americans stimulated a desire for more material 
goods on the part of Pacific Islanders, many of whom had worked as laborers 
for the American armed forces or served in the armed forces. This demand in 
turn affected how Pacific Islanders viewed plans for economic development 
in their homelands.
 One important change in the Pacific was the breakup of European colo-
nies, just as also occurred in Asia and Africa. In , Western Samoa became 
the first Pacific Island nation to reestablish its independence, and within a 
generation most of the territories held by Great Britain, New Zealand, and 
Australia had followed suit. Pacific areas under American trusteeship, mainly 
in Micronesia, gradually achieved more self-rule and, in some cases, inde-
pendence. The Hawaiian Islands and Alaska became states in , though 
heavy economic dependence on the mainland continued long after that time. 
Military connections increased with the Cold War. American rule of Japan 
ended in , when that nation regained full independence, but collective 
security agreements and economic ties between the United States, Japan, and 
South Korea tightened. The situation was different in the areas controlled by 
France. Generally viewing their Pacific Islands as part of greater France, not 
as areas slated for independence, French politicians increased central con-
trol over them, yielding ground to local advocates of self-determination only 
very grudgingly.²⁷
 While the end of World War II heralded the beginning, or in some cases 
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the resumption, of independence movements in the Pacific, it also vastly in-
creased the presence of the United States in the region. Cold War concerns 
boosted American interest. The victory of communists in China in  
especially shocked many Americans, and the Korean War of the early s 
drove home the point that the Pacific was of tremendous strategic value. As 
part of their containment policy enunciated in the late s, American poli-
ticians looked anew at military and diplomatic issues in the Pacific. President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower told his advisers in mid- that one of their main 
goals should be “to keep the Pacific as an American lake.”²⁸ Accordingly, the 
United States built new military facilities or greatly expanded existing bases 
in Japan, South Korea, Alaska, Hawai‘i, the Philippines, and Guam. Clashes 
soon arose between local residents, especially indigenous peoples, and fed-
eral authorities over political, economic, and environmental matters.
 The United States used parts of the Pacific as test sites for nuclear and 
thermonuclear bombs. The nation conducted above-ground tests in Micro-
nesia between  and , most notably at the Bikini and Enewetok atolls. 
American atmospheric testing also took place on the Johnston Atoll, about 
eight hundred miles southwest of O‘ahu, and on Christmas Island, about the 
same distance to the southeast of O‘ahu, in . Beginning in , Ameri-
can testing went underground as the result of a treaty banning atmospheric 
tests signed with Great Britain and the Soviet Union, and shifted to Am-
chitka Island in the Aleutian Islands, where three below-ground tests were 
conducted between  and . Nor was the United States alone. Between 
 and , the United States, Great Britain, and France exploded more 
than  nuclear devices in the Pacific. This extensive testing, often carried 
out against the wishes of local residents, who in some cases were not warned 
beforehand of the tests, has led Firth to label the Pacific a “nuclear play-
ground” for western powers. Antinuclear sentiments often blended with 
more general antiwestern thoughts, as locals sought to oust the American 
military from their areas.²⁹
 America’s economic reach equaled its military extension into the Pacific. 
As historian Jean Heffer has observed, commercial exchanges between the 
United States and the Pacific region rose rapidly after World War II. Mea-
sured in current dollars, American imports from the Pacific soared from 
$. billion to $ billion between  and , and American exports to 
the Pacific increased from $. billion to $ billion during the same years. 
Texan ports and West Coast cities such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, and 
Seattle increased their share of America’s foreign trade from  percent to 
 percent during the s. “This accelerating trade in goods and services,” 
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Heffer has written, “transformed the Pacific into an economic zone no less 
vital to United States interests than the Atlantic.” In fact, by the mid-s 
the value of America’s trade with the Pacific exceeded that of its trade with 
Europe. In the early s, the Pacific received  percent of America’s exports 
and accounted for an even higher  percent of its imports.³⁰ The openness 
of the American market to goods from Pacific nations spurred economic de-
velopment in them, allowing those nations to pursue growth strategies based 
on developmental ideas other than ineffective import-substitution policies. 
 Not all regions of the Pacific shared equally in the economic growth 
fueled by American actions, however. Growth was uneven. Most of the in-
crease in trade occurred in the North Pacific—commerce between the 
United States, Japan, Southeast Asia, and the “four little dragons” of South 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. In –, those regions ac-
counted for  percent of the Pacific’s exports to and  percent of the im-
ports from the United States. Trade with Oceania was much lighter. The same 
was true of direct foreign investment by American firms in the Pacific: the 
lion’s share went to Central America, Japan, and Australia, with much less 
going to Oceania.³¹
 In part because of their legacy of colonialism and in part because of 
their failure to participate fully in trade with America, many of the smaller 
Pacific islands developed what have been described as MIRAB economies. 
These were (are) economies based on the MIgration of people away from 
the islands to New Zealand, Australia, and the United States, Remittances 
that those migrants sent home, and foreign Aid which sustained the growth 
of government Bureaucracies. In other words, many of the islands failed to 
develop truly self-sustaining economies and were kept afloat only by wages 
earned elsewhere and foreign aid.³² Their small sizes, lack of resources, and 
great distances from major markets hindered economic growth.³³ Guam, 
American Samoa, and even the Hawaiian Islands long showed signs of 
having MIRAB economies. Many native Hawaiians, Chamorros, and Ameri-
can Samoans migrated to mainland America, and governments in all three 
areas, buoyed by federal spending, were important parts of the economies.
 For parts of the Pacific, tourism seemed to offer pleasing prospects for 
economic growth at little environmental cost, as American and Japanese 
tourists flocked into the region seeking relaxation and imagined exotic so-
journs away from reality. Writing in , two economists observed, “It has 
now become a cliché to describe the Pacific as the world’s fastest growing re-
gion for international tourism.” Between  and , international tourist 
arrivals at Pacific Rim destinations rose from  million to  million, far 
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outpacing the overall growth in international world tourism arrivals, which 
increased from  million to  million, or the increase in tourism in any 
other single part of the globe. Tourism had become important for national 
economies in Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia, accounting for  per-
cent,  percent, and  percent respectively of the gross national products 
(GNPs) of nations in those regions.³⁴ By the s and s, tourism was 
quickly replacing military spending as the mainstay of the economies of 
Guam and the Hawaiian Islands, a circumstance that led residents in both 
regions to reassess the value of the military for their lives.
 Residents of the Pacific were soon wrestling with issues stemming from 
tourism similar to those with which people in the American West had grappled 
for several decades: how to create or preserve various sorts of socioeconomic 
systems; how to provide infrastructures for those systems; and how to en-
sure a desirable quality of life. Far from being cost-free and “green,” tourism, 
they found, imposed significant burdens on host nations and regions. Land-
use issues, water matters, and stress to an area’s infrastructure accompanied 
touristic developments in the Pacific. Tourism also raised questions about 
ethnic and national identities. As occurred worldwide, tourism often led to 
some homogenization of culture and identity throughout the Pacific, a trend 
that caused backlash against tourism and tourists in parts of the region, in-
cluding Guam and Hawai‘i, by local residents.³⁵ United Nations (UN) offi-
cials recognized that tourism did not offer easy answers to the economic 
challenges facing Pacific Island nations, especially small ones. A  UN 
report observed correctly that, “Unregulated tourism practices could have 
adverse consequences for the environment and, in turn, the tourism industry 
itself.” The report also noted that, “if not well planned and managed, tourism 
can increase gender disparities and cultural erosion” and that “much of the 
wealth from the tourism sector does not trickle down to the community 
level.”³⁶
 As they dealt with common economic issues, Pacific residents, like people 
throughout the world, worked through organizations, and these bodies con-
tributed to the reintegration of the Pacific. Tangential to the parts of the 
Pacific dealt with in this study, but still significant, was the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) formed by Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, 
the Philippines, and Singapore in . Set up originally as an anticommu-
nist organization, this body pursued an “ASEAN way” of consensual decision 
making, and membership broadened in the s and s. More impor-
tant in the early s, however, was the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
forum (APEC), which embraced most of the Pacific in what has been de-
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scribed as “an amorphous, unstructured grouping stretching over four conti-
nents.” Committed to trade liberalization, leaders of APEC encouraged com-
merce throughout the Pacific. By , APEC officials were also beginning to 
address joint security concerns, such as the development of nuclear weapons 
by North Korea.³⁷
 Organizations also dealt with economic issues of special concern for 
Oceania. Longest-lived was the South Pacific Commission, later renamed 
the Secretariat of the Pacific Community. Started in  by Great Britain, 
France, the United States, the Netherlands, Australia, and New Zealand, the 
secretariat eventually included twenty-two Pacific states and territories com-
mitted to social and economic development. The South Pacific Forum was, 
however, more representative of the newly independent nations of Oceania. 
Founded by sixteen nations in , it was based in Suva, Fiji, and was dedi-
cated to opposition to colonialism and neocolonialism in economic and po-
litical affairs. Its work was instrumental in the creation of the South Pacific 
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty signed by representatives of ten nations in . 
Still other organizations sought to deal with common environmental chal-
lenges, the South Pacific Action Committee for Human Environment and 
Ecology and the South Pacific Regional Environmental Programme, for ex-
ample.³⁸
 Migration has also bound together parts of the Pacific. As the editors of 
the definitive study have observed, “People of the islands—of Hawai‘i and 
Guam, Aotearoa [New Zealand] and Fiji, Kiribati and Papua New Guinea, 
and two dozen other island groups—have been moving from village to city, 
from island to island, and back and forth to the industrialized nations of 
the Pacific periphery, throughout the second half of the twentieth century.” 
While they have noted that this movement “is not an entirely new phenome-
non” because “Islanders have been moving around the Pacific for as long as 
memory recalls, for many hundreds of years,” they have concluded that “the 
velocity and impact of such movements have increased dramatically in re-
cent decades.”³⁹ This migration was part of an increase in the global move-
ment of people after World War II following stagnation in such movements 
in the s. As many nations, led by the United States in , eased barriers 
to some forms of immigration, people around the world, but especially from 
Asia and the Pacific, moved to the United States, Canada, and Australia in 
large numbers.⁴⁰
 Although the movement of temporary workers, refugees, and perma-
nent settlers rose globally after , it was probably most pronounced in 
parts of the Pacific. By the mid-s, about one-tenth of Pacific Islanders 
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lived outside of their home countries, searching for economic and social op-
portunities. Especially relevant for my study is the fact that by  about 
, people identifying themselves as Pacific Islanders lived in mainland 
America. American Samoans, Chamorros, and native Hawaiians moved in 
large numbers to the mainland. There were more Chamorros living on the 
mainland than on Guam, and about one-third of all native Hawaiians re-
sided on the mainland, especially in California and Nevada.⁴¹
 Whether or not this movement of people would eventually create a new 
pan-Pacific identity remained uncertain in the early s, but migrations 
had clearly led to cultural sharing.⁴² Two brief examples illustrate that trend. 
After the Second World War, native Hawaiians in the American armed forces 
introduced American-style football, with Hawaiian twists, as “barefoot foot-
ball” to Guam. On Guam, some Chamorros eagerly adopted the game and 
added their own variations. Football thus served as both an assimilative force 
and as means by which locals maintained their own identities.⁴³ Another 
example also involved interchanges between native Hawaiians and Cha-
morros. Native Hawaiians used the Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act () to preserve elements of their culture, blocking re-
sort developments where they might disrupt ancient burial sites. Inspired 
by native Hawaiian successes, some Chamorros employed the congressional 
legislation in a similar way.⁴⁴
 Flora and fauna, as well as people, have moved throughout the Pacific 
for thousands of years. People entering Micronesia, Melanesia, and Polynesia 
took plants and animals with them from Southeast Asia. Others brought in 
the sweet potato from South America. Polynesians, in turn, carried pigs, dogs, 
chickens, rats, and some thirty-two plant species to the Hawaiian Islands in 
their voyaging canoes. The pace of biotic change accelerated with the en-
trance of westerners. As early as , for example, westerners had intro-
duced  plant species to the Hawaiian Islands. Introduced species dramati-
cally altered environments, especially in the Hawaiian Islands, Guam, and 
Alaska, and those changes had ideological overtones for indigenous peoples, 
as they equated losses of their plants with erosions in their cultures.⁴⁵
 Despite all the changes that have taken place since World War II, it would 
be wrong to overemphasize the integration of the Pacific. Caveats are in 
order. Oceania, for example, remains an identifiable subregion of the Pacific, 
with much of its own distinct history and present-day concerns. In the North 
Pacific differences based on nationalities linger. Anger over Japanese mili-
tarists’ actions in World War II, for instance, have hindered the development 
of a regional trading bloc there, as divisions and disagreements between 
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China and Japan have remained pronounced. Historian Roger Buckley has 
correctly observed that “it remains highly problematic to envisage an Asia-
Pacific region of genuine cooperation and mutual respect for all members, 
whether large or small.” He has concluded that “The creation of a common 
future would require decades of diplomacy among rival states that to date 
have found it immensely difficult to work together.”⁴⁶
Conclusions
Historian John McNeill accurately pointed out in  that “As yet there is 
no field of Pacific environmental history” though there is “a sizable scholarly 
literature devoted to environmental histories of various parts of the Pacific 
basin.” McNeill then went further than other scholars in discerning com-
monalities in environmental developments throughout the Pacific and in 
suggesting avenues for future research. He highlighted “threads that bind 
most if not all of the Pacific together,” ranging from natural ones, such as 
geological instability and the El Niño influence, to cultural connections and 
economic ties. He stressed the fragility of much of the Pacific and “the thread 
of biological change” as having “bound the shores of the Pacific together.”⁴⁷ 
Other scholars have identified environmental issues of particular importance 
for Pacific peoples. They have often cited global warming as a special con-
cern for several reasons: that rising ocean waters threaten low-lying islands 
with inundation; that salt water may infiltrate freshwater lenses under the 
islands, ruining the water supplies needed for human consumption and agri-
culture; and that weather patterns may be growing unstable.⁴⁸ Researchers 
for the UN have recently also recognized the great vulnerability of much of 
the Pacific to environmental changes.⁴⁹
 Informed by these analyses, my study looks at how people in Ameri-
ca’s Pacific possessions have tried to balance economic development issues 
with environmental concerns, how residents and nonresidents have sought 
to shape their lives in an ever-changing region of the world, and what the 
results have been. In doing so, my work differentiates Pacific from global 
issues. Of course, global and Pacific matters have often overlapped. Rising 
sea levels threaten islands in the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean Sea as well 
as in the Pacific. The rights of indigenous peoples, especially their right to 
preserve traditional relationships to their environments, extend far beyond 
the Pacific. Economic integration is a global as well as a Pacific issue. Still, 
many matters have had distinct Pacific meanings. The American military and 
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economic integration of the Pacific, in particular, has formed bedrock upon 
which economic development and environmental protection conflicts have 
been resolved.
 Let us begin our voyage with the Hawaiian Islands at the center of the 
Pacific. The next chapter examines developments on the island of Kaho‘olawe, 
one of the eight major islands in the Hawaiian archipelago. Here many of 
the issues running through deliberations about developmental matters were 
dramatically worked out in the s, s, and s. Environmentally de-
graded by western ranching before World War II, Kaho‘olawe was further 
damaged by its use by the U.S. Navy as a shelling and bombing range during 
and after the conflict. As native Hawaiians and others came to oppose the 
continued use of Kaho‘olawe as a live-fire range, they raised issues that re-
verberated across the Pacific.

C HA P T E R  
The Hawaiian Islands
The “Healing” of Kaho‘olawe
 In the late s and early s, American fighter-bombers training for the Vietnam War repeatedly swept down on targets placed on Kaho‘olawe, the smallest of the eight major islands of the Hawaiian archipelago and 
the only one then being used as a live-fire range. Between  and , the 
warplanes dropped , tons of bombs on Kaho‘olawe, and in the latter 
year alone they bombarded the island for  days, solidifying its reputation 
as “the most bombed island in the Pacific.” The American military had used 
Kaho‘olawe as a target range since the s, and even earlier, goats, sheep, 
cattle, and horses introduced by westerners had overgrazed the island, de-
grading its environment. The ground was severely eroded, and with much of 
its original vegetation gone Kaho‘olawe became home to alien plant species. 
Unexploded bombs made traveling on the island dangerous and fishing in 
nearby waters unsafe. Sediment from runoffs killed nearshore reefs.¹
 Beginning in the s, ranchers, environmentalists, native Hawaiians, 
and politicians throughout the Hawaiian Islands sought to return Kaho‘olawe 
to environmental circumstances before western contact. For native Hawai-
ians, restoration involved cultural renewal. George Helm, a major native 
Hawaiian leader, claimed that it was his “moral responsibility to attempt 
an ending to this desecration of our sacred aina [land] . . . for each bomb 
dropped adds further injury to an already wounded soul.” “What is national 
defense,” he wondered, “when what is being destroyed is the very thing the 
military is entrusted to defend, the sacred land of (Hawaii) America?” Simi-
larly, Dr. Noa Emmet Aluli, another important native Hawaiian leader, ob-
served: “The work to heal the island will heal the soul of our people. Each 
time we pick up a stone to restore a cultural site on the island, we pick up 
ourselves, as Hawaiians.” As native Hawaiians rediscovered their culture, the 
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restoration of Kaho‘olawe along Hawaiian lines became a burning topic for 
them, a major catalyst for a native Hawaiian renaissance.²
 This chapter looks at how disparate issues fused in the movement to 
halt the environmental degradation of Kaho‘olawe. It begins by discussing 
the environmental changes that ranching and military usage brought to 
Kaho‘olawe and then investigates how and why some Hawaiian residents 
began to oppose those alterations. Not particularly concerned initially with 
native Hawaiian rights, ranchers, environmentalists, and local politicians 
mounted the first challenges for reasons ranging from their dislike of federal 
government authority, to their desire to use Kaho‘olawe as a park, to their 
hope that the island could be preserved as a pristine counterpart to touristic 
development taking place on the nearby island of Maui. In the mid-s, 
native Hawaiians became the most important group advocating change in 
the status of Kaho‘olawe. For native Hawaiians, restoring the island physi-
cally and using it as a site for cultural renewal went hand in hand. Ultimately, 
they secured the removal of Kaho‘olawe from American military control and 
its restoration to the State of Hawai‘i, with the state pledged to give the island 
to them when they established their own sovereign nation. How they suc-
ceeded in convincing other Hawaiian residents to support their goals is an 
informative story of intergroup dynamics. The chapter closes by comparing 
developments with regard to the Hawaiian Islands to those surrounding the 
navy’s live-fire operations in Micronesia and the Caribbean.
 In their movement to recover Kaho‘olawe, native Hawaiians created a 
distinctive postcolonial variant of the United States’ environmental justice 
campaign. Viewing the United States as a colonizing power, they hoped to 
rid the island of its influence, especially that of the U.S. Navy. The attempt to 
restore Kaho‘olawe resembled in some ways the work of residents of urban 
areas in the United States, often poor people of color, to keep their neighbor-
hoods from being used as sites for landfills, sewage stations, electric power 
plants, and the like. However, far from being an urban area, Kaho‘olawe was 
an unpopulated rural island, and efforts to end its use for bombing and begin 
its restoration show the working out of cleavages, as well as cooperation, 
within the ranks of environmentalists, native groups, politicians, and the 
general public.
 At its heart, the success of native Hawaiians rested on a blend of culture, 
politics, and public policy—a combination of rediscovered native symbols, 
direct action, and astute use of courts. Native Hawaiians could succeed be-
cause federal law devolved some aspects of environmental management to 
locals, with lawsuits a major mode of management. While local in their ori-
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gins, environmental actions to restore Kaho‘olawe were nonetheless transna-
tional in their implications. Many native Hawaiians came to see their labors 
as part of a wide movement to remove colonial controls over the lives of 
Pacific Islanders, and some native Hawaiians played active roles in antimili-
tary movements throughout the Pacific. They engaged in pan-Pacific orga-
nizing, contributing to the region’s reintegration.
Traditional Hawaiian Life and Western Ranching
The smallest and southernmost of the four islands of Maui County, 
Kaho‘olawe lies seven miles off Mākena on southwest Maui and sixteen 
miles from Lānā‘i. About eleven miles long and seven miles wide, Kaho‘olawe 
covers , acres. Pu‘u Moa‘ulanui, the island’s highest point, rises to , 
feet, with smaller hills dotting the island. Kaho‘olawe’s southern and eastern 
shores rise dramatically from the ocean, forming steep cliffs. The northern 
and western shores slope more gradually and contain small sand beaches. 
Surrounded by the ocean channels, Kaho‘olawe is often difficult to approach 
from the sea due to winds and strong currents that frequently produce rough 
water. Northeastern trade winds blow for part of the year, exacerbating wind 
erosion on the eastern side and crest of Kaho‘olawe. Erosion caused by over-
grazing and bombing had removed six feet of topsoil from Kaho‘olawe by the 
s. Lying in Maui’s rain shadow, Kaho‘olawe is arid, with rainfall generally 
limited to showers occurring during periods of southerly winds. Rainfall 
varies from about ten inches annually on the west coast to twenty-five inches 
at the summit. All of the streams on the island are intermittent. A –
 study estimated that – thousand gallons of water could be col-
lected from rainfall annually, if catchment basins and storage systems were 
built. The study also concluded that groundwater impounded in a thirteen-
square-mile aquifer might be tapped to supply an additional  thousand 
gallons per year.³
 In pre-contact times, before Captain James Cook “discovered” the Hawai-
ian Islands in , Kaho‘olawe supported a semipermanent population. 
“Traditional habitation sites” developed on Kaho‘olawe, according to a de-
finitive report, “wherever potable water and/or food sources were available.” 
The earliest archaeological sites date to A.D. –, and as many as  
people lived on Kaho‘olawe as late as . In the late s and early s, 
wars to unify the Hawaiian Islands by Kamehameha I combined with dis-
eases unintentionally introduced by westerners to decimate the population 
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of Kaho‘olawe, which fell to about  by .⁴ Traditional life on Kaho‘olawe 
revolved around fishing and, to a lesser extent, farming. Both offshore and 
near-shore fishing grounds were rich, with Hawaiians practicing long-line 
and net fishing in the former and net and pole fishing in the latter environ-
ments. Hawaiians gathered squid and limpets at the rocky shorelines. They 
also grew various vegetables, including sweet potatoes. However, the lack of 
reliable, year-round water sources precluded cultivating taro, the food staple 
throughout most of the Hawaiian Islands. Instead, residents of Kaho‘olawe 
traveled to Maui to exchange their fish for poi made from taro. Those on 
Kaho‘olawe usually suspended work during the rainy winter months to visit 
friends and relatives on other islands. Although arid compared to the other 
major islands of the Hawaiian archipelago, Kaho‘olawe supported fairly 
varied agriculture and vegetation. There may have been more rainfall on the 
island than in later times, for a “sky bridge” of moisture-bearing clouds often 
connected Maui’s high volcanic peak Haleakalā to the summit of Kaho‘olawe 
well into the nineteenth century.⁵
 Kaho‘olawe was important as a spiritual center and as a navigation 
marker. The island, scholars and native Hawaiian activists have noted, “was 
originally named Kohemālamalama O Kanaloa and just simply Kanaloa, 
after the Hawaiian and Polynesian god of the ocean currents and naviga-
tion. Kaho‘olawe is the sacred kino lau, body form of the god Kanaloa.” The 
island was, they observe, viewed as “one of the residences of Kamohoali‘i, 
the shark god brother of the volcano goddess Pele.” Thus, Kaho‘olawe was 
considered to be a wahi pana (sacred place) by ancient Hawaiians and is 
so considered by many native Hawaiians today. Creation myths reinforce 
the island’s significance as a wahi pana, for they tell of the island as being 
born of the union of Papa, earth mother, and Wakea, sky father. Hawaiians 
also thought of Kaho‘olawe as a pu‘uhonua (place of refuge). The only Pacific 
island named after a major Polynesian god, Kanaloa, the island was seen in a 
special light by Hawaiians. The name Kohemālamalama O Kanaloa, scholars 
and activists have maintained, “can also be interpreted as meaning the sacred 
refuge or pu‘uhonua of Kanaloa.” Moreover, Kaho‘olawe, they have pointed 
out, “figured significantly in the long voyages between Hawai‘i and Tahiti.” 
The island’s southern tip was a launching place and ceremonial area for such 
voyages. A strong southerly current runs through the Kealaikahiki Chan-
nel toward Tahiti and is still known locally as the “Tahiti Express.” The high 
central part of the island was the location of a traditional training school 
for navigators. Offering sweeping views of the Hawaiian Islands, the crest of 
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Kaho‘olawe housed a platform used as a navigational school and a dwelling 
for the kahuna (priests) who taught the students in navigation.⁶
 A letter from a visitor in , at the close of the period of traditional life 
on Kaho‘olawe, captured well what circumstances were like and suggested 
changes about to occur. William F. Allen, the Kingdom of Hawai‘i’s minister 
of foreign affairs and a person soon to be deeply involved in ranching on 
Kaho‘olawe, noted the existence of “good soil” on various parts of the island 
and observed that “the natives have some Sugar Cane growing; melons, pota-
toes, and pumpkins grow well here.” He found the men “engaged in fishing, 
which is very good there most of the year,” and thought the Hawaiians lived 
in three villages. Foretelling a different future for the island, he concluded 
that it could support twenty thousand sheep and reported that “the natives 
are anxious to remain here, and some of them are willing to be employed as 
shepherds.”⁷
 By this time, Kaho‘olawe’s physical environment had already begun to 
change.⁸ Significant ecological alterations were under way on the Hawaiian 
Islands in the late s and early s. Before the coming of the first people, 
there were about , species of plants, , species of insects, and seven 
species of land birds on the Hawaiian Islands. There was also one land mam-
mal, the Hawaiian bat, but no reptiles or amphibians. In their colonization 
of the Hawaiian Islands, Polynesians introduced thirty-two plant species, in-
cluding taro, sugarcane, bananas, breadfruit, and sweet potatoes, along with 
chickens, dogs, pigs, and rats. As they established plots for taro and other 
crops, and as their plants and animals competed with native species, Polyne-
sian settlers changed the biota of the Hawaiian Islands. The clearing of low-
land forests and more selective cutting in the uplands started to transform 
the composition of trees and plants on the islands. Some species of birds 
were driven into extinction, mainly large flightless ones, just as occurred 
with the coming of the Maori to New Zealand. In addition, new uses brought 
ecological alterations to Kaho‘olawe. During the s and s, the King-
dom of Hawai‘i, which was created through the efforts of Kamehameha I and 
his successors, used the island as a penal colony. Expected to be as self-suffi-
cient as possible, the prisoners planted gardens and altered the landscape in 
other ways. At the height of its use as a penal colony Kaho‘olawe possessed 
about eighty residents, but with the end of its use for that purpose only 
about seventeen remained. As Helm and other late-twentieth-century native 
Hawaiians believed, their ancestors lived close to the land on Kaho‘olawe, but 
in a very dynamic, not static, relationship.⁹
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 The pace of ecological change accelerated with the coming of western-
ers. Captain Cook’s men brought melons, onions, and pumpkins in , 
and Captain George Vancouver’s crew added oranges, lemons, almonds, and 
grapes fourteen years later. Westerners introduced  plant species, includ- 
ing  fruits and vegetables, to the Hawaiian Islands by . Altogether, 
westerners brought in about , species and varieties of plants by the s. 
Westerners also introduced animals very destructive of native plants, even 
before ranching began. Vancouver introduced the first goats to Kaho‘olawe 
in . As western sea captains did on many of the seemingly “unpopulated” 
Pacific islands, Vancouver dropped off the goats on Kaho‘olawe so that their 
progeny might be available as food sources for shipwrecked sailors. Or, ac-
cording to some accounts, he gave the goats to a Maui chief, who sent some 
of them to Kaho‘olawe. By whatever means they arrived, the goats multiplied 
and began causing trouble. As early as , they were damaging trees by 
chewing on their trunks. Sheep, cattle, and horses came a bit later, with at-
tempts to establish ranching on Kaho‘olawe.¹⁰
 Eager to raise funds for its operations, increasingly influenced by west-
erners, and not at the time overly concerned about the island’s cultural or 
spiritual importance, the Hawaiian government leased all of Kaho‘olawe to 
Robert Wyllie and Elisha Allen, the chief justice of the supreme court of 
the kingdom, in . By , about nine hundred head of cattle, twelve 
thousand sheep, and an unknown, but large, number of goats roamed the 
island. The destruction of vegetation through overgrazing and concomitant 
soil erosion were recognized as substantial problems by the late nineteenth 
century.¹¹
 A concerned territorial governor, Walter Frear, publicized the destruc-
tion. Close to United States Secretary of the Interior James Garfield and Di-
rector of the United States Reclamation Service F. H. Newell, Frear was im-
bued with Progressive-era notions of conservation. In talking to a women’s 
group in , Frear observed that “in Hawaii the relation between forest, 
streams and lands are [sic] closer than in most other countries.” Turning 
specifically to developments on Kaho‘olawe, he noted that “I saw more clearly 
than I had ever seen before the results of continued neglect and wastefulness 
in the use of forests.” The island, he continued, was “formerly covered with 
forest,” but now “for miles and miles the vegetation has been killed off and 
the soil simply blown away.”¹² Governor Frear signed a proclamation desig-
nating Kaho‘olawe a forest reserve in August .
 For the next eight years, Kaho‘olawe was one of a number of forest re-
serves in the Hawaiian Islands. Ranching was phased out, and about five 
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thousand goats and a number of sheep were removed or eradicated. Per-
haps five hundred to a thousand goats and sheep remained on Kaho‘olawe 
as the island’s forest-reserve period came to a close. Archaeological work 
began, under the auspices of the Bishop Museum. Reforestation efforts ac-
celerated in an attempt to stabilize the soil and halt erosion. There was also 
some hope that forests would bring back rains that had, by tradition, fallen 
from clouds connecting Maui to Kaho‘olawe (traditional chants called these 
na‘ulu rains). Kiawe, spineless cactus, ironwood trees, and candle and grape 
trees—all alien species—were used in this effort. Australian salt bushes were 
also introduced and spread widely. The use of alien species was a common 
response to forestry problems in the Hawaiian Islands and elsewhere at this 
time. For example, when a natural die-off killed , acres of forest in east 
Maui in the early s, governmental officials and business leaders refor-
ested the land with eucalyptus trees from Australia.¹³ In typical Progressive-
era fashion, the goal was not to preserve a pristine native forest, but to put 
the land to productive use to avoid waste.¹⁴
 The experiment of creating a forest reserve on Kaho‘olawe ended in . 
Strapped for funds—the federal government failed to deliver the expected 
sums—the territorial government decided to lease the island once again for 
private ranching. An investigation near the end of the forest-reserve era con-
cluded that ranching and conservation could coexist, that “under a carefully 
prepared lease of the island with due restrictions and limitations good use 
could be made of these [Kaho‘olawe’s grasslands] and at the same time goats 
could be required to be exterminated.”¹⁵ Conservation work would, it was 
hoped, continue in private hands. There was little doubt that such work was 
needed. Writing in , C. S. Judd, the superintendent of forestry in Hawai‘i, 
observed, in words reminiscent of Governor Frear’s statement eight years 
earlier, “innumerable sheep and goats cropped the grass and other herbage 
so closely, that the sod cover was broken.” He continued, “the unprotected 
and exposed soil could not stand the force of the strong trade wind but was 
lifted little by little and carried southwest across the island and out to sea in a 
great red cloud.” As a result, Judd concluded, “the top of the island which was 
once covered with four to eight feet of good soil has been largely reduced to 
hardpan.”¹⁶
 The territorial government leased Kaho‘olawe to Angus MacPhee in 
. A former Wyoming cowboy, MacPhee had been the champion rodeo 
roper of the world between  and  and a top bronc buster in Buffalo 
Bill Cody’s Wild West Show. He had learned of possibilities on Kaho‘olawe 
in several ways. As the manager of a ranch on Maui, he could clearly see 
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Kaho‘olawe across the ocean channel separating the two islands. What he 
saw disturbed him, his daughter later recalled, “By noon each day, the Moa‘e 
Wind was sending a red-dust plume from the island to the western horizon.” 
As she remembered, her father told her, “much of the western land where 
I was born came to look like badlands too. Kaho‘olawe has life! Given the 
opportunity I could make the land blossom.” There was more to MacPhee’s 
decision to try ranching there than simply a desire to restore the island, how-
ever. He was a friend of the person who had leased Kaho‘olawe right before 
the island became a forest reserve and was well aware of the possibility of 
making a profit.¹⁷ Under the terms of his lease, MacPhee was to remove all of 
the goats and sheep before restocking the island with cattle. The lease’s pro-
visions also limited the number of cattle that could be grazed on the island 
at any one time.¹⁸
 Brash and full of optimism, MacPhee sailed for Kaho‘olawe on his newly 
acquired boat, the Kaho‘olawe Maru, with lumber needed to build redwood 
water tanks, so necessary for cattle raising in the arid land. MacPhee put 
in ten ,-gallon and several ,-gallon tanks. Other improvements 
came quickly, a ranch house and outbuildings. Perhaps most important ini-
tially, MacPhee constructed a seven-mile-long fence across the middle of the 
island to control goats and sheep. During his first two years there, MacPhee 
captured and sold or exterminated some twelve thousand goats and sheep—
moves that greatly reduced but did not completely eliminate the animals 
from Kaho‘olawe. Twelve Hawaiian cowboys led by Jack Aina conducted 
these operations. For a time, remembered MacPhee’s daughter, “the land 
smelled horribly of death.”¹⁹ As required by his lease, MacPhee also worked 
to restore the land by planting trees and bushes. Some were alien species: 
eucalyptus trees, Australian salt bushes, and kiawe trees, for example. Others 
were indigenous, such as sandalwood and Hawaiian tobacco.²⁰
 Pleased by the results of MacPhee’s labors, territorial officers renewed 
his lease in . In the new lease, MacPhee was joined by Harry Baldwin, a 
member of a well-known missionary and landowning family. The two men 
formed the Kahoolawe Ranch Company. By this time, MacPhee had invested 
$, in his ranching operations and was strapped for additional funds 
needed to continue making improvements. Baldwin initially paid in only $ 
to the joint venture but was expected to soon invest much more. His interest 
in Kaho‘olawe was as a potential site for the raising of purebred cattle and 
thoroughbred horses. In , severe storms hammered Kaho‘olawe, dam-
aging or destroying many of MacPhee’s improvements, including a large cis-
tern for water. Baldwin pumped tens of thousands of dollars into the ranch 
 The Hawaiian Islands 
over the next twelve years, until the total investment in the ranch had climbed 
to $, by .²¹ In , there were a reported  cattle,  sheep,  
goats,  horses,  mules, and  turkeys on Kaho‘olawe.²²
Military Use of Kaho‘olawe and Early Opposition  
to Live-Fire Operations
Another stage in western use of Kaho‘olawe began as military training re-
placed ranching. As early as the s, army pilots hanging out of the cock-
pits of their biplanes dropped hand-held bombs on targets on part of the 
island. Seven months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Baldwin 
and MacPhee subleased the southern tip of Kaho‘olawe to the United States 
for use as a bombing range by the Army Air Corps in an arrangement to be 
renewed annually and not to run beyond . With the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor, the U.S. military took over the entire island as a bombing and 
shelling range, and ranching ended.
 Military use of Kaho‘olawe generated criticism. As the Second World 
War continued, the Pacific front moved farther west, well away from the 
Hawaiian Islands, prompting the first questions about the military’s use of 
Kaho‘olawe; and those questions mounted once the war ended. MacPhee and 
Baldwin wanted compensation for the loss of tens of thousands of dollars’ 
worth of improvements that they had made on Kaho‘olawe. Moreover, they 
hoped to return to ranching on the island, a desire thwarted by the navy. The 
navy raised the rent it paid to them but did not allow them back on the island 
until , and then only for a short visit. All they found of the ranch dur-
ing that visit, wrote Inez Ashdown, were “heaps of rubble.”²³ Harry Baldwin 
died in , but a year later MacPhee sued the United States government 
for eighty thousand dollars in compensation. When MacPhee passed away 
in , his daughter kept up the pressure, but in the end received nothing.
 The navy cancelled its lease of the island from the Kahoolawe Ranch 
Company in the fall of . Some territorial officials joined MacPhee and 
Baldwin in questioning the navy’s actions. As early as , a few officials 
discussed how best to rehabilitate the island. Visitors noted that sheep and 
goats, which had been kept under control by the Kahoolawe Ranch Com-
pany, were increasing in number and again denuding the island. After the 
war ended, the navy nixed a proposal for joint usage of Kaho‘olawe. The ter-
ritorial government wanted to rid Kaho‘olawe of goats and sheep and restock 
it with game birds for hunters. Noting that there were many unexploded 
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shells and bombs on the island, navy officials rejected that plan as unsafe. The 
same logic led them to oppose returning the island to ranching. Then, too, 
Cold War concerns combined with a very hot war in Korea seemed to justify 
continuing use of Kaho‘olawe as a target range for bombing and shelling.²⁴
 Navy officials believed that military requirements necessitated the reser-
vation of Kaho‘olawe as a live-fire range, and President Dwight D. Eisen-
hower transferred the island to the jurisdiction of the navy by executive 
order in . Although it kept Kaho‘olawe for the navy, Eisenhower’s order 
also contained provisions for environmental restoration, at the insistence of 
territorial authorities. The agreement specified that the navy would eradicate 
feral goats, or at least limit their number to no more than two hundred. Then, 
too, territorial officials were to be allowed “at reasonable intervals to enter 
and inspect the island to ascertain the extent of forest cover, erosion, and 
animal life thereon, and to sow or plant suitable grasses and plants under a 
program of soil conservation.” Very important in light of later events, when 
the navy no longer required the use of Kaho‘olawe, it was to return the island 
to the territory of Hawai‘i in a condition “reasonably safe for human habita-
tion, without cost to the Territory.”²⁵
 The navy maintained an important presence in the Hawaiian Islands, 
but its significance lessened over time. America’s Pacific command (Com-
mander in Chief Pacific or CINCPAC) was headquartered at Pearl Harbor. 
CINCPAC’s scope of operations extended throughout the Pacific and into 
the Far East, South and Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean. CINCPAC 
decisions greatly influenced environmental developments on Guam, for ex-
ample. A unified command of the nation’s military services, CINCPAC was 
nonetheless mainly a naval show. In the late s, the navy had  facilities 
and the marines another  in the Hawaiian Islands. Even so, the relative 
importance of the military to the Hawaiian economy declined over time. 
The number of military personnel in the islands came to between , 
and , annually from the early s into the mid-s. Military per-
sonnel, including dependents along with civilian employees of the military 
and their dependents, composed about  percent of the population of the 
Hawaiian Islands in . However, as the population of the islands increased 
and economic diversification occurred, they came to make up only about  
percent of it by . Military expenditures accounted for nearly one-third 
of the personal income of Hawaiian residents in , but only . percent in 
. By way of contrast, tourism accounted for just . percent of the per-
sonal income of Hawaiian residents in , but nearly one-third by . As 
the importance of the military to their economy declined and memories of 
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World War II faded, many Hawaiian residents rethought their relationships 
to the U.S. Navy. That reassessment had important consequences for how 
they viewed the continued use of Kaho‘olawe as a live-fire range.²⁶
 As a  report issued by navy officials explained, throughout the s 
and s the navy used Kaho‘olawe “for training in air-to-ground weapons 
delivery and shore bombardment.” The navy set up seventeen air-to-surface 
targets and twenty-one surface-to-surface targets on Kaho‘olawe, mainly at 
its center. Exceptional tests punctuated routine training. In , for example, 
the navy simulated small atomic bomb explosions to explore the effects of 
blasts on ships anchored near the island. One detonation of  tons of TNT 
left a large ocean-filled crater that remains to the present day. Kaho‘olawe was 
especially utilized, however, by navy and marine pilots and gunners prepar-
ing for service in Vietnam.²⁷
 Increased bombing, combined with a growing environmental awareness 
in the Hawaiian Islands, brought the first major opposition to the use of 
Kaho‘olawe as a military range. The passage of clean air, clean water, wilder-
ness protection, and endangered species acts by Congress in the s and 
s and the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
in  signaled that environmentalism had reached a new stage of matu-
rity in the United States. Many Americans came to see having a clean envi-
ronment almost as a birthright, with the natural environment as something 
to be consumed in leisure-time activities. In the Hawaiian Islands, the ex-
plosive growth of tourism unified many local groups and people in early 
environmental efforts. In , the coming of statehood and the arrival of 
jet airplanes boosted tourism. Between  and , the number of tour-
ists visiting the Hawaiian Islands rose an average  percent each year, in-
creasing from , to ,,. This very rapid growth of tourism placed 
enormous stresses on the physical environment of the Hawaiian Islands and 
on established social and cultural practices. Land-use issues, water matters, 
community development topics, and quality-of-life concerns soon domi-
nated politics and policy making in the islands.²⁸
 Nowhere were these concerns more pressing than in Maui County, and 
particularly on the island of Maui, which experienced exuberant growth 
during the s and s. In , just , tourists visited Maui, which 
possessed  hotel rooms. By , , people were coming to Maui 
each year, housed in  hotel rooms. A scant thirteen years later . million 
visitors enjoyed Maui; and by  the number had risen to . million. A 
peak came in  with . million tourists visiting Maui, staying in , 
hotel and condominium rooms.²⁹ Appalled by the rapid growth of tourism 
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on their island, many Mauians saw the navy’s use of Kaho‘olawe, which was 
separated from their island by only an eight-mile-wide channel, as part of the 
more general problem of environmental protection.
 Even as she kept up her ultimately unsuccessful effort to secure com-
pensation from the navy for ranch improvements lost on Kaho‘olawe, Inez 
Ashdown increasingly criticized the navy for its environmental insensitivity. 
Replying to navy officials who repeatedly declared that Kaho‘olawe was an 
essential training target, she observed in an interview published in the Los 
Angeles Times in the fall of , “Hogwash! Kahoolawe could be a paradise. It 
has gorgeous beaches, spectacular valleys, cliffs and ravines.” She continued, 
“If the U.S. Navy has its way, Kahoolawe will be bombed off the map. . . . The 
Navy is destroying Kahoolawe.”³⁰
 Political leaders soon joined Ashdown in her opposition to the navy. 
Elmer Cravalho, a leading politician in the Hawaiian Islands, led the charge 
against the navy. As Maui County’s very forceful mayor, Cravalho came to 
view the bombing with a jaundiced eye. Bombs, he thought, were bad for 
business, especially tourism. A staunch believer in home rule, he also greatly 
disliked any actions of the federal and state governments that impinged on 
his local political power. In early , Cravalho complained to Rear Admi-
ral Fred Bakutis, commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, that bomb-
ing might have an adverse “impact on development here.” As Cravalho ex-
plained, “We’re talking about the investment of millions of dollars on this 
coast in the next  to  years.” All bombardment should cease, Cravalho 
thought. Bakutis agreed to give Maui’s residents prior notice of any bombing 
activities and said the navy would look into relocating targets to the side of 
Kaho‘olawe farthest away from Maui, but he insisted that the bombing con-
tinue.³¹
 Ironically, this effort to end the bombing focused, not on the value of 
preserving Kaho‘olawe as a pristine place, but on opening Maui to more 
tourism. How those opposing the bombing viewed tourism was complex. 
The initial objective of many opponents of the bombing was to make Maui 
more attractive to tourism. Yet attitudes changed. By the s and s, 
many pushing for the preservation of Kaho‘olawe, particularly most native 
Hawaiians, came to see preservation as an antidote to what they viewed as 
all-too-successful resort development of Maui, a real shift in values from 
those of a few decades earlier.³²
 Cravalho soon deepened his criticism to include environmental con-
cerns. In September , he called the navy to task for not eradicating the 
goats on Kaho‘olawe, as specified by the  executive order. Then came 
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a blockbuster discovery. An unexploded -pound bomb, accidentally 
dropped on Maui by a navy plane, was found on land in which Cravalho 
had a commercial interest. Navy technicians exploded it harmlessly, but the 
damage had been done. Cravalho attacked the navy for having “wantonly 
ravaged and destroyed” Kaho‘olawe. In a mixed appeal to preservation and 
use, Cravalho called for “productive use of the island” at a time “when the 
rallying cry of our citizens is focusing attention on the protection of our en-
vironment.” By mid-, he was suggesting the use of Kaho‘olawe as a park, 
saying “It’s an ideal place for just lying around, swimming or fishing; it’s a 
beautiful place.”³³
 Led by Cravalho, other politicians came to oppose the navy’s bombing 
of Kaho‘olawe. In , members of the Maui County Council (given the 
absence of city councils, the governing body in local politics) called for the 
termination of all bombing in , a stance reaffirmed in later years. Three 
representatives of the state’s congressional delegation—Representative Patsy 
Mink, Representative Spark Matsunaga, and Senator Hiram Fong—like Cra-
valho greatly disturbed by the discovery of the bomb on Maui, urged Secre-
tary of Defense Melvin Laird to halt all bombing on Kaho‘olawe to avoid, in 
Matsunaga’s words, “a major disaster.” In , Senator Daniel Inouye joined 
his Hawaiian colleagues in Congress in urging that Kaho‘olawe be returned 
to the state of Hawai‘i. Inouye was an influential figure in Washington, and 
his opposition counted. Inouye was a veteran of the famed nd Regimen-
tal Combat Team, composed of Americans of Japanese ancestry, and his 
break with the navy on the bombing of Kaho‘olawe was telling. In opposing 
the navy, politicians such as Inouye were concerned about more than the en-
vironment. Like the political leaders of many western American states, they 
wanted to wrest control of their land from the hands of federal officials. Like 
Cravalho, they resented having others tell them what to do.³⁴
 Grassroots environmental groups added their support. Most important 
was Life of the Land, an organization formed in  to clean up beaches on 
O‘ahu. Led by the charismatic Tony Hodges, members of this group made 
halting the bombing one of their goals. In , Hodges filed suit against the 
navy in federal court, charging that the use of Kaho‘olawe as a target range 
violated the National Environmental Protection Act of , which required 
that federal agencies prepare and file for public comment environmental im-
pact statements for any actions that might harm the environment. The navy, 
as Hodges noted, had failed to do so. Hodges employed sarcasm and irony 
in his public statements. “I hope the navy pilots have learned to recognize 
their targets a little better,” he told a newspaper reporter in a reference to 
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the bomb discovered on Cravalho’s land. “Both I, and, I am sure, Alexander 
and Baldwin, would hate to see bomber pilots mistake the Wailea resort area 
for Kahoolawe.” Wailea was a multimillion-dollar resort being constructed 
on South Maui directly across an ocean channel from Kaho‘olawe. It was 
being built by Alexander and Baldwin, one of Hawai‘i’s “Big Five” agricultural 
firms then making a transition to tourism. Hodges concluded, “Perhaps A&B 
should include some sort of anti-aircraft batteries in its master plan.” Asked 
to join the suit against the navy, Cravalho was delighted to do so, observing 
that the navy’s attitude was “arrogant” and that it had “completely ignored the 
County.”³⁵
 Navy officials prepared an environmental impact statement in early  
in response to the lawsuit. The statement admitted that shelling and bombing 
hurt Kaho‘olawe, stating that “the adverse effects are cratering, comouflets, 
sprays of shell and bomb fragments, ground disruptions, water pollution, de-
struction of vegetation and animal life, and other related effects.” Even so, the 
statement highlighted perceived “beneficial environmental effects of mili-
tary use,” ranging from pulverizing the island’s soil, thus making it amenable 
to the growth of vegetation, to the accumulation of rain runoff in bomb cra-
ters. Then too, navy representatives argued that “the mineral content per acre 
of the target sites, from [shell and bomb] fragmentations, might someday 
prove economically worthwhile from the standpoint of salvage and retrieval 
of some of the metallic alloy material involved.” “Unexploded dud ordnance” 
did constitute “a major problem,” but it was one “without noticeably adverse 
effect on the human population spread within the Hawaiian archipelago.” In 
short, according to navy officials, “thirty years of use of the island as a target 
site” had “slightly improved the balance of the island’s ecosystems.”³⁶
 Nor, according to navy officials, were alternative uses worthwhile. The 
navy’s report claimed that Kaho‘olawe “contains no areas of particular aes-
thetic value.” Unlike Cravalho, navy officials thought it unsuitable for pic-
nicking, hiking, or hunting. The navy did increase its efforts to reduce the 
goat population and boosted its restoration work, planting fifteen thousand 
trees and shrubs, mainly alien species—eucalyptus and tamarisk trees—but 
also some native species, wiliwili and Acacia koai. However, many of these 
trees and bushes died when the navy failed to water them. Nonetheless, navy 
officials adamantly refused to yield on the main bone of contention: their 
right to bomb and shell Kaho‘olawe. After surveying other possible sites in 
the Pacific and even debating the possibility of constructing an artificial 
island, navy officers concluded that no other option fit their needs. Cost con-
siderations, ownership issues, distances from military bases, and the inability 
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to use other sites year-round ruled out the possibilities. Only Kaho‘olawe 
would do. Such would remain their stance into the s. The federal court, 
satisfied that the navy had completed a meaningful environmental impact 
statement, dismissed the case in late .³⁷
Native Hawaiians and Direct Action
In the mid-s, native Hawaiians became the leading opponents of mili-
tary use of Kaho‘olawe, turning what had been a local conflict into a major 
statewide issue that attracted national and international attention. Their ac-
tions took place as part of the native Hawaiian renaissance, a movement that 
sought the return of lost lands, the revival of Hawaiian culture, and politi-
cal sovereignty. Beginning in response to the removal of native Hawaiian 
farmers from lands on O‘ahu in the late s, the movement later broad-
ened. According to Haunani-Kay Trask, a faculty member at the University 
of Hawai‘i and a leading native Hawaiian activist, efforts expanded from 
“an ongoing series of land struggles throughout the decade of the seven-
ties” to “a larger struggle for native Hawaiian autonomy” in the s. The 
movement, she noted, also “branched out politically to link up with Ameri-
Overgrazing and bombing left Kaho‘olawe badly eroded. (Courtesy of the Kaho‘olawe Island 
Reserve Commission)
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can Indian activists on the mainland, anti-nuclear independence struggles 
throughout the South Pacific, and international networks in Asia and at the 
United Nations.” The many sailings of the Hōkūle‘a helped to spread ideas 
and stimulate a shared consciousness.³⁸
 By this time, native Hawaiians had lost most of their lands—the Hawai-
ian Islands contained . million acres—over a century and a half of western 
economic development. Western traders extracted sandalwood from Hawai-
ian forests to trade in China as early as the s, leading Hawaiian chiefs to 
force commoners to harvest the wood but keeping most of the profits them-
selves. Further commercialization of the economy of the Hawaiian Islands 
followed in the s and s, as the islands became important supply 
points for whaling fleets plying the Pacific. Later in the nineteenth century, 
sugarcane replaced the supply trade as the major commercial enterprise in 
the islands. More than any other factor, the desire of planters to maintain 
their exports of sugar to mainland America led to the overthrow of the King-
dom of Hawai‘i in  and the annexation of Hawai‘i by the United States 
five years later. Sugar dominated the Territory of Hawai‘i, with pineapple de-
veloping as a secondary crop. With the spread of sugar and pineapple plan-
tations, land ownership became concentrated, until by the early s about 
one-half of the land in the Hawaiian Islands was owned by just eighty estates, 
corporations, or individuals. Most of the rest lay in the hands of the territo-
rial government, which leased desirable tracts to planters at low rates. Native 
Hawaiians lost out as land was reapportioned. Congress passed legislation in 
 to return about  thousand acres to native Hawaiians, but this mea-
sure proved ineffective. It was toward regaining their land base, and with it 
economic and political power, that native Hawaiians directed their rights 
movement.³⁹
 Land loss and other factors, according to a detailed report prepared 
for Congress by native Hawaiians in , had had important “psychologi-
cal, social, and cultural consequences for Native Hawaiians.” They had the 
lowest life expectancy, the highest infant mortality rate, and the highest sui-
cide rate of any ethnic group in the Hawaiian Islands. Only . percent of 
native Hawaiians completed college (compared to a statewide average of . 
percent), and  percent of native Hawaiian families lived in poverty. The 
report concluded, “by all major indices—health, education, income—Native 
Hawaiians display distinct disparities with their fellow citizens.” Many native 
Hawaiians left Hawai‘i. By , about one-third of all native Hawaiians were 
living on the mainland, where they sought better social and economic op-
portunities, just as many Pacific Islanders in the South Pacific lived in New 
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Zealand and Australia. In Australia the number of Pacific Islanders more 
than doubled between  and , and the number of Pacific Islanders in 
New Zealand almost doubled between  and .⁴⁰
 More native Hawaiians stayed, however; and an increasing proportion 
became involved in the native Hawaiian renaissance, and then in pan-Pacific 
movements. As Trask observed, native Hawaiian leaders—like some other 
indigenous Pacific peoples, such as some of the Maori of New Zealand—be-
came proponents of a nuclear-free Pacific and took their antimilitary cam-
paign from Kaho‘olawe to other Pacific islands. The Maori also sought to re-
assert their control over lands lost to the British in the s and later. Native 
American efforts, especially after the Second World War, aimed at regaining 
land, water, and fishing rights lost in broken treaties, objectives similar to 
those of many native Hawaiians. Ties between Native American and native 
Hawaiian groups were usually tenuous, however; for native Hawaiians iden-
tified much more closely with Pacific peoples and did not consider them-
selves to be a Native American tribe. Still, there were examples of coopera-
tion, especially by the s. Both groups made effective use of the Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, passed by Congress in 
, to protect sacred burial sites from development, and in the early s 
some native Hawaiians favored the passage of congressional legislation 
giving them many of the rights possessed by Native American tribes recog-
nized by the federal government. In a meaningful division, however, some 
native Hawaiians opposed the proposed legislation, arguing that if they ac-
cepted it, they would be giving up their rights to political independence and 
sovereignty.⁴¹
 Over time, a pan-Pacific, transnational identity began to form, largely 
based on indigenous peoples’ opposition to the American, and in some areas 
the French and British, military in the Pacific. Native Hawaiians involved in 
opposition to the U.S. military in Hawai‘i soon became engaged in anticolo-
nial activities throughout the Pacific. This transnational Pacific identity was, 
in turn, part of growing global indigenous people’s movements.⁴²
 Some of the native Hawaiian opposition to the bombing of Kaho‘olawe 
began with Charles Kaulewehi Maxwell. A resident of Maui, Maxwell orga-
nized a group of native Hawaiians as the Aboriginal Lands of Hawaiian An-
cestry (ALOHA) in the early s. As he informed the Maui County Coun-
cil in late , the ALOHA’s “primary objective is to seek land or money 
reparations from the United States Congress” in compensation for lands 
the body’s members thought had been taken illegally in the late s. The 
“Island of Kahoolawe will be among the lands we are seeking,” Maxwell ob-
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served. He lobbied Congress to allocate reparation funds for native Hawai-
ians to no avail. Upon returning to the Hawaiian Islands from Washington, 
DC, Maxwell focused his energies on Kaho‘olawe, largely as a result of an 
epiphany he experienced in the summer of . Despite a navy prohibition 
of the activity, he was hunting with several friends on Kaho‘olawe when they 
were surprised by a navy helicopter flying overhead. As his friends hid under 
kiawe trees, Maxwell stood his ground. The thought came to him, Maxwell 
explained: “I am a native Hawaiian. I have prior rights. . . . I should not hide, 
this was my land, my aina.” He took off his shirt and waved it at the helicopter, 
which, however, ignored him. While looking out over the ocean from a cliff 
on Kaho‘olawe that evening, he “felt that the presence of my ancestors was 
very close to me.” Maxwell returned to Maui and, in his words, “started this 
movement of Kahoolawe.”⁴³
 Maxwell was not alone. In , native Hawaiians on the nearby island 
of Moloka‘i formed Hui Alaloa (the Group of Long Trails), an organization 
that soon became important in the fight to change how the navy treated 
Kaho‘olawe. Hui Alaloa sought to regain public access to the trails, roads, and 
beaches, which was being cut off by large landowners involved in economic 
development activities. Hui Alaloa was aided by Cravalho, who as the mayor 
of Maui County sought public beach access. The organization’s founders 
noted that they had “recovered part of the dying Hawai‘i culture.” Hui Alaloa 
soon turned its attention to Kaho‘olawe, which was quickly becoming the 
preeminent symbol, in the eyes of many native Hawaiians, of their oppres-
sion. Writing to presidential candidate Jimmy Carter in , Walter Ritte, 
Jr., the head of Hui Alaloa, explained why the bombing seemed to them so 
heinous: “The Hawaiian people recognizes Kaho‘olawe as a place where their 
culture is being desecrated as bombs blow up their sacred heiaus, or places of 
worship, destroy many koas or fishing shrines along the shore, wipe out the 
historical village site of old, kill the reef surrounding the island which was 
teeming with food, and especially killing the entire Hawaiian island.” Ritte 
voiced the thoughts of a rapidly growing number of native Hawaiians. “The 
renaissance, which is going on in Hawaii today, has picked Kaho‘olawe as the 
place of revival of a living Hawaiian culture.”⁴⁴
 Following the initial work done by ALOHA and Hui Alaloa, landings on 
Kaho‘olawe led to the formation of additional organizations and challenges 
to the navy. Influenced by the seizure of Alcatraz Island in San Francisco Bay 
by Native American militants in , native Hawaiian groups sponsored 
unauthorized—the navy called them “illegal”—landings on Kaho‘olawe to 
protest the bombing of the island and to dramatize their demand for the 
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island’s return to native Hawaiians. In  and , as Ritte and Walter 
Sawyer explained, there were “five symbolic landings on Kaho‘olawe . . . 
chosen to represent the five fingers of limahana (the working hand).”⁴⁵
 The first landing was timed to coincide with the bicentennial of Ameri-
can independence. Before dawn on January , , as Maxwell later recalled, 
the protestors set out in several boats from Maui for Kaho‘olawe. Many of 
those sailing for Kaho‘olawe were members of Hui Alaloa and wanted to 
secure native Hawaiian access to the island. Others were fishermen irked by 
the closure of the island’s waters most of the time. Near Kaho‘olawe they were 
turned back by the coast guard. Only nine people, who became known as 
the “Kaho‘olawe Nine,” returned later on the same day to “occupy” the island, 
including a Muckelshoot Indian from the Pacific Northwest who was visiting 
the Hawaiian Islands for a Native Claims Association meeting. Seven of the 
nine protesters were quickly captured, but Aluli and Ritte remained at large 
for two days.⁴⁶
 Within two days of their forced departure from Kaho‘olawe, Aluli, Ritte, 
and George Helm spearheaded the formation of a new group, soon named 
the Protect Kaho‘olawe ‘Ohana (PKO; ‘ohana means family), which became 
the leading body in the fight against the navy. The PKO sponsored two more 
landings in the winter of . Even as the landings occurred, navy officials 
displayed continuing insensitivity to native Hawaiians. In March , they 
denied a request from five Moloka‘i kūpuna (elders) to visit Kaho‘olawe, 
saying that unexploded ordnance made a visit too dangerous. In the same 
month, a particularly heavy bombing run rattled homes on Maui, alarming 
that island’s residents. A South Maui resident was reported as exclaiming, 
“We ran out of our house, we thought it was an earthquake.” The mayor’s 
office, police stations, and the coast guard were deluged with calls asking 
whether a natural disaster had occurred. A bit later, the marines came out 
with a T-shirt bearing the slogan “Bomb the Kahoolawe Ohana.”⁴⁷
 Public opinion throughout the Hawaiian Islands began to turn against 
the navy. The state’s leading newspaper editorialized in early : “It’s not 
a question of whether Kahoolawe will be returned. The question is when.” 
After holding discussions throughout the Hawaiian Islands, members of an 
investigatory committee of the state legislature concluded that most resi-
dents favored the goals of the PKO, reporting that “the majority of the people 
meeting with the Committee expressed their strong support for the ‘Ohana 
on seeking the return of the Island and a stop to the bombing.” Support 
for the PKO was not unconditional, however. Many people, including many 
native Hawaiians, disliked the group’s tactics. “Many disagreed,” the commit-
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tee observed, “with the methods of the ‘Ohana including trespass and any 
other law breaking.” Some older native Hawaiians, in particular, said that 
they thought that the actions of PKO members “destroyed the dignity and 
grace for which Hawaiians had long been known.”⁴⁸
 The work of the PKO, especially its dramatic landings, helped change 
attitudes, but so did altered economic matters. Simply put, the navy was be-
coming less important to Hawaiian life, and memories of World War II were 
growing distant (or completely nonexistent for young people). In , the 
Hawaiian Chamber of Commerce, the state’s leading business organization, 
came out publicly against the navy’s bombing. The chamber had earlier been 
a staunch supporter of the navy, mainly on economic grounds, but now the 
chamber changed its stance. The growing significance of tourism may well 
have influenced the decisions of chamber members, as, like Cravalho, they 
came to see the bombing as bad for tourism. The investigation by the com-
mittee of the state legislature reached findings backing up the altered posi-
tion of the chamber. The committee concluded that claims by the navy of 
large economic losses to the state should the navy be forced to abandon its 
activities on Kaho‘olawe were “unsubstantiated” and should be ignored.⁴⁹
 The campaign to end the bombing broadened as more groups found 
common cause, but such was not always the case with regard to environ-
mental issues in the Hawaiian Islands. Native Hawaiians, environmentalists, 
and developers often found themselves at odds. They differed, for example, 
on the proposed construction of a large geothermal electric power plant on 
the island of Hawai‘i. Many environmentalists favored building the facility as 
a way to free the Hawaiian Islands from dependence on oil-fired plants, but 
many native Hawaiians opposed the proposition because it would have to be 
built in an area they considered to be sacred to their volcano goddess, Pele. 
No plant was built. Environmentalists, resort developers, and native Hawai-
ians also disagreed about how a part of South Maui right across the strait 
from Kaho‘olawe should be treated. Developers wanted to put in a new hotel; 
native Hawaiians hoped to preserve their shoreline trail; and environmental-
ists wanted to create a state park, even if doing so meant relocating the trail. 
Eventually, a compromise was worked out, with Cravalho acting as mediator. 
Nonetheless, as late as  Aluli viewed the agreement with dismay, stating 
that it was “just another compromise for us. It says our culture is for sale, our 
water’s for sale. Our concerns have been sold out.”⁵⁰
 Thus, cleavages often divided native Hawaiians, environmentalists, and 
other Hawaiian residents—but not over ending the use of Kaho‘olawe as a 
live-fire range. The island’s geography and lack of reliable water supply made 
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resort development unlikely, and by their actions native Hawaiians were 
able to convince environmentalists and others that the island was special 
for them. Many questions remained. How and when might a transfer occur? 
How would the island be used in the future? What would cleaning up the 
island cost? A new environmental impact statement in late  suggested 
that it would cost about $, per acre to clean up the island, for a total of 
$ to $ million, depending on how much land was cleaned—figures navy 
officials stood by two years later.⁵¹ More immediately, there was the question 
of how to convince federal government authorities to relinquish Kaho‘olawe 
and return the island to the state, for navy officials remained adamantly op-
posed to any such action.
 George Helm increasingly led the opposition to the navy, especially for 
native Hawaiians. Born in , he was raised on rural Moloka‘i, the son of a 
part-native Hawaiian father and a native Hawaiian mother. Music was an im-
portant part of his life. His father gave Helm a ukulele and, as one commen-
tator observed, “passed on to George, Jr., his love of Hawaiian music.” At the 
age of fifteen, Helm moved to Honolulu to attend high school. He continued 
to find time for music, studying as a vocalist with a well-known teacher of 
Hawaiian chants. Within a few years of graduating from high school, Helm 
pursued a career in music, playing in leading clubs and restaurants in Hono-
lulu. Performing songs important to native Hawaiians was part of his act. 
That move into performing music full-time was a major turning point in 
his life. From then on, as his mother later observed, Helm “spent any spare 
time he had reading and researching his Hawaii culture,” traveling to “other 
islands to meet with the kupunas and Hawaii people to learn first hand all 
that was true Hawaii.” It was a short step for Helm to become an activist. 
His brother Adolph introduced him to others who were starting Hui Alaloa 
and the PKO. Helm was a bundle of energy, researching native Hawaiian 
land claims, speaking at community gatherings, and helping his compatriots 
when the navy took them to court for trespassing. He was, by all accounts, 
charismatic, with a lilting, melodic voice that projected well. Beyond Helm’s 
specific words lay an intensity and impatience to get things done, leavened by 
a sense of humor. His message, if often fuzzy, was powerful. When asked in 
early  about long-range plans for Kaho‘olawe, he replied that it would be 
a “spiritual place,” where native Hawaiians could “discover themselves,” and 
“experience the ocean, the aina,” a place where he and others might “spread 
our thoughts out, see and experience ourselves as Hawaiian.”⁵²
 Two meetings at which Helm presided stand out. At an early  gather-
ing with Hawaiian elders on Maui, Helm overcame initial resistance through 
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music. At first dismissed as “hippies” and “radicals,” Helm and his friends 
won acceptance by singing old Hawaiian songs. The elders responded posi-
tively: “You boys are not radicals, you are hui o ho‘oponopono, those who will 
set things right.” Later that year, Helm addressed the Hawaiian state legisla-
ture—the first time a nonmember had been allowed to do so—calling for the 
ending of bombing and the return of Kaho‘olawe to the state. “Helm moved 
his audience, some of them to tears,” one Hawaiian resident recalled. That 
same day the legislature approved a resolution urging the navy to halt the 
bombing and return Kaho‘olawe to Hawai‘i.⁵³
 Nonetheless, navy officers remained intransigent, and federal officials 
dragged their feet, leading to additional landings on Kaho‘olawe. The fourth 
landing was destined to be the longest and most tragic. On January , , 
Helm, Ritte, Sawyer, and two others landed on the island. Within a few days, 
all but Ritte and Sawyer had given themselves up to authorities. Ritte and 
Sawyer remained until March , when they surrendered by flagging down a 
navy helicopter. Meanwhile, unaware that they had left the island, Helm re-
turned to Kaho‘olawe to aid them. Helm recruited James “Kimo” Mitchell of 
East Maui. A graduate of Fresno State University, Mitchell was a twenty-five-
year-old ranger in the National Park Service. Helm and Kimo Mitchell in 
turn linked up with Billy Mitchell (no relation to Kimo) and Polo Simeona, 
a Honolulu fireman who provided a boat. Around : a.m. on March , the 
group set out for Kaho‘olawe. Upon nearing the island, Helm and the Mitch-
ells went over the side of the boat onto two surfboards.⁵⁴
 On reaching the shore of Kaho‘olawe, Helm and the Mitchells searched 
for Ritte and Sawyer. When a pickup boat failed to arrive, the three men at-
tempted to paddle back to Maui on their surfboards in the early morning of 
March . Exactly what transpired at this point is unclear. Billy Mitchell, the 
only survivor, later said that he last saw Kimo Mitchell and Helm struggling 
in the surf near Molokini, an islet in the channel separating Kaho‘olawe from 
Maui. Unable to help them, he returned to Kaho‘olawe. After hiking across 
the island, he convinced a group of marines to aid him. By that time, how-
ever, almost two days had passed. The navy mounted a search, but no trace of 
Kimo Mitchell or George Helm was ever found. The weather was stormy, and 
Helm and the Mitchells were already tired when they attempted to paddle 
back to Maui. Most likely, they were lost at sea.⁵⁵
 The deaths of the two activists thrust the PKO into the limelight. Al-
though in momentary disarray after the disappearance of Helm and Mitch- 
ell, PKO members soon rallied. A  report by the state government of- 
fers an incisive contemporary look at the PKO. “The ‘Ohana,” the report 
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observed, “is not the kind of group that is run on the basis of by-laws or 
headed by an elected group of officers.” It was, instead, “a rather nebulous 
group held together by the belief in a common goal—the cessation of the 
bombing of Kaho‘olawe and its return to the State of Hawai‘i.” As the report 
explained, concepts of ‘ohana (family and cooperation), aloha ‘aina (love of 
the land), pule (prayers), na‘au (gut feelings or emotions), and ho‘oponopono 
(a desire to make things right) permeated the work of the organization. A 
loose organization, the PKO had a membership that fluctuated greatly over 
time, probably with several hundred members as its core constituency and 
several thousand others as strong supporters.⁵⁶
 The PKO encompassed disparate groups. Many native Hawaiian leaders 
were young, urban, and college-educated—similar to the leadership of some 
Native American groups such as the American Indian Movement (AIM). 
However, far from all PKO members fit that mold. Coming from distinctly 
rural areas such as Moloka‘i, many had to overcome what one observer in 
 called “a traditional Hawaiian ‘crab mentality’ and a ‘make no waves’ 
ethic.” It was at a series of meetings that members of the PKO resolved their 
differences. There, older native Hawaiians, or kūpuna, played significant roles, 
as many of the younger activists looked to them for instruction in Hawaiian 
culture. At an important meeting on Moloka‘i in April , those present 
were divided on how to proceed after the deaths of Helm and Mitchell. Ritte 
appealed to Aunty Clara Ku, the oldest kupuna in the room, “Aunty, give us 
your na‘ao.” According to a reporter at the meeting: “Out comes a voice like 
a lioness: Have you forgotten yourself? . . . We are here to save that aina. That 
aina is being bombed and you all here hukihuki [are quarreling] . . . we have 
to listen to our hearts.” After Ku sat down, the members of the PKO voted 
unanimously to stand firm on their demand for a six-month cessation of all 
bombing, long enough for a joint committee of Hawaiian residents and con-
gressmen to study the situation.⁵⁷
 At many such PKO meetings young and old worked together to alter 
how Kaho‘olawe would be used. Both “heart” and a savvy understanding of 
federal legislation guided their next steps. As the PKO matured, the body 
broadened its leadership. Working to advance what was fast becoming their 
cause, native Hawaiians followed new leaders. Dr. Noa Emmett Aluli and 
Harry Mitchell typified the diversity of those leaders.
 Aluli combined in his life urban and rural approaches to activism. Born 
in , he grew up on O‘ahu. He graduated with a Bachelor of Science from 
Marquette University in  but, drawn to medicine, returned to his home-
land to graduate in the first class of the John A. Burns School of Medicine 
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at the University of Hawai‘i in . After completing his residency there a 
year later in an integrated surgery/family medicine program, Aluli moved 
to Moloka‘i to join the Family Practice Clinic. As Aluli later explained, he 
hoped “to deliver health care to rural areas.” Some of the professors with 
whom he had studied were, Aluli remembered, “interested in developing an 
alternative approach, one that was more Hawaiian,” which included “la‘au 
lapa‘au, or the use of herbs.” Aluli was early drawn to Hawaiian rights issues 
and became deeply involved in them on Moloka‘i. Working with Helm and 
others, he was one of the founding members of the PKO and a participant 
in the first landing on Kaho‘olawe. He became one of the foremost leaders of 
the PKO in the s and s, eventually heading the commission oversee-
ing the regeneration of Kaho‘olawe.⁵⁸
 The kupuna Harry Mitchell, the father of Kimo Mitchell, shared many 
of Aluli’s concerns. Born in  in Ke‘anae, a traditional area in East Maui, 
he worked as a taro grower, cowboy, fisherman, and hunter. Mitchell also be-
came a renowned native healer, skilled in the use of plants and herbs. Active 
in Hui Alaloa’s efforts to gain beach access, he helped start the PKO, be-
coming especially convinced of Kaho‘olawe’s significance as a spiritual place 
Dr. Noa Emmett Aluli was very 
active in ending the U.S. Navy’s use 
of Kaho‘olawe as a live-fire range. 
(Courtesy of the Kaho‘olawe Island 
Reserve Commission)
 The Hawaiian Islands 
for native Hawaiians. Mitchell opposed military exercises on Kaho‘olawe, 
even making a solo surfboard trip to the island at night to protest shelling 
and bombing in . Mitchell instructed the younger generation of native 
Hawaiians in their cultural, linguistic, and healing practices. From Mitchell, 
Aluli learned some of his geographic knowledge of Kaho‘olawe, including 
ancient meanings of place-names there. Mitchell also connected with Aluli 
as a native healer. Throughout his work, Mitchell stressed that people needed 
to “give back to the aina.” He is perhaps best remembered as the author of 
“Mele o Kaho‘olawe,” a chant/song, which became the unofficial anthem of 
the PKO.⁵⁹
 Like many others in the PKO, Aluli and Mitchell took the message of 
native Hawaiian activists abroad. Together they served as ambassadors from 
the PKO to nuclear-free-Pacific conferences on the island nations of Fiji and 
Vanuatu. At one meeting a smiling Mitchell held up a banner reading “No 
More Hiroshimas.” Mitchell also testified on behalf of Greenpeace activists 
in Japan. Aluli, Mitchell, and other native Hawaiians came to consider their 
work in the Hawaiian Islands as part of a broader movement to remove west-
ern military powers from the Pacific. As people of color, they saw the federal 
government’s efforts to maintain its control over Kaho‘olawe as a form of 
cultural repression. Ending the bombing and winning control of the island 
became part of a Pacific-wide, anticolonial movement. At a large rally in 
Honolulu on May , , “Nuclear Free Pacific” banners intermingled with 
“Malama K” [“Care for Kaho‘olawe”] and “Aloha Aina” banners in the crowd. 
Marchers in that demonstration chanted, “Make the Pacific Nuclear-Free.”⁶⁰ 
The Native Hawaiian campaign had taken on transnational meanings.
Changing Navy Policies and Native Hawaiian Use of Kaho‘olawe
While the actions of the PKO raised public consciousness about the bomb-
ing of Kaho‘olawe, environmental results nonetheless depended upon legal 
decisions and sympathetic judges. In , the PKO filed suits in federal 
court against the secretary of the navy and the secretary of defense for vio-
lating clean air, clean water, historic site, and freedom of religion laws. The 
suits claimed that the navy’s  environmental impact statement was in-
adequate and that the navy was not complying with a court order calling for 
the protection of archaeological sites on the island. In , the judge hearing 
this case told the navy to follow the order and to identify sites on Kaho‘olawe 
that might be nominated to the National Register of Historic Places. In fact, 
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he ordered the navy to obtain the secretary of the interior’s opinion for the 
possible inclusion of the entire island in the National Register. The navy was 
also instructed to draft a more complete environmental impact statement 
detailing the results of its activities on Kaho‘olawe.⁶¹
 In late , navy lawyers responded with a supplement to the  en-
vironmental impact statement in which they grudgingly gave ground. “It is 
concluded,” noted the report, that the “U.S. Navy, in conjunction with other 
users, has no suitable alternative to the use of Kahoolawe as a target site.” 
Pointing out that they had planted additional trees and had eradicated six-
teen thousand feral sheep and goats in the s, navy officials praised their 
environmental restoration efforts. They also claimed that they had followed 
the order directing them to sponsor archaeological work on the island.⁶² 
Public hearings on the supplemental environmental impact statement in 
 showed, however, just how dissatisfied many Hawaiian residents were 
with the navy.
 Members of the PKO led the opposition in the hearings. Walter Ritte 
offered a detailed critique of the navy’s findings, concluding that “inside I’m 
pissed off” and that “the credibility of the United States Navy stinks!” Like 
Ritte, Aluli denounced the navy for violating federal laws and orders. At the 
close of his testimony Aluli stated: “Listen. Stop the bombing, cross the cul-
tural gap. You’re big enough and powerful enough. We are a rising nation, 
and we are going to be recognized.” Isaac Hall, who was just beginning a 
distinguished career as an environmental lawyer on Maui, testified on behalf 
of the PKO, noting that “basically, we have pitted the national military needs 
of the navy against the cultural needs of the people of Hawaii.”⁶³
 Members of other native Hawaiian groups and representatives of envi-
ronmental bodies echoed the sentiments of those in the PKO. After asking 
for “a few seconds of silence for Brother George Helm and Brother Kimo 
Mitchell,” a member of Hui Alaloa observed, “it is my firm belief that we 
Hawaiians today have every right to walk and hunt our mountains, to fish 
and surf and camp on our beaches.” Similar testimony came from mem-
bers of the Hawaii Coalition of Native Claims and the Mama Loa Founda-
tion. Representatives of Life of the Land condemned the navy for what they 
viewed as its callous treatment of animal and plant life. A representative of 
the Sierra Club called the bombing a “sad display of natural and archaeologi-
cal destruction” and drew an analogy that an increasing number of Hawaiian 
residents accepted. “Kahoolawe,” he said, “is in a very real sense the Plymouth 
Rock of the Polynesian pilgrims who came to Hawaii.”⁶⁴
 Faced with hostile testimony, in  the navy accepted a consent decree 
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setting new rules for the use of Kaho‘olawe. Endorsed by the PKO, the federal 
court decree began a period of joint use of Kaho‘olawe by the navy and native 
Hawaiians in . The decree stipulated that the navy clear about one-third 
of the island’s surface of all ordnance. The PKO was to select the areas to be 
cleaned up according to their significance for “restoring the religious, cul-
tural, historic and environmental values of Kaho‘olawe.” Moreover, the navy 
was to give the PKO access to Kaho‘olawe for at least four days each month 
for ten months of the year for religious, cultural, scientific, and educational 
purposes. Furthermore, the navy was to submit to the secretary of the interior 
an application for the inclusion of all of Kaho‘olawe in the National Register, 
and a few months after the navy signed the consent decree the island was in-
deed so listed. The navy was ordered to eradicate all goats still on the island, 
implement a soil conservation program, begin revegetation, and draw up an 
ocean management plan for surrounding waters. Finally, the navy was told 
to recognize members of the PKO as stewards of Kaho‘olawe.⁶⁵
 A jubilant PKO won a major victory with the consent decree. In , 
native Hawaiians reinstituted Makahiki celebrations, end-of-the-year festivi-
ties of peace, relaxation, and religion. By , some four thousand people 
had visited Kaho‘olawe, mainly for spiritual and educational purposes. That 
fall, cultural ceremonies rededicated Kaho‘olawe as a center for the spiritual 
well-being of the Hawaiian people. Still, there was nothing in the consent 
decree to prevent the navy from using some of Kaho‘olawe as a gunnery and 
bombing range, and it reserved about one-third of the island as a live-fire 
range.⁶⁶
 Rim of the Pacific (RimPac) exercises, which involved the bombardment 
of Kaho‘olawe by the U.S. Navy and the navies of America’s allies in the Pacific 
every two years, particularly irked those trying to put an end to military use 
of the island. The  exercises led to a protest landing on Kaho‘olawe by 
PKO and Greenpeace members in kayaks, causing political leaders of Aus-
tralia and New Zealand to halt their navies’ ships from firing on the island. 
In the wake of the  exercise, the PKO broadened its protests by seeking 
international help. In , PKO members met with members of the South 
Pacific Peoples Foundation, who at the time were deeply involved in efforts 
to stop nuclear testing in the Pacific. Aluli denounced RimPac exercises in 
 for failing to protect Hawaiian sites on Kaho‘olawe, leading Japanese 
leaders to bar their ships from firing on the island.⁶⁷ However, it was the  
RimPac exercises that attracted the most protests. Together with PKO mem-
bers, Hannibal Tavares, the mayor of Maui County, landed on Kaho‘olawe 
during a lull in the military maneuvers, planted a county flag on the island, 
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and called upon the navy to return the island to the people of Hawai‘i. Ac-
companied by Harry Mitchell, Tavares then toured parts of the island, at-
tentive to Mitchell’s admonition, “from the land alone can come life, not out 
of cement,” a derogatory reference to resort development taking place on 
Maui.⁶⁸
 The  protests strengthened ties between the PKO and other Pacific 
groups. As Aluli explained at the time, the PKO’s work was “all part of a net-
work of groups involved in issues such as the rights of indigenous people, 
peace, and the environment.” Specifically, Aluli named three Japanese groups 
with which he was in contact: Jinshukoza, Jensuikin, and Jensuiky. The first 
body was involved in supporting the rights of indigenous peoples; the other 
two took part in antiwar protests. As a Honolulu newspaper observed, 
“While the Navy prepares for biennial Rimpac exercise in May, the Protect 
Kahoolawe Ohana can turn to a network of international contacts to protest 
in their countries the bombing of the target island in Hawaii.”⁶⁹
 Political action followed the protests. Pushed by Senator Daniel Akaka 
of Hawai‘i and supported by Senator Inouye, the chair of the Senate Defense 
Appropriation Committee, the Senate passed and the House concurred in 
a  measure creating the Kaho‘olawe Island Conveyance Commission 
(KICC) to set terms for the return of Kaho‘olawe to the state of Hawai‘i. 
At the same time, President George H. W. Bush instructed his secretary of 
defense to end use of Kaho‘olawe as a firing range. This temporary halt was 
later made permanent, and after  no bombs fell on Kaho‘olawe. With 
Tavares as its chair and Aluli its vice-chair, the KICC held public hearings 
throughout the Hawaiian Islands in  to encourage further discussion of 
the island’s future. Those who had once been in opposition now ran the show, 
and their leadership created a new mood at the hearings. Tavares urged those 
testifying to “speak from the mind and the heart” in “any language you want, 
Hawaiian, Portuguese, Japanese, Filipino, whatever.” He called upon native 
Hawaiian elders to begin the meetings with prayers and chants.⁷⁰
 Testimony strongly favored ending military use. A representative of the 
PKO articulated what was in the minds of many native Hawaiians, stating 
that “the aina is alive with mana [power], and we all know that it is wounded, 
and we need to heal it.” Dana Naone Hall, a native Hawaiian activist on 
Maui and wife of the environmental lawyer Isaac Hall, called for “a com-
plete cessation of military use” and the immediate return of the island to 
the state of Hawai‘i “prior to its ultimate conveyance to a sovereign Native 
Hawaiian entity.” Charles Maxwell voiced similar sentiments. Politicians of 
every stripe, representatives of the Sierra Club, members of the International 
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Longshoremen and Warehousemen’s Union, and officers of Maui Historical 
Society supported the testimony of native Hawaiians. Most poignant was 
the testimony of Inez Ashdown, the last living descendant of those who had 
once been ranchers on Kaho‘olawe. Ill and unable to attend the hearings, the 
ninety-two-year-old Ashdown had a priest present her testimony. The priest 
began by noting that Ashdown was one of the few people alive who had 
known the Kingdom of Hawai‘i’s last queen, Lili‘uokalani. “Though her body 
is very weak and old,” the priest said, Ashdown “speaks vehemently against 
those who have hurt it [Kaho‘olawe], those who have destroyed it.”⁷¹
 In the testimony given at the hearings and the results of a  state-
wide public opinion poll, the KICC found overwhelming support for an end 
to military use of Kaho‘olawe. Some  percent of the  people testify-
ing at the public hearings, as well as  percent of , Hawaiian residents 
chosen at random for polling by the governor of Hawai‘i’s Office of State 
Planning, wanted to halt all military activity immediately. Of those testify-
ing,  percent thought Kaho‘olawe should be given into the stewardship of 
the PKO and held by the state of Hawai‘i until some form of sovereignty for 
native Hawaiians was recognized. Of those polled,  percent believed that 
Kaho‘olawe should be relinquished by the federal government to their state 
government, but only  percent wanted the PKO to manage the island ( 
percent wanted the state government to do so). A poll of , Hawaiian 
residents in the February  edition of Honolulu Magazine revealed simi-
lar findings. It revealed that there was “nearly universal agreement” that the 
“best thing about Kaho‘olawe” was “the efforts to save the island/stop the 
bombing.”⁷²
 The polling and the hearings revealed a remarkable degree of support for 
the PKO and native Hawaiians, backing that had been much less widespread 
just ten or fifteen years earlier. Much had changed to explain the growing 
support. First and foremost was the work of native Hawaiians themselves. 
Their landings, along with the deaths of George Helm and Kimo Mitchell, 
had dramatized and simplified issues for many residents of the Hawaiian 
Islands, as Helm and Mitchell became almost unquestioned icons for those in 
the movement. Moreover, the maturing of the native Hawaiian renaissance, 
especially the PKO’s increasing reliance on lawsuits, made native Hawaiian 
demands seem less radical.
 The PKO’s changing approach also won acceptance from other Hawai-
ian residents. Even though they benefited from the spending of the federal 
government in their islands, such as its support of military establishments, 
Hawaiian residents resented what they saw as their colonial, second-rank 
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status. Such a reaction should not be surprising. Many western American 
residents harbored deep dislikes and suspicions of the federal government, 
even though their region had benefited inordinately from federal spending. 
The Sagebrush Rebellion of the s and s is perhaps the best-known 
manifestation of this feeling. Rebels in western states like Nevada called 
upon the federal government to give vast tracts of the public domain to the 
states, presumably so that the land might then be sold to private purchasers. 
Permeating the opposition of Hawaiian politicians to the navy’s bombing 
of Kaho‘olawe was a desire to take control of affairs away from the federal 
government. Much the same thinking, we shall see, affected developments in 
many of the other regions dealt with in this study, most notably in Alaska and 
Guam.⁷³ Then, too, Hawaiian residents found that they could back the PKO 
for their own reasons. Environmentalists, whose numbers greatly increased 
during the s and s, saw the movement to end the bombing as a 
major issue. While they might not agree with native Hawaiians about every 
detail of Kaho‘olawe’s future, they could easily agree that bombing should 
stop.
 Finally, navy officials were, at times, their own worst enemy. Throughout 
the s and s, they fought all efforts to limit their usage of Kaho‘olawe, 
giving ground only when forced to do so; they failed to move with the times. 
Consistently arguing that no other spot in the Pacific had the advantages 
offered by Kaho‘olawe for live-fire exercises, navy officials persisted in their 
stance even as the world around them changed. As America’s role in the con-
flict in Vietnam ended in the s, and as the Soviet Union disintegrated and 
the Cold War wound down in the s and s, the unwavering stance 
of the navy came to seem anachronistic to many Hawaiian residents: the 
navy simply became less relevant to their lives. Fewer and fewer Hawaiian 
residents were willing to accept the argument that bombing Kaho‘olawe was 
essential to America’s national security. In addition, the relative importance 
of military spending to the economy of the Hawaiian Islands decreased, 
making it easier for Hawaiian residents to forsake the navy. To some, the 
bombing even seemed to threaten desired touristic developments on nearby 
Maui.
 As the “major finding” of its final report to the federal government, the 
KICC declared that Kaho‘olawe was “a special place with unique and impor-
tant cultural, archaeological, historical, and environmental resources” and 
recommended that all “commercial activity and exploitation of resources” 
be prohibited. It concluded, moreover, “that all military use of Kaho‘olawe 
must cease, and that the State of Hawai‘i must guarantee in perpetuity that 
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the island and its surrounding water be used exclusively for the practice of 
traditional and contemporary Hawaiian culture, including religion—and for 
educational and scientific purposes.” The KICC asked that Kaho‘olawe be 
returned to the state “without conditions” and that the federal government 
“be responsible for the removal of unexploded ordnance . . . and that the 
island be restored to a condition reasonably safe for human habitation and 
human use.” The recommendations hearkened back to President Eisenhow-
er’s  order, which had stated that Kaho‘olawe would someday be returned 
to Hawai‘i in an appropriate condition for civilian use.⁷⁴
The Return of Kaho‘olawe
At sunrise on May , , native Hawaiians and their supporters on 
Kaho‘olawe walked down to the beach at Hakioawa—a major settlement in 
precontact days, and in the s the base camp for the PKO—to celebrate 
the island’s return to the state of Hawai‘i. In the early morning, the celebrants 
cleansed themselves by bathing in the ocean, changed into traditional dress, 
and gathered in front of a stone platform where a ceremony giving thanks 
for the return of Kaho‘olawe took place. “Linked in prayer” and with “feet 
rooted in the ‘aina,” the celebrants chanted and sang in the sunrise. As the sky 
turned blue, an ‘awa ceremony began, honoring those who had helped bring 
about the transfer. Offerings were made by PKO leaders to Kanaloa, god of 
the ocean, and to Lono, god of agriculture. Later in the day, the celebrants 
visited a rock where plaques honoring George Helm and Kimo Mitchell had 
been placed. Here Aluli spoke: “George Helm dreamed of the re-greening of 
the island. Now the island is home. It’s up to us to come back, to learn from 
the ‘aina and make it grow.” Finally, those on Kaho‘olawe formed a circle, 
joined hands around the Hawaiian flag, and exclaimed, “I ku wai! [stand 
together].”⁷⁵
 The official documents transferring Kaho‘olawe from the federal govern-
ment to the state of Hawai‘i had been signed the day before at a meeting on 
Maui. By their terms, the federal government gave up all claims of ownership 
to Kaho‘olawe to the state of Hawai‘i and agreed to clear unexploded ord-
nance from the island and complete its restoration within ten years. While 
the cleanup was under way, the navy would control access to the island, doing 
so, however, in close consultation with state officials. A congressional appro-
priation of $ million was to pay for the cleanup. After a decade, the navy 
would transfer all control to the state. State actions reinforced those of the 
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federal government. Hawai‘i established the Kaho‘olawe Island Reserve, con-
sisting of the island and its surrounding ocean waters, for the preservation of 
native Hawaiian cultural, spiritual, and subsistence practices. No commercial 
uses were allowed. State legislation also set up the Kaho‘olawe Island Reserve 
Commission (KIRC) to lead the cleanup in cooperation with the navy. Aluli, 
the former PKO activist, became the chair of the KIRC and was joined on 
the body by other PKO members. The KIRC recognized the PKO as “the 
landowner of the island, holding it in trust for the sovereign native Hawai-
ian entity when it is re-established and recognized by the state and federal 
governments.”⁷⁶
 Meanwhile, the KIRC set policies in a use plan promulgated in late 
. The commission was empowered to decide how thoroughly the many 
sections of the island were to be cleaned up. Under various agreements be-
tween the federal and state governments, about one-quarter of the surface of 
Kaho‘olawe was to be cleared of ordnance to the extent that it would be com-
pletely suitable for human use. Roughly three-quarters of the island were to 
be made reasonably safe. Working closely with the PKO, the KIRC listed thir-
teen areas for complete cleanup. As the land was cleared of ordnance, it was 
to be restored through the control of erosion, revegetation with native plant 
species, and the recharging of water tables. The KIRC’s plan also designated 
areas for the establishment of educational centers/work camps, overnight 
campsites, cultural/historical preserves, and botanical/wildlife preserves.⁷⁷
 Both the navy and the KIRC felt increasingly pressed for time to meet 
the cleanup deadline of , resulting in a change in priorities. While the 
KIRC initially insisted that the surface of the entire island be cleaned, it later 
agreed to the cleaning of  percent. The KIRC also agreed to less subsurface 
cleaning, selecting only those places that would be in high use. Federal efforts 
ended in November , with about  percent of the surface and  percent 
of the subsurface of Kaho‘olawe cleaned up. The management of access to the 
island was at that time turned over to the state of Hawai‘i. Kaho‘olawe was 
well on its way to becoming a religious, cultural, and educational center for 
Hawaiians.⁷⁸
Naval Live-Fire Operations Elsewhere in the Pacific and Caribbean
Despite the resolution of matters on Kaho‘olawe, the navy remained em-
broiled in controversies elsewhere in the Pacific. In , a federal court 
ordered the navy to cease using the tiny island of Farallon de Medinilla in 
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the U.S. Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, about fifty miles 
from Saipan, as a live-fire range. With Kaho‘olawe closed to shelling and 
bombing, this islet, which was about . miles wide, . miles long, and  
acres in area, was one of the few live-fire ranges the navy had in the Pacific. 
Although uninhabited by humans, it was the home of extensive birdlife, in-
cluding masked, brown, and red-footed boobies and great frigates. The inter-
national environmental group Earthjustice Legal Defense for the Center for 
Biological Diversity argued that the navy’s bombing was destroying the birds 
and their habitat. Navy officials opposed closing the island to live-fire exer-
cises. Showing just how complex matters could be, the congressional delegate 
from Guam and Saipan’s business leaders, who were often at odds with the 
federal government on other issues, supported the navy on this occasion. 
They feared that any move by the navy to lessen its operations in the North-
ern Marianas would harm the region’s economy. On appeal, navy lawyers 
succeeded in having the stay on its bombing lifted.⁷⁹
 Naval officers were less successful in getting their way in the Caribbean, 
as demonstrated by events involving the small American island of Vieques, 
Native Hawaiians restored Kaho‘olawe in the 1990s, with federal government funding. (Courtesy 
of the Kaho‘olawe Island Reserve Commission)
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located a few miles east of Puerto Rico. In , , and , protestors 
decried the navy’s use of large parts of Vieques as a bombing and gunnery 
range in terms and with methods very similar to those employed by native 
Hawaiians a generation earlier. A local referendum of the island’s residents 
revealed that two-thirds of them wanted the navy to stop all military use of 
their island. In statements reminiscent of the early opposition to the bomb-
ing of Kaho‘olawe, residents said that they feared that the bombs might go 
awry (an errant bomb killed a civilian in ) and that they thought that the 
bombing was bad for tourism and fishing. When the navy refused to stop the 
bombing, activists led by the vice president of Puerto Rico’s Independence 
Party moved onto the bombing range to dramatize their protests, and fisher-
men piloted their boats into forbidden waters around the island. Supported 
by the governor of Puerto Rico, the activists forced navy officials to the bar-
gaining table in , and a year later a compromise had been worked out. 
The navy greatly limited its military use of the island and restored parts of 
the bombing range to civilian use.⁸⁰
 The navy clearly needed ranges for live-fire bombing and shelling as 
the twenty-first century opened. The world remained an unsafe place, and 
America’s armed forces required places to practice their operations. But 
where would they be? The growing opposition to live-fire operations in both 
the Pacific and the Caribbean from the s onward left the navy with fewer 
options than had been the case in earlier times. Moreover, that opposition 
became more than a NIMBY (not in my backyard) affair. As opposition 
increasingly equated environmental with cultural matters, the navy found 
itself beset in ways that had not occurred in previous decades.
Conclusions
The campaign to end military use of Kaho‘olawe is revealing for what it illu-
minates about the development of environmentalism, particularly within 
the United States. As distinct from conservation movements, environmen-
talism developed as part of consumerism in the United States, particularly 
during the s and s. Americans came to regard a clean environment 
as almost an entitlement, similar to their right to possess advanced consumer 
goods, such as color televisions. As historian Samuel P. Hays has observed, 
“Environmentalism was a part of the history of consumption that stressed 
new aspects of the American standard of living.”⁸¹ As might be expected, 
local environmental groups composed mainly of middle-class Caucasians, 
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joined by local politicians, mounted the first major opposition to the navy’s 
bombing of Kaho‘olawe. The degradation of the island did not fit in with the 
advanced consumer society they thought they should have. It was not that 
they wanted to build shopping malls on the island but that many of them, 
such as Cravalho, hoped that the island could be used (consumed) as a park 
or a place for leisure-time activities such as fishing or hunting. They also saw 
a halt to bombing as a boon to the development of tourism on Maui. For 
them, nature had become something of a commodity.
 Many native Hawaiians viewed matters differently, and their entrance 
onto the environmental stage during the mid-s changed the nature of 
the campaign against the navy. Many thought of the island as a spiritual and 
cultural home and only secondarily, if at all, as a place for leisure-time hunt-
ing, fishing, and picnicking. They sought cultural renewal as well as envi-
ronmental restoration. No hotels, resorts, or appurtenances of consumerism, 
they insisted, should be allowed. For example, there would be no organized 
bicycle riding down Kaho‘olawe’s hills, nothing like the very popular eco-
tourism bicycling on Maui. A KIRC commissioner spoke for many native 
Hawaiians when she contrasted the restoration of Kaho‘olawe as an unde-
veloped, spiritual place to what she viewed with dismay as the touristic de-
velopment of Maui. Kaho‘olawe, she observed, “has a basis of culture that 
does not require condominiums, does not require cement walkways.”⁸² The 
landings of native Hawaiians in the s, along with their work through 
the courts in later decades, convinced other Hawaiian residents to accept 
the idea that Kaho‘olawe had special meaning for them and that they should 
become stewards for the island.
 The environmental activism of native Hawaiians resembled the drifting 
of some Americans into an environmental justice movement in the s 
and later. Garbage dumps, electric power plants, sewer facilities, and hazard-
ous waste sites seemed to be located near Indian reservations and in lower-
income, often black and Hispanic, urban areas. For instance, in his recent 
examination of Chicago, historian David Pellow has examined “conflicts 
over solid wastes and pollution in urban areas, particularly in communities 
of color” and “workplaces where immigrants and low-income populations 
live and labor.” By , about , local groups had been formed across 
the United States to oppose toxic-site placements. The environmental justice 
movement was interested as well in changing workplace conditions. In doing 
so, the movement, scholar Robert Gottlieb has written, began “to shift the 
definition of environmentalism away from the exclusive focus on consump-
tion to the sphere of work and production.”⁸³ Native Hawaiians faced some 
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of the same challenges as other minorities in the United States in environ-
mental justice matters, and for native Hawaiians the continuing destruction 
of what they viewed as their land, the island of Kaho‘olawe, by an outside 
force, the U.S. Navy, came to symbolize all that was wrong with how they had 
been treated by Americans for over a century.
 With its emphasis on the spiritual and cultural value of the land, how-
ever, the native Hawaiian version of environmentalism also differed from 
the ideas espoused in the environmental justice movement. The efforts of 
native Hawaiians to reassert control over Kaho‘olawe resembled closely the 
work of other indigenous peoples—ranging from Native Americans to the 
Maori of New Zealand to the Chamorros on Guam—to regain lands lost 
to western powers. Many native Hawaiians came to see their work as part 
of a larger transnational, anticolonial movement, part of a reintegration of 
the Pacific, and continue to do so to the present day. The native Hawaiian 
effort to “heal” Kaho‘olawe came to stress a perceived sacredness of the earth 
and was incompatible with any efforts to put the island to economically 
productive use, even environmentally friendly use. As Helm had written in 
introspective notes not intended for publication: “My veins are carrying the 
blood of a people who understand the sacredness of the land and water. 
This is my culture & no matter how remote the past is, it does not make 
my culture extinct.” He concluded, “We are Hawaiians first, activists second.” 
While partially romanticizing the lives and thoughts of the Hawaiians who 
had once lived on Kaho‘olawe (for Hawaiian actions, especially their agricul-
tural plantings, had begun altering the island well before the first westerners 
arrived), Helm voiced sentiments shared by some other leaders of Pacific 
peoples. Like Helm, they partially mythologized the pasts of their groups as 
a way of understanding and achieving goals in the present.⁸⁴
 Kaho‘olawe’s story is mainly a rural one, though many of the native 
Hawaiian and environmental leaders involved in it were urbanites. The next 
chapter turns to two major urban areas of the Pacific: Silicon Valley in the 
San Francisco Bay area and Seattle in Puget Sound. In these regions seem-
ingly different economic development and environmental issues were played 
out; but beneath the surface, and not very far underneath it at that, many of 
the same Pacific and global issues raised in restoring Kaho‘olawe surfaced 
again.
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The Pacific Coast
Seattle and Silicon Valley
 Writing in  about the Seattle area, Philip Herrara, a journalist for Fortune Magazine, observed that the region was “a lovely land blessed with a mild, moist climate” and “tall, rugged mountains.” 
The area was, however, “in the grip of a tremendous boom” about which the 
“two million presumed beneficiaries seem to have decidedly ambivalent feel-
ings.” The reason for doubt was not far to seek, Herrara thought. Economic 
growth was creating “a monster city actually known by the monstrous name 
Pugetopolis.” That awkward-sounding name came from Puget Sound, the 
inlet of the Pacific Ocean on which Seattle fronted. “With roads, housing 
subdivisions, and strip developments encroaching on the landscape,” Herrara 
concluded, “the region’s residents are naturally beginning to see further de-
velopment as a threat to the unique charm that has made their way of life so 
attractive.”¹ By , the Seattle region covered an area a hundred miles long 
and sixty miles wide and was home to more than  million residents.²
 Much the same transition from rural to urban and suburban occurred 
around other Pacific Coast cities.³ Benefiting from military spending for 
World War II and the Cold War, the cities boomed. Here, as in other Pacific 
possessions of the United States, the federal government was of great impor-
tance. Nowhere was population growth and expansive development more 
apparent than in parts of the San Francisco Bay region, especially the south-
ern section known as Silicon Valley. For decades, fruit growing and process-
ing had, in the words of a publication of the California state government 
in , led many to think of the region as “ ‘The Valley of Heart’s Delight’ 
because of its scenic attractions, mild climate, and diversified agriculture.”⁴ 
The situation dramatically changed during the s and s and later, as 
high-technology firms, supporting businesses, new highways, and housing 
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blanketed the area. The white blossoms of plum and apple trees became rare 
as orchards were uprooted. Writing in , journalist Cathy Newman aptly 
described Silicon Valley as “an extended suburb of flat monotony . . . a ter-
rain made visible by the grace of fluorescent and halogen light, connected by 
concrete tentacles of freeway.”⁵
 This chapter examines the development of Silicon Valley and the Seattle 
region as high-technology and industrial districts after World War II and 
looks at what those developments meant for people living in the areas. High-
technology firms created tens of thousands of jobs, as those companies kept 
Americans on the cutting edge of technological advances in their industries 
worldwide. However, exuberant growth created problems. The rearrangement 
of the physical landscape was a major part of the story, and reactions against 
those alterations led to the birth of grassroots environmentalism. Economic 
development was uneven, as some sections of Pugetopolis and Silicon Valley 
benefited more from growth than others. Moreover, the burden of health 
hazards in making computer chips fell on production-line workers, many 
of whom were immigrant Asian women—part of the Pacific-wide migra-
tion—who were paid low wages. Then, too, Native Americans were displaced. 
Environmental justice was at stake, in some ways similar to what was taking 
place on Kaho‘olawe.
The Development of Silicon Valley
The name “Silicon Valley” originated with a reporter for Electronic News who 
wrote a journalistic history of the San Francisco Bay area’s semiconductor 
industry in .⁶ The name stuck, because the region was home to building 
computer hardware, which used silicon in great quantities. The geographic 
area came to include about , square miles running from the outskirts of 
San Francisco south along the San Francisco Peninsula through Santa Clara 
County, with the city of San Jose at its center.⁷ Silicon was (and is) a primary 
raw material used in making semiconductors and integrated circuits. Silicon 
transmits electricity well, and is thus a semiconductor, and so could be used 
in making transistors, which are in effect very small switches to control the 
flow of electricity. In , William Shockley and others at Bell Laboratories 
in New York invented the transistor. Seven years later, Shockley moved to Sili-
con Valley, where he started Shockley Transistor Laboratories. Soon, leaders 
of firms in Silicon Valley and Texas combined transistors with other devices 
on silicon wafers to make integrated circuits. Integrated circuits were (and 
 The Pacific Coast 
are) capable of sending complex electrical signals from miniaturized com-
ponents. Transistors and integrated circuits quickly replaced bulky and less 
reliable vacuum tubes in such tasks. By the early s, Silicon Valley firms 
were assembling not just integrated circuits but also microprocessors, the 
hearts of personal computers.⁸ Resulting environmental problems—heavy 
metal pollution of water supplies and the emission of poisonous fumes—
were not addressed for nearly a generation.
 Small and medium-size firms were the lifeblood of California’s Silicon 
Valley. Nimble, ever-changing, and amorphous, they made the region the 
foremost high-technology center in the world after World War II. As scholar 
Annalee Saxenian has explained, these companies formed “a regional net-
work-based industrial system that promotes collective learning and flexible 
adjustment among specialist producers of a complex of related technolo-
gies.”⁹ There was, however, more to the development of Silicon Valley than a 
collection of small firms. A wide variety of developments came together in 
what might be called a “hot mix” to create the high-technology region. The 
work of people at nearby universities, the labors of business entrepreneurs, 
and the availability of federal government spending for military purposes 
were all central in the initial development of the Valley.¹⁰
 Silicon Valley did not spring up overnight. Although sometimes over-
looked, high-technology developments in the San Francisco Bay area pre-
dated the emergence of Silicon Valley. In the early s, engineers, business-
men from Sacramento, and the president of Stanford University formed the 
Federal Telegraph Company (FTC) in Palo Alto. FTC employees developed 
new ways to send radio messages for the U.S. Navy. World War I brought in 
orders from the navy and army, but orders declined after the conflict. Patent 
disputes with the very aggressive Radio Corporation of America (RCA) also 
pummeled the FTC, leading the firm to move in new directions and to spin 
off new ventures: Magnavox in , Fischer Research Laboratories in , 
and Litton Industries in . Such spin-offs would become a hallmark of the 
Valley in later years. The FTC itself moved from the San Francisco Bay area 
to New Jersey in . The FTC had been purchased by another company, 
which decided to consolidate its research work in Newark. Many other engi-
neers and high-technology companies were active in the San Francisco Bay 
area, demonstrating the first all-electronic transmission of a television image 
in  and developing the gammatron tube a bit later.¹¹
 Particular individuals were important. “If anyone deserved to be called 
the ‘father of Silicon Valley,’ ” historians Stuart Leslie and Robert Kargon have 
written, “it was Frederick Terman.” As a faculty member in engineering, later 
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as the dean of engineering, and finally as the provost of Stanford University, 
Terman pioneered in the establishment of connections between academia 
and industry, trained students in high-technology fields, and helped those 
students get started in business. Two of his best-known graduate students, 
William Hewlett and David Packard, formed Hewlett-Packard in , using 
a loan of $ from Terman to begin the business. Other start-ups, often 
formed by Terman’s students, were also important. Charles Litton established 
Litton Industries in , and Sigurd and Russell Varian started Varian Asso-
ciates a few years later.¹²
 Prodded by Terman, Stanford University established the Stanford Indus-
trial Park in the early s. Renamed the Stanford Research Park (SRP) in 
, this land became the nation’s first high-technology park. Its develop-
ment, historian Margaret Pugh O’Mara has explained, benefited from being 
on the “right side” of important demographic and economic trends in the 
United States. First was the growing importance of research universities in 
higher education. Located in Palo Alto, a close-in suburb of San Francisco, 
Stanford evolved as a regional educational facility before World War II, but 
federal spending transformed it into a national powerhouse in electronics 
and engineering during the Cold War. Second, Stanford was suburban at a 
time when more and more Americans, including engineers and scientists, 
wanted to live in suburbs. Its suburban location also meant that Stanford had 
the land upon which a research park could be built. Third, Stanford’s location 
fit in with the decentralization and dispersal tactics begun by the Depart-
ment of Defense during World War II, an effort to move plants out of the 
Northeast where, it was feared, they might be vulnerable to enemy attack.¹³
 The SRP soon bustled with activity. In a bucolic, campus-like setting, 
where buildings seemed to blend into the rolling hills of the countryside, 
the SRP accepted Varian Associates as its first tenant, a move that success-
fully brought together academic researchers and businesspeople. By , the 
SRP housed forty-two companies employing , workers. Six years later, 
the SRP boasted sixty firms with almost , employees.¹⁴ As some of the 
high-technology firms in the SRP and nearby areas developed, they “hived 
off” many new, smaller companies. A case in point was Fairchild Semicon-
ductor, founded in  by Robert Noyce and other scientists who broke 
away from Shockley Transistor Laboratories. During the s, employees 
who left Fairchild to capitalize on their specialized knowledge founded over 
two dozen semiconductor-related companies. Called “Fairchildren,” these 
small firms added greatly to the vibrancy of Silicon Valley. Noyce himself 
left Fairchild to help start the firm that became Intel in .¹⁵
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 Military spending linked different eras in the development of the SRP 
and, more generally, of Silicon Valley. As historian Stuart W. Leslie has pointed 
out, “it may not be too much of an exaggeration to say that the Department 
of Defense was the original ‘angel’ of Silicon Valley—a relationship that . . . 
goes back to before World War I.” From the early radio days, the military was 
a significant purchaser of electronics products, but it was World War II that 
gave the “infant West Coast industry a chance to show what it could do.”¹⁶ 
Hewlett-Packard, which had been founded near San Jose a few years earlier, 
saw the number of its employees jump from nine in  to one hundred in 
 and its annual sales mushroom from $, to $ million in the same 
years. The Cold War and the very hot Korean War further benefited Califor-
nia’s high-technology companies. Between  and , California firms 
received $ billion in prime defense contracts, allowing the state to displace 
New York as the nation’s leading recipient of defense contracts. Aerospace 
ventures in Southern California received much of the funding, but those in 
Silicon Valley, Leslie has noted, “won their share.” By the late s, the Valley 
trailed only Los Angeles (and surpassed San Diego) as a recipient of defense 
funding in the Golden State. Sensing opportunities, eastern high-technology 
firms moved west. Lockheed Missiles and Aerospace opened a major manu-
facturing facility in Sunnyvale, near Stanford University, in . Soon em-
ploying , workers there and at a research facility in Palo Alto, Lockheed 
served as “a crucial catalyst for further high-technology growth.”¹⁷
 By the early s, what had been a small cluster of companies had 
expanded into a full-fledged high-technology district. At first, executives 
located their operations near Stanford University, but they soon spread them 
southward down the San Francisco peninsula. Confined by natural bound-
aries of mountains and ocean, the companies formed a very dense network 
of enterprises. As Silicon Valley matured, individual entrepreneurs and small 
firms remained at its core, and their work helps explain the Valley’s suc-
cess as a high-technology district.¹⁸ Most of the makers of computer hard-
ware and software, producers of communications equipment, and manu-
facturers of defense products were smaller firms that consciously avoided 
vertical integration. (Vertically integrated companies embrace all or most 
of the stages of production and sales within one corporate entity.) Instead 
of trying to internalize all facets of their companies’ work in single firms, 
Silicon Valley entrepreneurs got ahead by forming a large, informal, flexible 
network of linked but independent companies. Located in one region, this 
agglomeration of many small businesses allowed producers to benefit from 
economies of scale without forming big businesses. Proximity encouraged 
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communications among the firms and stimulated growth. Bars and restau-
rants, along with institutions such as professional and business associations, 
where scientists and entrepreneurs could meet informally, encouraged the 
spread of information among the firms. Then, too, workers moving from job 
to job—for job-hopping was very common—spread information across firm 
boundaries. By the late s, Silicon Valley possessed nearly three thousand 
electronics firms,  percent of which had fewer than ten employees and  
percent of which had fewer than .¹⁹
 Not all Silicon Valley firms were small, however. As early as , Lock-
heed Missiles and Aerospace employed , workers at its Sunnyvale 
establishments and soon gave jobs to thousands more. Hewlett-Packard em-
ployed tens of thousands of workers in the s and s. Some of the 
larger firms were branches of foreign companies, which wanted to have “eyes 
and ears” in the Valley. Korean and Japanese companies established sizeable 
operations during the s. Many of the big businesses tended, at least in the 
s and s, to act in ways typical of smaller ventures. Hewlett-Packard 
was long known, for example, for its informal management style and pater-
nalistic work practices, popularized as the “HP Way.”²⁰
 Companies of all sizes benefited from continued federal government 
spending for defense. In , San Jose, the capital of Silicon Valley, was the 
leading community in the United States in terms of the value of prime de-
fense contracts per employed worker—at $,, more than four times the 
average for workers in American cities. Washington, DC, was a distant sec-
ond at $,, and Los Angeles–Long Beach trailed in ninth place at $,. 
Seattle-Everett was eleventh at ,.²¹ The relative significance of mili-
tary spending to the economic development of Silicon Valley declined in 
the s, as defense spending plummeted early in that decade.²² A sign of 
the changing times was that Lockheed employed only about six thousand 
workers in Silicon Valley by .²³ Nonetheless, defense contracts remain 
important to the Valley to the present day.
 Specialized service firms aided the maturation of the Valley as a high-
technology region. Adopting the informal style of their high-technology 
clients, law firms proliferated with the Valley’s development. The number of 
Palo Alto law firms rose from thirty-five in the mid-s to sixty-nine in 
. Moreover, they increased in size. In the mid-s, the largest Palo Alto 
firms had only  lawyers apiece, but by  they boasted as many as  
attorneys each. The firms specialized in patent, copyright, and intellectual 
property law, but their members did much more than simply handle legal 
cases for their clients; they acted as business counselors and deal makers of 
 The Pacific Coast 
all sorts.²⁴ Similarly, venture-capital firms performed many functions for the 
high-technology enterprises. Their members provided much of the financing 
for the expansion of high-technology companies. Between  and , 
thirty venture-capital firms located in Silicon Valley, many of them on Sand 
Hill Road in Palo Alto. Their members assumed a “hands-on” relationship 
with their clients, just as did members of the law firms. Taking substantial 
equity positions in their client firms, they sat on their boards of directors, 
offered business advice of all types, and often helped spread information 
from firm to firm.²⁵
 The flexibility of the many small firms, and of Silicon Valley as a whole, 
spelled success for decades. The suburban nature of the Valley and the small, 
decentralized character of the thousands of companies reinforced each other 
to create a high-technology juggernaut. Between  and , forty-five 
semiconductor firms began business in the United States, and forty of these 
were in the Santa Clara Valley, at the south end of the Silicon Valley. During 
the same period, about , new jobs were added to the region.²⁶ Many of 
these were high-technology jobs. (Not all were, for some were in companies 
servicing the high-technology firms.) Silicon Valley firms employed about 
, high-technology workers in . By , that number had jumped 
to ,.²⁷
 Even so, Silicon Valley companies faced a major crisis in the mid-s 
and early s, when they lost the market for semiconductors to fierce 
competition from Japanese companies. In , American companies were 
making about  percent of the world’s semiconductors, but by  their 
share had dropped to only  percent. Semiconductors had shifted from 
being a custom to a commodity product, in which low-cost production had 
become the watchword. Between  and , about  percent of the 
semiconductor employees in the Valley lost their jobs.²⁸
 Silicon Valley partially recovered in the s. It boomed with the ad-
vent of commercial applications for the Internet for most of the s, only 
to partially collapse in a “dot-com” bust as the decade closed. As late as , 
the market for high-technology stocks remained hot.²⁹ Soon, however, the 
respected British business magazine The Economist expressed growing 
doubts about there being “a new era” in business in which “the economy 
would grow by . percent a year forever” and in which “inflation and the 
business cycle were dead.” It was all, the journal feared, “a bubble.”³⁰ Stock 
prices plummeted in the spring of . By May, reporters for the Wall Street 
Journal wrote about “a pileup of corpses in the land of dot-coms,” and in 
July journalists for the Economist discussed high-technology firms as going 
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“from dot.com to dot.bomb.”³¹ The Wall Street Journal reported in mid- 
that losses incurred by high-technology firms in the previous year had wiped 
out all the profits they had earned since . Looking at the earnings of the 
, companies that listed their stocks on the Nasdaq, the paper concluded 
that recent losses were so great that it was as if the boom of the mid- and late 
s had never occurred.³²
 Still other problems assailed Silicon Valley. Even as some firms gener-
ated new jobs there, others outsourced jobs abroad, especially by setting up 
silicon-chip-fabrication and computer-assembly operations in Southeast 
Asia. Fairchild put up a plant in Hong Kong as early as , and in the s 
many other firms followed suit. Many production firms relied on “tempo-
rary” workers who received few benefits. Those companies followed addi-
tional strategies to cut their costs, as was happening in a broad range of com-
panies across America.³³
 Silicon Valley’s overall success in job generation led to efforts to replicate 
the high-technology district elsewhere. As early as the s and s, Ter-
man was involved in these actions. In New Jersey he worked with Bell Labs, 
high-technology firms, and university leaders to try to establish a “Silicon 
Valley East.” The venture failed when the companies and the educational 
facilities proved unable to cooperate. New Jersey’s high-technology firms de-
veloped, as a consequence, more as individual companies than as part of an 
industrial district. In the Dallas–Fort Worth area, Terman’s work with high-
technology companies and Southern Methodist University was cut short by 
a recession that dried up funding.³⁴
 Leaders in other regions sought with mixed results to emulate the de-
velopment of Silicon Valley. Despite efforts by the president of Renasselaer 
Polytechnic Institute and leaders of nearby businesses, it proved impossible 
to develop a full-fledged high-technology district around Troy, New York, 
in the s. The lack of a strong regional industrial base thwarted such 
efforts.³⁵ Similarly, attempts to build a high-technology district around the 
Georgia Institute of Technology, in conscious emulation of Terman’s work in 
the San Francisco Bay area, only partially succeeded. State legislators proved 
fickle in financing Georgia Tech. Similarly, lacking massive federal spending 
and an adequate land base, the University of Pennsylvania experienced only 
partial success in trying to create a high-technology district in the s and 
s.³⁶ There were some successes. Working with university leaders, North 
Carolina Governor Luther Hodges used the research and development capa-
bilities of the University of North Carolina and two other state universi-
ties to attract high-technology companies. In the mid-s, he succeeded 
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in creating the Research Triangle Park, which became the chief southern 
challenger to Silicon Valley. Another high-technology district emerged in 
Austin, Texas, with the University of Texas at its center.³⁷ In the Boston area, 
large high-technology firms clustered along Route . Lacking the flexibility 
of Silicon Valley, however, the Boston region declined, in relative terms, as a 
high-technology district after the s.³⁸
 A pattern of mixed successes and failures characterized attempts to bol-
ster economies in the United States’ Pacific possessions. Among the many 
regions to embrace high-technology business as its economic savior were 
the Hawaiian Islands, especially the island of Maui. Hard-hit by declines in 
the plantation-agriculture crops of sugarcane and pineapple, Maui’s resi-
dents turned to other avenues of economic advance. Some sought economic 
growth through the development of tourism, but that industry experienced 
ups and downs with fluctuations in the global economy. And, of course, not 
all Hawaiian residents, certainly not all native Hawaiians, favored touristic 
developments. Well into the s, high-technology businesses seemed to 
offer solutions to Maui’s economic difficulties without harming the island’s 
environment. However, problems arose in trying to turn high-technology 
dreams into realities.
 Well aware of their island’s economic difficulties, Maui’s political and 
business leaders formed the Maui Economic Development Board (MEDB) 
in  to diversify their island’s economy, especially by nurturing high-tech-
nology ventures through the creation of the Maui Research and Technology 
Park (MRTP). Those forming the MEDB, and its child the MRTP, believed 
that high-technology businesses could become a “third leg” of Maui’s econ-
omy, along with agriculture and tourism.³⁹ The MEDB entered into agree-
ments with the state of Hawai‘i, the University of Hawai‘i, Maui County, and 
the federal government to try to make the MRTP a reality.⁴⁰
 State and federal funding helped. State Senator Mamoru Yamasaki per-
suaded the state government to finance the first major building to serve 
as an incubator for newly formed high-technology companies. The state’s 
agreement to participate in the MRTP broke an impasse. Private firms con-
structed a second building, a state-of-the-art commercial office complex. 
Next came the Maui High Performance Computing Center, complete with 
a very powerful supercomputer, made possible by funding from the federal 
government secured by Senator Daniel Inouye. Other installations followed 
in the s. Still, it proved difficult to attract tenants. A major challenge lay 
in a dearth of scientists and technicians on Maui. MEDB members hoped 
to upgrade scientific education in the island’s public schools and labored 
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to improve higher education as well. They wanted especially to turn Maui 
Community College into a major four-year research institution. They failed 
in this unrealistic goal, for state funding to do so was not available. The lack 
of a four-year university on Maui hurt badly.⁴¹
 Only in the late s did the MRTP begin to fulfill its promise. By the 
winter of , about twenty companies, mainly small businesses, and orga-
nizations there employed about  people. High-technology companies had 
not, however, yet become a third leg of Maui’s economy.⁴² Nor, despite con-
siderable government support, had that occurred elsewhere in the Hawaiian 
Islands, which lacked many of the factors needed to attract high-technology 
businesses—elements ranging from the possession of a first-class scientific 
research university to the existence of government policies favorable toward 
businesses. High tax rates hurt business development in Hawai‘i, for example. 
In , Forbes Magazine ranked Honolulu th out of  regions—third 
from the bottom of the list—in the United States as a desirable place in which 
to conduct high-technology businesses.⁴³
 There was more success in another Pacific region influenced by the 
United States, South Korea. Here Terman was important. Korean leaders had 
long stressed technical education and research as important parts of its de-
velopment strategy, and Chung Hee Park continued this policy after he took 
power in . The United States government was also very important, its 
cooperation part of its efforts to build up allies in the Pacific. In , Park 
secured $ million in development loans from the United States, including 
some for the Korean Institute of Science and Technology (KIST). Ameri-
can officials selected Terman to head a committee to assess the feasibility of 
KIST’s proposals and projects, and Terman, along with two of his protégés, 
who were also on that committee, toured Korea in , meeting with gov-
ernment officials and business executives.⁴⁴
 From those meetings, and earlier conferences, came the idea for the 
Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), situated in 
the Korean government’s Ministry of Science and Technology. KAIST was 
originally envisioned as a graduate-only institution, to have  masters-
level and  doctoral-level students in such fields as electronics, polymers, 
and pharmaceuticals. The institute would have close ties with industry, just 
like those binding Stanford to the many firms in Silicon Valley. Backed partly 
by American funding, the KAIST succeeded. By the mid-s, it had , 
students, two-thirds of whom were at the masters level. Its graduates contrib-
uted in important ways to South Korea’s advances in high-technology fields, 
for example in the making of D-RAM chips. In , KAIST moved from 
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Seoul to the Taedok Science Town, about sixty miles to the south, and South 
Korean planners transformed that city into a technopolis. A combination of 
American aid and advice and South Korean know-how had worked over a 
decade and a half of consistent effort.⁴⁵
 As developments across the United States and its Pacific territories dem-
onstrated, it was not a simple matter to replicate Silicon Valley. Many factors 
had to come together for high-technology districts to succeed. Having flexible, 
entrepreneurial firms seemed necessary, but they were not by themselves a 
guarantee of success. Governmental spending, such as the defense spending 
so important for Silicon Valley firms, helped. So did the presence of a nearby 
research university, such as Stanford, especially if researchers from that in-
stitution interacted with high-technology entrepreneurs and service busi-
nesses such as specialized venture-capital firms and law firms. Even though 
success was difficult, many areas hoped to become new Silicon Valleys in the 
early twenty-first century. In their aspirations, people in these regions tended 
to overlook the many downsides of Silicon Valley’s development.⁴⁶
Environmental Problems in Silicon Valley
The problems in Silicon Valley constituted a dark side to the region’s growth. 
In their recent wide-ranging historical account, David Pellow and Lisa Park 
have observed, “ ‘The Valley of the Heart’s Delight’ is often referred to as the 
‘Valley of the Toxic Fright’ by environmentalists and occupational health 
advocates.” They have noted that the “Valley holds many dubious distinctions, 
including hosting the highest density of federally designated toxic Super-
fund sites anywhere in the nation.”⁴⁷ Looking at the status of women workers 
in the Valley, Glenna Matthews has written that the development of Silicon 
Valley was achieved only at considerable human cost. The “biggest cost,” she 
has concluded, “has been paid by the assembly workers: exposed to toxic 
chemicals, poorly compensated.”⁴⁸ In his account of Mexican Americans, 
the largest minority group in Silicon Valley, the historian Stephen Pitti has 
also decried the costs to workers of the district’s development. While stress-
ing that they were not simply victims, Pitti has pointed out that “few ethnic 
Mexicans enjoyed runaway economic success in the Gold-Rush atmosphere 
of the late-twentieth-century information age.”⁴⁹ Many lived in poverty.
 Far from being clean and offering opportunities to all, Silicon Valley’s 
high-technology industries created a host of environmental problems, which 
raised serious quality-of-life questions. Crowding, congestion, and air and 
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water pollution affected nearly everyone in the region by the s and s. 
Health issues, however, most affected production-line workers. As late as 
, making an eight-inch silicon wafer required , gallons of deionized 
water (in addition to gallons of regular water), , cubic feet of bulk gasses, 
 cubic feet of hazardous gasses, and  pounds of chemicals. Production 
processes created , gallons of waste water and  pounds of hazardous 
waste.⁵⁰
 Unless handled carefully, these substances harmed the health of workers. 
Too often, few safeguards were in place, especially in the early days. Chemi-
cal fumes, corrosive acids, and other toxic substances assailed production-
line workers, who were usually not warned of the dangerous circumstances 
under which they labored as they fabricated wafers and assembled electron-
ics products. According to a  report by the state of California, workers 
in semiconductor plants suffered from illnesses at a rate three times greater 
than that of workers in general manufacturing. A year later, another state 
report, this one about forty-two California semiconductor firms, revealed 
that nearly half of elevated illness rates their workers incurred came from 
systemic poisoning or toxic exposure.⁵¹
 A pioneering investigation in  summarized many of the dangers. 
Prepared by the director of the Labor Occupational Health Program at the 
University of California, Berkeley, and the safety coordinator in the Santa 
Clara County Office of Education, the report was damning. It found that 
“electronics is not a sterile, clean industry,” but rather one using “hundreds of 
potentially dangerous substances.” Organic solvents used in cleaning opera-
tions caused “a range of health problems, including dermatitis; central ner-
vous system effects, such as nausea, dizziness, and headaches; liver and kid-
ney damage; and even cancer.” Corrosive acids caused “serious burns” and 
“lung damage.” Moreover, “other toxic substances, including gasses such as 
arsine and phosphine, metals such as lead and other solders, and epoxies, 
pose[d] additional risks.” Finally, “reproductive hazards” included “radiation 
and various chemicals.”⁵²
 These dangers fell heavily on a largely immigrant workforce. Liberaliza-
tion of America’s immigration laws in , combined with the lure of jobs 
in California, pulled new workers into the San Francisco Bay area. Many 
ended up in Silicon Valley. Hispanics and Asians, especially, took part in the 
new immigration into the United States. The movement of Asians into the 
San Francisco Bay area was an important element in the Pacific Diaspora. In 
the two decades after , for example, , Filipinos came to the United 
States, with nearly  percent settling in western America. Filipino women 
were a very important component of Silicon Valley’s workforce.⁵³
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 Relatively few of the immigrants to the San Francisco area found mana-
gerial positions. In , Latinos held a scant  percent and Asians only  
percent of Santa Clara Valley’s high-technology managerial white-collar 
jobs. Another  percent of the craft jobs were held by Latino employees, 
 percent by Asian workers. By way of contrast, Latinos filled  percent of 
the jobs classified as belonging to “operatives” or “laborers,” and Asians held 
an additional  percent of them.⁵⁴ In the early s, about  percent of 
the electronics workers were women, and at least  percent of them were 
minorities, mainly Hispanic and Asian. By way of contrast, white males com-
prised  percent of the managers. Fifteen years later, the situation remained 
about the same. In , Hispanics held only  percent of the white-collar 
jobs in Silicon Valley’s high-technology industries, but  percent of the 
blue-collar ones in original manufacturing firms and  percent of those in 
contract companies. Asians had  percent of all white-collar positions, but 
 percent of the blue-collar jobs in original manufacturers and  percent 
of those in contract firms.⁵⁵
 Environmental challenges caused by high-technology manufacturing 
extended beyond the workplace. Nowhere were problems worse than in the 
pollution of groundwater supplies. Silicon Valley drew mainly on ground-
water in aquifers for its industrial and drinking water. By the early s, it 
was becoming apparent that toxic-waste water from high-technology manu-
facturing was contaminating the aquifers. The discovery of toxic chemicals, 
which were used to clean microchips and computer boards, in the soil and 
water near a Fairchild plant and an IBM plant in the early s turned out 
to be just the tip of the iceberg. Testing by governmental authorities soon 
revealed that  of  companies examined had released toxic chemicals 
into the ground beneath them. Some  wells providing drinking water had 
been contaminated, and  plots of land were too toxic for humans to walk 
on. Making the problem worse than it might have otherwise been was the 
fact that some , old wells, uncased and uncapped, once used to provide 
water for the irrigation of orchards allowed chemicals easy access to Sili-
con Valley’s groundwater. By the late s, the Environmental Protection 
Agency had designated twenty-nine Superfund sites in the Valley, more than 
in any other county in America. Twenty-four of the sites resulted from pol-
lution by electronics firms.⁵⁶
 Among those districts hit hardest by the water pollution was east San 
Jose, home to the barrio in which many Chicanos lived. Long neglected by 
San Jose’s city officials, east San Jose had historically lacked services found 
throughout the rest of the city. As late as the s, children played in gulches 
containing raw sewage. Many streets remained unpaved and without side-
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walks or public lighting. After , San Jose’s “Latino community boomed in 
size” until it came to “comprise more than  percent of the city by , but 
its recent history only highlighted the Valley’s greatest constant, the power of 
race for structuring local political and cultural developments,” Pitti has ob-
served.⁵⁷ Not surprisingly, perhaps, it was the water supply for the Los Paseos 
neighborhood that was among those found to be most contaminated—by 
seepage from tanks on Fairchild’s property. An investigation revealed “an ap-
parent clustering of birth defects, miscarriages, stillbirths” over a three-year 
period.⁵⁸
 Complaints from women in the area, together with the efforts of activist 
lawyers, led to the formation of a grassroots environmental movement. Tra-
ditional national environmental groups held back, perhaps because many of 
their members were managers in high-technology firms. Two local organi-
zations were of most importance. Having held community workshops about 
chemical solvents even before the discovery of the first release, the one at the 
Fairchild plant, the Santa Clara Center for Occupational Safety and Health 
(SCCOSH) greatly expanded its operations after it. Formed in response to 
the Fairchild spill, the Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) also soon 
increased the scope of its work. That work soon brought results. Fairchild 
closed its plant in south San Jose in  and spent $ million on remedia-
tion work. In contrast, many other companies persisted in denying any re-
sponsibility for damages to the environment or to the health of their workers. 
In fact, many executives initially blamed their workers for the health prob-
lems, accusing women employees who complained about illnesses as suffer-
ing from “hysteria.”⁵⁹
 They changed their stances in the s as a result of continuing pres-
sure from local environmental groups and the federal government. In her 
discussion of workers’ health issues in Silicon Valley, Matthews observed that 
by the opening years of the twenty-first century there had been “real and im-
portant progress,” but she has also noted that “the problem is still serious.”⁶⁰ 
Similarly, Pellow and Park conclude their account of quests for labor and 
environmental justice in the Valley with the observation that “labor and en-
vironmental justice organizations have made their mark on Silicon Valley’s 
political and economic terrain.” Still, they question “whether they can con-
tinue to reform an industry that is growing more rapidly around the globe 
than any other.”⁶¹
 Although environmental concerns involving toxic substances were of 
the most immediate concern to production-line workers in Silicon Valley, 
planning matters, especially urban planning issues, were not far behind. Just 
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as the development of high-technology businesses brought many more bene-
fits to white-collar than blue-collar workers, it also brought greater benefits 
to some sections of the San Francisco Bay area than to others. The develop-
ment of Silicon Valley exacerbated earlier uneven patterns of growth in the 
region, as did high-technology developments in the Seattle region slightly 
later. Private market forces, not government planning, with the important 
exception of military spending, dictated the early economic development 
of Silicon Valley. Land-use planning and planning for water resources were 
minimal, setting the stage for later problems such as traffic congestion and 
groundwater pollution.
 Unplanned growth in California replicated a general lack of planning 
elsewhere in the nation. This situation might be expected, for the San Fran-
cisco Bay area had long developed in a chaotic way. Efforts to rebuild San 
Francisco after its horrific  fire and earthquake in a designed manner 
proved largely abortive, despite the fact that a city plan had been drafted in 
. Then, too, regional planning efforts for the development of transporta-
tion, though much discussed, won scant approval and were not implemented 
in the years before World War II. None of these facts should be surprising; 
America’s Pacific Coast cities developed in mainly unplanned ways in these 
decades. They simply contained too many different groups of people with 
many diverse ideas and were growing too quickly, at least into the s, to 
embrace urban planning.⁶²
 Increased planning efforts, especially regional planning, accompanied 
World War II and continued after that conflict. In , federal officials estab-
lished a Metropolitan Defense Council (MDC) composed of local business-
men and politicians to try to improve the San Francisco Bay area’s infrastruc-
ture for the war effort. The MDC in turn led to the creation of the Bay Area 
Council a year later. Led by prominent businessmen, the council was dedi-
cated, in its officers’ words, “to the proposition that the San Francisco Bay 
Area is an integrated economic unit.” Over time, council members became 
pro-suburban in their mind-sets and tried to attract new industries whose 
employees would be won over by “a good climate, beautiful landscape, and 
cultural amenities.” What had begun as regional planning became decentral-
ized boosterism.⁶³
 A major result of decentrist thinking was to widen differences among 
localities in the San Francisco Bay area. Not all communities, and certainly 
not all people, benefited equally from the high-technology boom. Richmond 
and Oakland, which had gained in job creation from World War II, were 
largely bypassed as Silicon Valley expanded to the south. San Francisco ini-
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tially found few benefits. Not until the s and later did the city profit 
much from high-technology developments. Most of the growth and the bulk 
of the new jobs were concentrated on the west and south sides of San Fran-
cisco Bay.
 One of the first signs that uneven development might cause environ-
mental problems occurred in the “Battle of the Hills” in Palo Alto during the 
early s. Seeking to expand the SRP, Stanford University officials faced 
opposition from some of the local residents. Locals wanted to keep the foot-
hills into which an expanded SRP would intrude free of commercialization. 
Moreover, the expansion proposal acted as a lightning rod for those who 
had come over the previous decade to dislike noise and fumes from some 
of the businesses in the supposedly “green” SRP. In the end, Stanford officials 
carried the day and expanded the SRP, but only in a scaled-back fashion, as 
grassroots environmentalism had an impact on development.⁶⁴
 A more dramatic event highlighting inequalities was the seizure in late 
 of federally owned Alcatraz Island by seventy-eight Native Americans 
calling themselves “Indians of All Tribes.” At issue was the matter of sov-
ereignty, just as it would later be on Kaho‘olawe. Responding to demands 
that they leave the island, Native Americans exclaimed that it “is the hope 
of Indian People to advance themselves culturally and spiritually. . . . We will 
no longer be museum pieces, tourist attractions, and politicians’ playthings.” 
Those seizing Alcatraz declared it to be Indian land and vowed to build a 
cultural and educational center there. However, they were soon divided by 
leadership struggles and harmed by a lack of adequate food, water, housing, 
and electricity on Alcatraz. Those few Indians still remaining on Alcatraz 
were removed by federal officials in June .⁶⁵
 The development of Silicon Valley’s high-technology industries led to 
rapid population growth, which gobbled up land for urban use and led to 
further environmental problems. San Jose’s population mushroomed from 
, in  to , in . This population explosion outpaced that 
for the state of California as a whole, which increased from . million to 
. million in the same decades, and that of the San Francisco Bay area, 
which rose from . million to . million. Uneven development continued. 
As one urban historian has explained with understatement, San Jose’s ex-
pansion “consumed considerable adjacent farmland, including some of Cali- 
fornia’s finest vineyards and numerous orchards.” California being the most 
urbanized state in America in , some  percent of Californians lived in 
metropolitan areas. Quality-of-life issues caused by urban sprawl, the disap-
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pearance of green space, and a lack of affordable housing were epidemic.⁶⁶ 
They were nowhere more pressing than in Silicon Valley.
 Pushed by a progrowth city government, San Jose expanded rapidly 
through the s. Using control over their city’s sewer treatment facilities 
as a club, San Jose’s political leaders convinced people in many contiguous 
areas to agree to annexation, until by  the city covered  square miles.⁶⁷ 
San Jose’s rampant growth, which sparked fears about increased costs for 
city services and, at the same time, generated concerns that bucolic lifestyles 
were in danger, led to the formation of an antigrowth coalition. Women were 
in the forefront of this campaign. As early as , the conservative Virginia 
Shaffer had won election to the city council on the strength of promises to 
reduce city taxes. By , she and others had succeeded in removing San 
Jose’s progrowth city manager from office. Still more women won election to 
the city council in the s. In , San Jose voters chose Janet Gray Hayes, 
one of the councilwomen, as their city’s mayor, making her the nation’s first 
woman to be mayor of a city of five hundred thousand or more people. Hayes 
campaigned on the promise to “make San Jose better before we make it big-
ger” and was an advocate of parks and green areas.⁶⁸
 State legislation framed local actions, but local measures often had 
greater impacts. Already in the s, farmers and slow-growth advocates 
secured state legislation limiting the power of municipalities to annex farm-
land and guaranteeing that farmland would be assessed for taxation on the 
basis of its value as agricultural land, not on the basis of its market value as 
real estate. This legislation, however, had little effect in Silicon Valley, where 
many farm owners were small landowners eager to sell at hefty profits to 
developers. Closer to home, San Jose’s voters approved Measure B in , 
an ordinance limiting new zoning for homes wherever schools were over-
crowded.⁶⁹ Measures like that one did reduce the pace of growth within San 
Jose’s city limits, but urbanization continued outside of them. San Jose, after 
all, was far from the entirety of Silicon Valley. Then, too, ways to continue 
annexation were found, leading to an overall tenfold increase in the size of 
San Jose between  and .
 Affordable housing became rare in the Valley, in part because of the 
movement of so many new people into the area and in part because of limi-
tations on building such as Measure B. In , only  percent of the region’s 
residents could afford the $, median house price. The problem was 
that house prices had more than doubled since , while per capita income 
had risen by a much smaller  percent (and for the bottom quartile of wage 
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earners’ real incomes had actually fallen). Even renting an apartment was 
difficult, with a median apartment rental price of $, per month. All-
too-typical was the family of John Singh. Singh worked on a contract basis 
for Hewlett Packard, and his wife had employment as a registered nurse. 
Together, they earned $, annually. However, with three children they 
could not afford to buy a house and lived, instead, in the Boccardo Reception 
Center, a shelter for the homeless in San Jose. They were not alone;  percent 
of the shelter’s residents had jobs.⁷⁰ High-technology workers were not the 
only ones hit hard by high housing prices. Service workers such as teachers, 
firemen, and policemen found it increasingly difficult to live in the Valley.⁷¹
 Even for those who could afford Valley homes, life was far from easy. A 
study of some forty communities across the United States in the late s 
revealed that, “although Silicon Valley ranked high in interracial trust and di-
versity of friendships, it landed near the bottom in civic engagement, chari-
table giving, volunteering, and civic leadership—and in sense of community 
as well.”⁷² In a region where vacations had come to be derided as “downtime,” 
even some successful high-technology entrepreneurs questioned what they 
were doing with their lives as the twenty-first century opened. In such an 
environment, growing traffic congestion was, not surprisingly, particularly 
resented as a waste of time.⁷³
 Thus, Silicon Valley, and more generally the San Francisco Bay area, ex-
perienced exuberant growth in the twentieth century, especially after World 
War II. Buoyed by entrepreneurial ambitions and defense spending, the re-
gion boomed as a high-technology region, well known and imitated around 
the globe. Areas throughout the Pacific, from would-be high-technology dis-
tricts in the Hawaiian Islands and Japan to a more successful one in South 
Korea, sought to become new Silicon Valleys. In trying to emulate the Val-
ley’s apparent success, residents in other regions overlooked the negative as-
pects of such expansion. For instance, many of the same issues emanating 
from industrial and high-technology growth arose in an expansive Seattle 
after World War II.
Economic Growth and Environmental Problems  
in Seattle and Pugetopolis
Traffic tie-ups were even worse in the Seattle area than in Silicon Valley. As 
a scholar of urban planning observed in , “traffic congestion in Greater 
Seattle is arguably the worst in the nation.” Every nook and cranny from 
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Everett in the north to Tacoma in the south was being filled with urban and 
suburban developments, and Pugetopolis was quickly coming to resemble 
the linked cities of Boston, New York City, and Washington, DC. From an 
overgrown town of , people in , Seattle became a major metropo-
lis of . million residents fifty years later.⁷⁴
 The Seattle region suffered from some of the same growth problems 
as Silicon Valley, but there were differences as well. Beyond transportation 
congestion loomed runaway housing prices, land-use questions, and water-
quality problems. Seattle boomed in the s and later, in part, from the ex-
pansion of high-technology firms such as Microsoft. However, because these 
companies engaged more in software production than in the fabrication of 
computer chips and hardware, there was less contamination of the region’s 
water supply by toxic chemicals. True, Seattleites and people in nearby sub-
urbs polluted Lake Washington with their sewage, but in a rare show of re-
gional cooperation they succeeded in cleaning up that body of water.⁷⁵
 Seattle’s first period of rapid development started with the acquisition 
of rail connections to the Midwest and East in the s and s. Seattle’s 
business leaders were well situated to take advantage of new economic de-
velopments. With much of the Great Lakes cut over, the United States came 
to depend more heavily than before on the Pacific Northwest for its timber. 
Seattle-area mills helped supply that demand. Even more explosive, though 
short-lived, was the impact of the Klondike Gold Rush to Alaska in the mid- 
and late s. Possessing a fine natural harbor and ambitious merchants, 
Seattle benefited greatly as the leading outfitting point for the north. Slightly 
later, Seattle fishermen and corporations came to control most of Alaska’s 
salmon industry. Local railroads also opened up areas near Seattle to coal 
mining and farming. Seattle thus developed as a commercial city more than 
as a manufacturing center. Still, as the city grew in size and population, it be-
came a large enough market to spur the development of local industries such 
as shipbuilding and ironworking. Between  and , the city’s popu-
lation rose more than fivefold, from , to nearly ,, growth that 
made Seattle a large regional center on America’s Pacific Coast.⁷⁶
 Faced with the rapid expansion of their city, some Seattleites turned to 
planning to channel the forces of change. In some matters, largely engineer-
ing ones aimed at the commercial expansion of their city, they succeeded. 
Seattle’s chief engineer, R. H. Thomson, oversaw a major regrading effort that 
lowered the heights of Seattle’s hills by using hydraulic monitors (apparatus 
similar to large fire hoses) to wash them away. He then utilized the resulting 
dirt and gravel to fill in parts of Seattle’s waterfront. This action both re-
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moved a significant barrier to Seattle’s commercial and residential expansion 
and created new sites for industrial development. Seattle’s officials also seized 
new water supplies for their growing metropolis, especially by securing a 
watershed area off-limits to most types of development around the Cedar 
River. At about the same time, the federal government built a major set of 
locks on a waterway connecting Lake Washington to Puget Sound, a project 
that further enhanced the city’s commercial potential.⁷⁷
 There were environmental downsides to these actions, however—prob-
lems only dimly perceived and rarely acknowledged by Seattleites in their 
scramble for wealth. Entire ecosystems were greatly altered. The building of 
the locks, for example, sent Lake Washington’s water out to sea by a new 
route. Doing so lowered the lake’s level considerably and completely elimi-
nated the Black River, which had earlier been its outlet. Environmental jus-
tice issues were involved, as public works especially hurt Native Americans. 
Once again, benefits from growth were unevenly distributed. For instance, 
the industrial development of newly created areas on Seattle’s waterfront and 
the banks of nearby rivers, especially the Duwamish, impinged on the liveli-
hood of Native Americans in the area. They found it impossible to maintain 
a subsistence lifestyle based on hunting, fishing, and gathering, and had to 
move away. Only in the s and later did small groups return.⁷⁸
 Seattleites proved less successful in redesigning the spatial layout of their 
city. Like the residents of other Pacific Coast cities, they considered a com-
prehensive city plan for their metropolis. Called the Bogue Plan after Virgil 
Bogue, the engineer who drew it up, the scheme envisioned the coordinated 
construction of new harbor facilities, streets, parks and boulevards, and a 
civic center. Presented to voters by the city council in , the plan embraced 
an area of  square miles and sought to prepare Seattle for a population of 
one million people, roughly four times its population then. The Bogue Plan 
failed to win approval. Like the Progressive-era city plan for San Francisco, it 
initially attracted a lot of favorable comment, as many business and profes-
sional groups came out for it. Yet, those organizations soon split on particu-
lar aspects of the scheme. Many Seattleites also feared that approval of the 
plan would raise their taxes. Feeling themselves already heavily burdened to 
pay for engineering works such as the regrading of their hills, they opposed 
any measure that might hike their taxes still more. While some parts of the 
Bogue Plan were put in place over the following decades, the idea of com-
prehensive city planning was relegated to the back burner for many years to 
come.⁷⁹ A major reason for this turn of events was a slowdown in the rate of 
Seattle’s growth. Like most Pacific Coast cities, with the notable exception of 
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Los Angeles, Seattle grew more slowly in the s and s. Consequently, 
the urgency for comprehensive planning dissipated.⁸⁰
 Seattle’s population resumed its upward trajectory during and after 
World War II, as its shipbuilding firms, and especially the Boeing Company, 
boomed.⁸¹ Into the s, Seattle’s fate was tied directly to that of Boeing. 
While Boeing’s expansion brought economic growth to the Seattle region 
in the form of tens of thousands of jobs, challenges also trailed in the wake 
of the rapid development of the firm. People lived ever farther from Seattle’s 
downtown, as suburbs proliferated. Downtown businessmen tried to arrest 
this trend, with only partial success. A climax to their actions came in the 
late s, when they sought through regional planning to address district-
wide infrastructural issues, nearly all of which impinged upon the physical 
environment of the Seattle area.
 Describing Seattle after World War II, urban historian Carl Abbott has 
accurately observed, “The engine that was obviously driving the new Seattle 
was Boeing.”⁸² It was during and right after the conflict that Boeing became 
central to Seattle’s economy, and it was really only then that Seattleites from 
many walks of life—business leaders, many labor leaders, and politicians—
united, for a time, in pushing for Boeing’s agenda at the national level. In the 
importance of Boeing to the Seattle region can be glimpsed, once again, the 
significance of the American military, World War II, and the Cold War in 
the Pacific. While many of Boeing’s sales were commercial, many others were 
military, especially in the s and s.⁸³
 Founded shortly before World War I, the Boeing Company expanded 
during the conflict, only to contract after it. Established on the banks of 
the Duwamish River close to Seattle’s waterfront, the company was one of 
the manufacturing ventures that displaced Native Americans there. Boeing 
had become Seattle’s largest industrial venture by , with  employ-
ees. Hurt by the Great Depression, Boeing boomed from the s into the 
late s, as the firm developed military aircraft and, after World War II, 
civilian airplanes as well. It delivered its , the first American commercial 
jetliner, to airlines beginning in . Boeing’s employment in the Seattle 
region jumped from about , in  to roughly , four years later. 
Employment slumped to , in , but climbed to , in  and 
reached about , by . By the mid-s, about  percent of all of 
the jobs in King County were with the Boeing Company.⁸⁴ The company’s 
expansion also spurred population growth in the Seattle area. In , about 
, residents made Seattle their home, up from , a decade before. 
In , some , people lived in the city of Seattle, with many more in 
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its suburbs. By that time, . million people were living in Seattle’s standard 
metropolitan area.⁸⁵
 Although Seattle’s leaders backed Boeing’s efforts to win Defense De-
partment contracts, some came to harbor doubts about the impacts the firm 
was having on their region’s economy and development. By the early s, 
they voiced two major critiques: they thought that Boeing’s dominance was 
precluding the development of a diversified economy (some even came to 
see Seattle as being simply a “colony” of Boeing); and they believed that too 
much of the economic growth and spatial development was occurring out-
side of Seattle in its suburbs, thus endangering downtown businesses. There 
was considerable truth to these perceptions, especially the second one. Need-
ing space for runways, large assembly plants, and research facilities, Boeing 
located most of its facilities beyond Seattle’s city limits, eroding the city’s 
tax base. Then, too, as Boeing attracted workers to the region, an increasing 
proportion lived outside of Seattle. In the decade of the s, the outlying 
parts of Seattle increased in population by  percent, but within the city 
limits the rise was less than  percent. The first regional shopping center, 
Northgate, opened in , just north of Seattle’s city limits. The trend toward 
suburbanization, aided by the construction of interstate highways, continued 
in the s, until by  about  percent of Seattle-area residents lived in 
suburbs.⁸⁶ These decades were, one disgruntled Seattleite observed, “the era 
of the bulldozer, the ranch-style house, the shopping center, and long runs of 
commerce on arterials.”⁸⁷
 Seattle’s business and political leaders responded in several ways. Like 
San Jose’s leaders, they embraced annexation, sometimes using their control 
over water and sewers to persuade outlying regions to agree to become part 
of the city of Seattle. The sixty-block area in which Northgate was located 
was annexed in , bringing revenues from taxes on the shopping center 
into the city’s coffers. In , they also mounted a world’s fair in a section 
of Seattle not far from the city’s downtown. Seattle’s leaders hoped that the 
exposition would both attract new businesses to their region and showcase 
the downtown as the center of the Seattle area. The exposition drew nearly 
 million people. However, it proved to be too isolated from the downtown 
to help the downtown area much. Its emphasis on aerospace and science, as 
in the construction of the landmark Space Needle, did more to boost Boeing 
than other firms in the public’s imagination.⁸⁸
 Nonetheless, Seattle’s downtown did not stagnate. At the hands of politi-
cal and business leaders, it developed as an international center for finance 
and trade, complete with a host of shimmering skyscrapers soaring above 
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its hills. During the s and s, choices made by Seattle’s elite moved 
their city ahead of other regional rivals such as Portland to become a glob-
ally “networked” city. Historian Abbott credits civic initiatives undertaken in 
these decades—the world’s fair, the building of a downtown sports complex, 
including a domed stadium (the Kingdome, since torn down to make way for 
a newer stadium), harbor improvements designed to handle containerships, 
and the construction of a new park system—with helping Seattle to attain 
international standing.⁸⁹
 Still, Seattle’s downtown never regained the dominance it had once 
exerted over its surrounding area. Despite some success at annexation, new 
areas continued to spring up beyond the city limits, as suburbs marched 
ever deeper into the countryside. Increasingly, those suburbs sought inde-
pendence from Seattle; more and more people in the new suburbs refused 
annexation, as they came to realize that it did not automatically bring side-
walks, streetlights, and other amenities. As a result, Seattle’s city boundaries 
were basically fixed by about .
 In terms of suburban expansion, the greatest growth, and the most wor-
risome for Seattle’s downtown leaders, occurred to the east of Seattle. As 
environmental historian Matthew Klingle has observed, “the most dramatic 
gains were in the smaller towns that ringed Lake Washington, especially 
in the Eastside region across the lake.” About thirty miles long and one to 
three miles wide, Lake Washington runs north–south along Seattle’s eastern 
boundary. Two bridges, one opened in  the other in , connect Seattle 
to the metropolis’ Eastside. Only four incorporated towns, including Seattle, 
touched Lake Washington in , but twenty years later nine new towns 
bordered the lake on the Eastside alone. The Eastside’s population more than 
doubled in the s.⁹⁰
 Of the rapidly growing Eastside communities, Bellevue attracted the 
most attention. Incorporated in , Bellevue’s expansion was chaotic. 
“There was nothing orderly about it,” noted George Bell, the Eastside’s prime 
housing developer. In the mid-s, Bellevue was, as one Seattle maga-
zine exclaimed, “the fastest-growing chunk of Washington” and “one of the 
fastest-growing areas in all of America.” Rapidly becoming an independent 
city, Bellevue nonetheless was home to many residents who had moved there 
hoping to enjoy a country existence. It was a place that “proudly proclaims its 
own unique, non-metropolitan identity,” the Seattle journal noted. However, 
its character was changing. “Already the Bellevue landscape is a kaleidoscope 
of contrasting scenes,” the journal mused, with “the most obvious contrast” 
being “between the remaining belts of rusticity and the highly developed 
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sections of town.” By , , people were living in Bellevue, up from just 
, in .⁹¹
 As in the San Francisco Bay area, economic growth was very uneven in 
Pugetopolis. Generally speaking, Seattle and the Eastside suburbs benefited 
at the expense of southern Puget Sound and Indian reservations throughout 
King and Pierce Counties. For instance, the Duwamish–Green River cor-
ridor became poorer and more polluted, while Lake Washington and the 
Seattle suburbs grew wealthier and cleaner.⁹²
 Political contests over two groups of economic development and envi-
ronmental protection issues laid bare divisions between Seattle and its sub-
urbs and demonstrated the limits of power wielded by the metropole. In the 
late s, Seattleites and their suburban neighbors cleaned up Lake Wash-
ington, which had become polluted by sewage from surrounding towns. 
Such cooperation proved difficult to achieve and had partially hidden envi-
ronmental costs, however. About a decade later, voters in the Seattle region 
considered a package of issues designed to improve both their economic and 
physical environments, but approved only some of them.
 Pollution problems in Lake Washington worsened dramatically after 
World War II.⁹³ Seattle’s sewers dumped into Puget Sound for the most part, 
but the sewers of Eastside communities had their outlets in the lake. By , 
ten new sewer systems discharged treated and untreated sewage into Lake 
Just east of Seattle, Bellevue sported its own downtown skyscrapers. (Courtesy of Elizabeth 
 Lawrence)
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Washington, and leaking septic tanks added to the problem. Even Seattle’s 
sewage, which coursed through the same pipes as rain runoff, spilled into 
Lake Washington in times of heavy rainfall. Combined sewage overflows lay 
at the heart of the problem. In a wake-up call to Seattleites, a University of 
Washington professor of zoology proclaimed the lake “dead” in . For 
months over the next three summers, large sections of the lake were closed 
to swimming and recreational activities, further alarming Seattleites.
 Worried that the deteriorating condition of Lake Washington might 
hurt the growth and image of their city, Seattle’s leaders, beginning to dream 
of a world’s fair, joined forces with younger professionals and educators to 
change matters. Doing so would be difficult, they realized; for, like many 
regions, Seattle was characterized by fragmented government. There were 
about  separate local governments in King County, including  sewer 
districts representing  communities around Lake Washington. Nonethe-
less, led by James Ellis, a young Seattle attorney active in civic affairs, they 
sought to build consensus for change. They initially failed. In March , 
voters turned down a plan for a comprehensive sewer system. Two factors 
led to the defeat. First, it was presented to voters as part of a package that 
also included a regional mass transit system and plans for regional zoning. 
Even many who wanted to clean up Lake Washington hesitated to vote for 
that expansive package. Then too, Seattleites and the residents of Bellevue 
approved the plan, but it lost heavily in South King County, whose residents 
in many suburbs viewed it as a power grab by Seattleites.⁹⁴
 Sewer advocates quickly reworked their proposition. They stripped it 
of any connections to mass transit and regional zoning and limited the vote 
to residents of communities directly bordering on the lake. Approved by a 
wide majority in September , the measure provided for the construction 
of huge interceptor sewers around Lake Washington, soon making the lake 
a “textbook example on how ‘bioremediation’ can pull aquatic ecosystems 
back from the brink of collapse.”⁹⁵
 There was a dark side to even such a dramatic environmental victory, 
however. The new sewers dumped into Puget Sound, increasing pollution 
there, and into the Duwamish River, where what little remained of aquatic 
life was almost snuffed out. These actions occurred just as Native Americans 
in the state of Washington were beginning to reassert their historic fishing 
rights. Only in later decades were some remediation efforts taken to improve 
the quality of water in the Duwamish River, allowing a few Native Ameri-
cans to fish there again. More broadly, the rehabilitation of Lake Washington 
helped draw more people to the Seattle region, thus ironically increasing 
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some forms of pollution and congestion. With only slight hyperbole, histo-
rian Klingle has observed that a “rising tide of concrete and asphalt began 
to flow up the Sammamish River [which drains into Lake Washington] and 
onto the Issaquah Plateau, engulfing more and more acreage with every 
year.”⁹⁶
 As growth continued, Seattle-area residents sought to control sprawl 
through “Forward Thrust” proposals. Extensive bond issues to fund the 
proposals were voted on separately, not as single entities; proponents had 
learned from the defeat of the initial Lake Washington sewer measure. With 
Ellis again playing a leading role, some proposals won relatively easy accep-
tance in : area-wide parks and recreation centers, the Kingdome, addi-
tional sewers, flood-control measures, and various neighborhood improve-
ments.⁹⁷
 Transportation measures, on the other hand, mainly failed at the polls. 
Voters were asked to approve the building of new arterial streets (streets 
just short of being freeways) through Seattle. These propositions drew im- 
mediate fire. One street, named R. H. Thomson after Seattle’s early-twentieth-
century engineer, would have sliced through Seattle’s world-famous arbore-
tum, an oasis of nature in the city. Another would have destroyed much of 
Seattle’s black community. Yet another would have crossed Lake Washington 
on a third bridge. There was more to Forward Thrust’s transportation plans, 
however. A mass transit scheme was also part of Forward Thrust: four co-
ordinated rapid-rail lines serving major travel corridors into Seattle from the 
suburbs. The results at the polls were mixed. Some of the proposed arterials 
were built, but not all. Even those that were constructed were greatly modi-
fied in light of public concerns. No arterial bisected the arboretum (instead, 
half-built on-ramps today provide diving platforms for swimmers enjoying 
Lake Washington), and a third Lake Washington bridge was not built. The 
street extending through part of the black neighborhood was greatly modi-
fied to do much less damage than the one originally proposed.⁹⁸
 The opposition to freeways in Seattle was part of a nationwide antifree-
way movement that had begun in San Francisco in  and spread through-
out much of the United States in the s and s. Urban historian Ray-
mond Mohl has identified a number of commonalities in successful freeway 
revolts: “persistent neighborhood activism” and “interracial alliances,” strong 
journalistic and political support, a tradition of planning in the affected 
localities, and ways for proponents to take their concerns into court sys-
tems. In Seattle, many of these characteristics were present. Very strong local 
neighborhood organizations coalesced into a large citywide umbrella orga-
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nization, Citizens Against Freeways, well able to flex its political muscles. 
Its leaders were well-positioned professionals similar to those in Forward 
Thrust, and they could not easily be brushed aside. The journal Seattle Maga-
zine and Seattle’s major newspapers initially provided support for many of 
Forward Thrust’s plans, but in time questioned its freeway ideas, as did local 
and statewide politicians. While never as important as in some other areas, 
court cases sometimes were used to slow construction plans. Most important 
in Seattle, however, were the votes on bond measures.⁹⁹
 No mass transit system was approved. The mass transit plan included in 
Forward Thrust, and backed as well by many members of Citizens Against 
Freeways, won a bare majority of the vote,  percent, but not the needed 
 percent. The major reason the issue failed was that the proposed routes 
aimed simply at moving people into and out of the downtown area, not be-
tween the rapidly developing suburban communities, what some observers 
of urban developments were beginning to call “edge cities.” Even the editor of 
the progressive Seattle Magazine had doubts about this plan.¹⁰⁰ The failure of 
the mass transit proposals and the inability to construct some of the arterials 
set the stage for the clogging of Seattle-area roads, which has resulted in a 
high degree of congestion to the present day.¹⁰¹ Saving the arboretum and 
Seattle’s black area from highways and protecting Lake Washington from a 
third bridge entailed environmental costs. Choices on economic develop-
ment and environmental protection matters, the example of Seattle’s For-
ward Thrust shows, are rarely easy.
 At about the same time that Seattleites addressed problems of urban 
growth and congestion, residents throughout Pugetopolis began changing 
their attitudes toward the region’s defense industries. By the late s, and 
especially in the s and s, inhabitants of the Puget Sound region began 
to oppose defense developments on environmental and antiwar grounds. 
Historian Brian Casserly has cogently written, “Puget Sound communities 
traditionally welcomed the local military presence for the economic bene-
fits that it brought but . . . this changed in the s and s . . . as groups 
of citizens challenged the traditional cozy relationship between local civic 
and business leaders and the military.” That alteration, he has concluded, re-
sulted from “the development of environmental concerns about the impact 
of military related growth, such as the destruction of natural areas like Hood 
Canal, increased urban sprawl, etc.” “In addition,” Casserly observed, “new, 
more critical approaches to the military were also influenced by the growth 
of peace activism in the s.”¹⁰²
 A case in point lay in efforts to stop the building of a Trident nuclear 
 Pathways to the Present
submarine base at the Bangor Ammunition Depot near Bremerton on Hood 
Canal just across Puget Sound from Seattle. In the s, a loose coalition of 
local property owners worried about the costs of infrastructure improvements 
and higher taxes, environmentalists who were concerned about changes that 
an increase in population might bring to the landscape and quality of life 
in their region, and peace activists sought to shut down the project. Like 
those challenging the navy’s use of Kaho‘olawe at about the same time, they 
relied on demonstrations to dramatize their opposition. One group invaded 
the base illegally to plant a garden “to symbolize the conflict between issues 
of world hunger and ‘the tremendous amount of money being spent on a 
nuclear first strike offense.’ ” Again like the navy’s opponents in Hawai‘i, they 
went to court to challenge the navy’s environmental impact statements to try 
to halt the construction of the base. They lost, and the Trident base opened in 
. However, the widespread opposition heralded, Casserly has explained, 
“the emergence of a new phase in western relations with the military, espe-
cially regarding facilities associated with nuclear weapons.”¹⁰³
 A second instance of local opposition to the military, this time success-
ful, occurred with regard to Fort Lawton right in Seattle. Seattle’s civic and 
business leaders had lobbied hard for the creation of Fort Lawton during the 
early s, but once established, the base never generated the anticipated 
economic growth. When military officials proposed using part of its grounds 
as an Anti-Ballistic Missile facility in , local leaders mounted spirited 
opposition, arguing that the base’s grounds could better be used as a park 
to enhance the quality of life for Seattleites.¹⁰⁴ They were joined by Native 
American leaders. Inspired by the  Indian occupation of Alcatraz Island, 
Seattle-area Indians took over some of Fort Lawton’s grounds in early March, 
. Jane Fonda joined them in their protests several weeks later. In the end, 
the base’s lands were transferred to Seattle for use as a park, which included 
an Indian cultural center.¹⁰⁵
High-Technology Developments in Seattle
The only-partial success at regional planning by Forward Thrust advocates 
combined with an economic downturn in the early s to usher in a new 
period in Seattle’s history. Boeing was hit hard by the national recession 
and laid off , workers between  and .¹⁰⁶ As unemployment 
in Seattle climbed to  percent, a billboard on Interstate Highway  asked, 
“Will the Last Person Leaving Please Turn Out the Lights?” Boeing even-
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tually recovered from this downturn, but never again dominated Seattle’s 
economy the way it had in the s and s. The city developed a more 
diversified economy, based in part on high-technology industries.¹⁰⁷ This 
change did not, however, halt environmental alterations, as suburbanization 
continued apace. In fact, the choices made by Seattle-area residents in reject-
ing many of the plans proposed by Forward Thrust continued to affect them 
as the twenty-first century began.
 While less important to Seattle’s economy than before, Boeing remained 
significant. Consequently, Seattleites continued to benefit and suffer as the 
company endured cyclical ups and downs in its production and sales. Buoyed 
by both commercial and military orders, the firm’s employment in the Seattle 
region recovered to , by . Another recession and cutbacks in mili-
tary spending led to layoffs in the mid-s, but employment rose again 
later in the decade. Surprises came in the opening years of the twenty-first 
century. In , Boeing moved its headquarters, although no factories, to 
Chicago, and a few years later ethics scandals rocked Boeing, costing the firm 
several large federal government orders.¹⁰⁸
 However, Boeing was no longer the only game in town. Lumber and 
fishing remained significant industries; ocean-borne trade through new har-
bor facilities was important; and a research-oriented University of Wash-
ington and new research institutions, such as a major branch of the Colum-
bus-headquartered Battelle Memorial Institute, added a fillip to the region’s 
development. Tourism boomed. Recognizing these alterations and the de-
velopment of a significant high-technology component to the Seattle-area 
economy, Fortune Magazine named Seattle America’s number-one city for 
business in .¹⁰⁹
 Seattle’s high-technology segment differed from that in Silicon Valley. 
It was not an agglomeration of many independent, tightly linked firms. 
Instead, Seattle’s high-technology development took more of a “hub-and-
spoke” design. Boeing acted as a hub for aerospace developments. It both 
subcontracted work to other companies in the region and spun off start-up 
aerospace firms, although not to the extent that high-technology firms such 
as Fairchild did in Silicon Valley. In , there were eighty-six companies 
making aircraft and aircraft parts and another five producing guided mis-
siles and space vehicles in the Seattle area. Microsoft formed part of a hub 
for software companies. Some six hundred software firms made the state of 
Washington their home by , with the great majority of them located in 
the Seattle region. Often less well recognized was Boeing’s role in the devel-
opment of software enterprises. Founded in , Boeing Computer Services 
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(BCS) employed , people by . Established to serve Boeing’s internal 
needs, BCS ventured into commercial markets and spun off independent 
companies. There were already over a hundred software companies in the 
Seattle region by the time Microsoft was incorporated in . Finally, the 
University of Washington and its Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Cen-
ter served as the hub for a fledgling group of biotechnology firms. By the 
mid-s, some sixty such enterprises employed , workers. The various 
types of high-technology businesses provided about  percent of the jobs, 
and a higher percentage of the payroll, in the Seattle region by .¹¹⁰
 Renewed economic growth led to further expansion in Seattle’s suburbs, 
until by  the Seattle region contained . million residents. The Eastside 
especially boomed. Bellevue soon boasted its own downtown, complete with 
skyscrapers rivaling those in Seattle. Bellevue had become a classic edge city, 
largely independent of Seattle. By , Bellevue boasted , residents.
 Rapid population growth and spatial expansion resulted in renewed 
calls for planning and controls. As in California, some localities in Puget-
opolis sought to limit development though the adoption of “no-growth” or 
“slow-growth” ordinances. When these generally proved only partially effec-
tive, Washingtonians turned to their state legislature for help.¹¹¹ In , the 
Washington State Legislature passed the Growth Management Act (GMA). 
This legislation required that local governments make plans channeling 
growth in specific areas by designating areas as either growth or nongrowth 
corridors. The GMA also required that infrastructure improvements—
schools, water and sewer facilities, roads, and the like—be put in place be-
fore residential or commercial development could occur. Moreover, the 
state’s twelve most populous counties had to submit comprehensive land-
use plans.¹¹² The GMA proved less effective in controlling growth than many 
of its advocates had hoped. One scholar of urban development observed, the 
“result has been even more rivalry among entities,” as little cooperation to 
curb growth occurred. Continuing, he noted, “Although expansion of built-
up areas into exurban areas has been reduced, each community has vigor-
ously tried to increase its share of the employment and population pie.” In-
deed, he has concluded, “within the growth boundaries, traditional zoning 
regulations have been relaxed in favor of higher densities.”¹¹³
 The Seattle region was too popular for its own good. A writer for News-
week observed in , “Sooner or later, it seems, everyone moves to Seattle, 
or thinks about it, or at least their kids do.” Seattle, he concluded, had come 
to “consist entirely of people who were born somewhere else. Rootless youths 
seeking alienation beneath Seattle’s brooding skies, but with plenty of girls to 
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keep them company. Middle-aged strivers betting that Microsoft can create 
one more millionaire.” Seattle’s motto had become, he suggested, “Seattle: if 
you can make it there, so what?”¹¹⁴ Growth extended far into the countryside. 
A reporter for the Seattle Post-Intelligencer observed the trend accelerating 
in , as many Seattleites lived ever farther from the city’s center. Writing 
about Issaquah, he described how “, homes are planned to the northeast 
in Issaquah Highlands . . . where a new Microsoft campus is planned.” “As 
a result,” he noted with dismay, “the broad greenswards that helped attract 
settlers to Issaquah Creek’s flood plain more than a century ago have been 
covered with blacktop and storefronts.”¹¹⁵
Conclusions
Military spending for World War II and the Cold War helped America’s 
Pacific Coast cities, just as such spending boosted other Pacific regions. 
The cities experienced rapid economic growth and attained national, even 
international, stature. Seattle and Silicon Valley created measurably high 
economic standards of living for their residents. In , and even more so 
twenty years later, residents in Seattle enjoyed a per capita income quite a 
bit higher than that of the average Washingtonian. Similarly, Silicon Valley 
residents had incomes on average considerably higher than those of other 
Californians.¹¹⁶ In Silicon Valley and, increasingly, in the Seattle region the 
rising incomes came from high-technology companies.
 However, major environmental costs accompanied economic growth. 
Some costs were obvious, others hidden. Congestion and high home prices 
were in plain view. So was water pollution by sewage. In both Silicon Valley 
and Seattle, urban and suburban development altered physical landscapes 
in ways similar to those described by environmental historian Adam Rome 
for communities across America.¹¹⁷ As in the rest of postwar America, sub-
urban growth spawned environmental efforts to control sprawl, with, at least 
in the cases of Seattle and Silicon Valley, only partial success.¹¹⁸ Ground-
water contamination, especially by toxic chemicals, was much less obvious. 
Even further from public view were questions of environmental injustice, as 
high-technology development fostered uneven economic growth. The health 
problems of immigrant women workers in Silicon Valley’s wafer fabrication 
plants and the loss of fishing grounds on the Duwamish River by Native 
Americans were two deleterious results.
 Environmental justice concerns were, of course, central to policy 
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making for Kaho‘olawe. Trade-offs between economic development and en-
vironmental justice matters also occurred in Alaska, the subject of the next 
chapter. Those issues became apparent in efforts to create a new international 
park in cooperation with the Russians. That effort seemed to infringe on 
the rights of Alaskan Natives and was initially opposed by some of them. 
Trade-offs between business development and environmental protection in 
Alaska revolved, however, mainly around the exploitation of fishery and oil 
resources.

C HA P T E R  
Alaska
The Aleutian Islands
 Returning to her home port of Cordova, Alaska, on April , , the  king crab boat Master Carl developed mechanical problems in the  face of a fierce storm, a blow featuring waves more than thirty feet 
high. Water entered the vessel’s hull as she passed near Montague Island just 
outside of Prince William Sound, and at midnight the ship’s flooded engine 
died. Tossed by waves, the Master Carl rolled onto her side and her cap-
tain and crew members had to abandon her. After donning survival suits, 
they clambered into a life raft and, with great difficulty, cast off. Caught in 
three-storey-high waves, the raft overturned on several occasions, spilling 
the men out into the rampaging sea. Against the odds, they climbed back 
in, and eventually two of the crewmen made it to shore. The captain and 
another crew member died in the attempt. Once on shore, the two surviving 
men, exhausted and suffering from hypothermia, huddled together through 
a cold night. They were harassed by a grizzly bear, which they fended off by 
throwing rocks. Only after a horrific night were they rescued the next day by 
a coast guard helicopter.¹
 The loss of the Master Carl was typical of accidents afflicting king crab 
vessels in Alaskan waters. In early , the Americus and her sister ship, the 
Altair, went down in -knot winds, sinkings that cost the lives of thirteen 
men. Even earlier, in the winter of –, thirteen king crab boats were 
lost, most with all hands, in storms whose winds exceeded  miles per 
hour.² Men and women were willing to endure extreme hardships in Alaska’s 
fisheries for the same reason that they did so in exploiting the state’s other 
natural resources: they wanted to get rich quick.³ Whether hunting sea otters, 
mining gold, fishing for salmon and king crabs, drilling for oil, cutting down 
forests, or boosting a burgeoning tourism industry, Alaskans—like Ameri-
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cans on frontiers before them—sought personal enrichment and adventure.⁴ 
A national park service planner who had spent five years in Arctic Alaska 
observed in the mid-s that the state’s coat of arms should be a shield di-
vided into quarters with each bearing one of four mottos: “Dig it up; chop it 
down; fish it out; shoot it.” Even those who failed to strike it rich in Alaskan 
ventures—and there were many—aspired to riches.⁵
 Relatively little thought was given at first to the conservation of natural 
resources or to more general environmental matters. However, as develop-
ment continued and resources seemed to be in danger of depletion, conser-
vation matters, and sometimes environmental issues, were taken more seri-
ously by Alaskan residents.⁶ By the late-nineteenth and the early-twentieth 
centuries there were stirrings of concern about the conservation of natu-
ral resources, especially wildlife. After World War II, that concern broad-
ened and deepened to include land-use and water-management matters and 
quality-of-life issues.
 This chapter examines conservation and environmental issues in Alaska 
since the Second World War; World War II in Alaska, as throughout so much 
of the Pacific, was a watershed in history. After surveying Alaska’s develop-
ment through the s, the chapter first analyzes efforts, only partly suc-
cessful, to preserve fishing stocks in Alaskan waters, particularly those along 
A large king crab. (Author’s 
collection)
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the Aleutian Islands and in the Bering Sea. The chapter looks next at contro-
versies surrounding drilling for oil on the state’s continental shelf, especially 
its outer continental shelf. This development brought oil prospectors into 
conflict with fishermen, and how those disputes were resolved is a reveal-
ing story of resource management. The chapter closes by investigating joint 
efforts on the part of the American and Russian governments to create a 
Beringia Heritage International Park on both sides of the Bering Strait and 
what those attempts have meant for people already living in that region.
 The developments dealt with in this chapter took place in what might 
be called “Island Alaska” and shared similarities with occurrences elsewhere 
in America’s Pacific possessions. Several major themes permeate this story. 
Once again, politics emerge as very important in determinants of resource 
allocation. In the political arena, businesspeople, environmentalists, poli-
ticians, and others worked out compromises on how to use and preserve 
Alaska’s lumber, fish, and minerals. Then, too, the rights of indigenous people, 
Alaskan Natives and Eskimos (Inuit), played important roles similar in some 
ways to those played by native Hawaiians and, as we shall see in a later chap-
ter, by Chamorros on Guam. Finally, economic and social developments in 
Alaska passed through different stages of integration, disconnection, and re-
integration with other parts of the Pacific.
Alaska’s Development
From the beginning, Euro-American explorers rightly described Alaska as 
immense. Russians called it “Bolshaya Zemlya,” the “Great Land.” Today’s 
state of Alaska embraces , square miles ( million acres), an area 
one-fifth the size of the lower forty-eight states sweeping across four time 
zones. A map of Alaska superimposed on one of the lower forty-eight states 
shows it touching the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the Canadian and 
Mexican borders. Alaska is as diverse as its geography is large, with six re-
gions having distinct topographies and climates. The state possesses , 
miles of seacoast,  percent more than the total of the lower forty-eight 
states combined. Two oceans and three seas wash Alaska’s shores.⁷
 Russian fur traders and merchants moving east from Siberia and Kam-
chatka were the first non-natives to enter Alaska. Private individuals, they 
sought profits by trading the pelts of sea otters found in Alaskan waters for 
goods in China. The Russian adventurers established an extensive fur-trading 
empire dependent on the Aleuts as hunters. Stretching by the early s 
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from the Aleutians through Alaska’s panhandle and south to an outpost in 
northern California, that empire was beset by problems. Its great distance 
from Russia meant that needed supplies were often scarce; there were con-
flicts with native groups in southeastern Alaska; and there was growing com-
petition with traders from the United States and European nations. Always 
lightly held—there were never more than about seven hundred Russians in 
Alaska—Alaska was sold to the United States in .⁸
 Russian work in Alaska set trends that Americans continued. Despite 
attempts to rein in the slaughter, the Russians and other westerners hunted 
sea otters to near extinction. Coming a bit later, most Americans also looked 
upon Alaska’s natural resources as treasures inviting plunder. As historian 
Stephen Haycox has noted, Alaskans have generally been “insensitive to their 
impact on nature and landscape, regarding the land as infinitely renewable 
and its resources as inexhaustible, and theirs to appropriate for their own 
uses.” Some of that same insensitivity long governed relations with native 
peoples. Torn from their homes and overworked, Aleut Indians fell prey to 
diseases unintentionally introduced by Russians to which the Aleuts had no 
natural immunities. Aleut numbers dropped from ,–, in precon-
tact times to a scant  in . As with Hawaiians and Chamorros, disease 
was the big killer of the Aleuts, just as it was for Native Americans across 
North America.⁹
 Alaska long remained colonial in its economy. Most of the capital nec-
essary to develop Alaska came from outside of the region, most recently in 
the case of the oil and lumber industries, earlier in mining and fishing.¹⁰ 
To the extent that people succeeded in developing Alaska’s economy in the 
early days, they did so through their engagement in the Pacific economy. 
Sea otter pelts were traded in China, with food to support the Russian ven-
ture arriving from such diverse sources as Russia, the Hawaiian Islands, the 
Pacific Northwest, and California. For a while in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, Alaskans turned their backs a bit on greater Pacific con-
nections, focusing on just the Pacific Coast of North America. However, after 
World War II salmon fishermen and king crabbers, along with most miners, 
lumbermen, and oilmen, returned to a full involvement in the Pacific econ-
omy. In these varied Pacific relationships, Alaskans remained dependent on 
outside regions for development funds, markets, and their general economic 
well-being, just as were residents in the Hawaiian Islands, Guam, and (for 
many years) the Seattle area. Alaskans’ work was part and parcel of the eco-
nomic integration of the Pacific stimulated by Americans.
 Even the nature of later federal–state governmental relations during 
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American times was foreshadowed in the Russian period, for in both time 
periods the relationship between the metropole and the periphery was a 
love-hate one. Alaskans recognized that they needed the support of the fed-
eral government, but were most reluctant about acknowledging that neces-
sity. Like Hawaiians and Guamanians, they resented what they regarded as 
outside federal interference in their affairs.¹¹ Americans were active in Alas-
kan developments even in Russian times, including Russian Alaska in their 
Pacific maritime frontier from about the s. American ships carried New 
England goods to the Pacific Northwest and Alaska, where they were ex-
changed for furs, especially sea otter pelts. Later, American whalers hunted 
in Alaskan waters, periodically putting into the Hawaiian Islands to resupply. 
By the s and s, hundreds of American whalers wintered in Honolulu 
on O‘ahu and Lahaina on Maui.¹²
 Like many regions dependent on just a few resources, Alaska developed a 
boom-and-bust economy. Mining was the first major industry to go through 
that cycle. Hard-rock gold mining in southeastern Alaska flourished from 
the s, with the mines and smelters paid for by outside capital and with 
most of the profits leaving Alaska. Copper mines operated in south-central 
Alaska by the Kennecott interests two decades later also depended heavily 
on outside capital and organization. However, it was the discovery of gold 
in Canada’s Klondike in  that boomed Alaska. In –, ,–
, gold rushers left Seattle and San Francisco for the Klondike. By , 
fifty new gold-mining camps had been established in Alaska. Alaska’s non-
native population rose from about  people in  to roughly , in 
. Conversely, the region’s native population fell from , to , 
over the same decades.¹³ The mining boom quickly became something of 
a bust. Gold production peaked in , and copper production began fall-
ing in the early s. By , only , Alaskans were working in mines. 
By , Alaska’s non-native population had fallen to ,, a figure only 
slightly higher than the , natives living in the region.¹⁴
 The territory’s fisheries proved more long-lived, but showed the same 
boom-and-bust characteristics. Moving their operations north from Califor-
nia and the Pacific Northwest, salmon companies set up their first canneries 
in Alaska during the s and s. In , thirty-seven canneries packed 
, cases of salmon (a case was  net pounds). Capitalized at $ mil-
lion, they employed about , people. Most of the workers were brought in 
from outside Alaska for the summer and fall canning season, and few local 
residents found employment in the canneries. Nor, initially, did residents 
benefit much by catching fish for the canneries. Instead, the canneries relied 
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mainly on their own fish traps and nets set at the mouths of rivers up which 
the salmon swam to spawn. By , the Alaskan salmon pack came to . 
million cases. About . million cases were packed in , as the U.S. Army 
bought canned salmon for its troops. Output fell to fewer than  million 
cases in , but recovered to more than  million cases in , an all-time 
high.¹⁵
 Efforts to regulate Alaska’s salmon industry were sporadic political foot-
balls pitting the salmon canneries against local Alaskan fishermen and fed-
eral officials against territorial ones. As early as , an inspector for the 
U.S. Fish Commission, worried that the fish traps were depleting Alaska’s 
salmon runs, recommended conservation measures. The packers disagreed 
on what to do and accomplished little. Instead, the federal government and 
the packers turned to artificial propagation in fish hatcheries, which, how-
ever, did little to help. Alarmed by failures at conservation, Secretary of Com-
merce Herbert Hoover convinced President Warren Harding to establish a 
salmon-fishing reservation in southwestern Alaska in . Local fishermen 
opposed this action as unfairly limiting their activities. Legislation following 
Harding’s executive order, the White Act of , named after Representative 
Wallace H. White of Maine, who introduced it in the House, was ineffective. 
Its two most controversial sections—one prohibiting the use of fish traps, 
as desired by Alaskan residents, the other establishing more fishing reser-
vations, as desired by the packers—were deleted before passage. The White 
Act did give the secretary of commerce the power to limit fishing in parts of 
Alaskan waters and allowed him to set the types of fishing gear that could be 
deployed, although not the amount, a crucial omission. The legislation also 
decreed that half of the salmon be allowed to swim upstream to spawn. Even 
this last requirement was only rarely enforced at the time, however.
 Little more was accomplished over the next two decades. Significant in 
its own right—the industry employed more workers than any other industry 
in the territory during the s and s—the Alaskan salmon industry 
was important for precedents it set. The conflict between local and outside 
interests was replicated in many later industries, including the king crab in-
dustry. In addition, Congress’ actions in trying to conserve salmon greatly 
angered many Alaskans, contributing to their dislike of the federal govern-
ment.¹⁶
 At the time of World War II, Alaskans still lived a colonial existence, with 
their economy based on the extraction of minerals, fish, and furs. Nearly all 
of the capital came from outside. In the case of infrastructure improvements, 
such as the building of the Alaska Railroad, completed from Seward to Fair-
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banks in , the source was the federal government. In the case of private 
businesses, funds came from across the United States. In the instance of the 
salmon industry, the sources lay in Pacific Coast companies. Not surpris-
ingly, most of the business profits left Alaska, repatriated to corporate offices 
elsewhere. The economy of Alaska had become less of a Pacific economy 
by about . Alaskans still had ties with America’s Pacific Coast, but they 
temporarily turned away from Asia and Hawai‘i. Only later were those con-
nections fully reestablished.¹⁷
 Developments during World War II and the Cold War partially changed 
Alaska, but earlier precedents remained significant. Billions of federal gov-
ernment dollars flowed into Alaska, linking the region closely to the rest of 
the United States. The achievement of statehood further boosted Alaska in 
the eyes of many. Even so, sustained economic growth was, as before, elusive. 
As one prominent Alaskan historian explained in , the state’s progress 
depended on “minerals, oil, coal, timber, and furs,” supplemented by “high-
grade fish.” More than elsewhere in western states, Alaskans acted out the 
paradox of the centrality of the state and the conviction of personal respon-
sibility and autonomy.¹⁸
 In Alaska, World War II revolved around Japan’s attack on the Aleutian 
Islands in , including the taking of the islands of Attu and Kiska, and the 
United States’ successful counterattack to recapture the islands a year later. 
American bombers also flew , sorties from bases in the Aleutians against 
Japanese positions in the Kurile Islands, and nearly half of the lend-lease 
materials reaching Russia was carried in ships traveling the northern circle 
route, which went through the Aleutians. As elsewhere in the Pacific, the war 
greatly increased the American presence in Alaska. At its peak in , the 
American military stationed , troops there (as late as  only  
military personnel had been in the territory). The war brought infrastruc-
ture improvements, many of which were later put to commercial use. These 
included building the first all-weather highway connecting Alaska to the 
lower forty-eight states, the Alaska/Canadian (ALCAN) highway, making 
improvements to harbors, and constructing numerous air bases.¹⁹
 Not all benefited from wartime developments. As elsewhere in the 
Pacific, economic growth was uneven. Aleut Indians, in particular, were hurt, 
as they were evacuated by the American military from their settlements on 
the Pribilof and the Aleutian Islands. Some of their villages were razed to 
prevent Japanese use of their buildings. Many Aleuts spent the war in unsani-
tary relocation camps in southwestern Alaska. Still others were taken pris-
oner by the Japanese on Attu. Placed in an internment camp on Hokkaido, 
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 percent died. The survivors found that they could not return to Attu at 
the close of the conflict, for the island was littered with war debris. They 
joined other Aleuts in a resettlement colony on Atka Island. Like Chamor-
ros on Guam, Aleuts were innocent victims of the Pacific conflict. Only in 
the s and later did Aleuts receive some compensation for their wartime 
losses.²⁰
 The Cold War extended changes that had begun in World War II. After 
briefly slumping at the close of World War II, military construction in Alaska 
averaged about $ million per year between  and . Although mili-
tary expenditures declined in real terms after the mid-s, they remained 
important, amounting to $ million in . Similarly, the number of mili-
tary personnel, after falling to , in , rose to , in , before 
dropping to , in . Alaska’s population rose from , in  
to , in  and then soared to , in . The nature of that 
population changed. As late as , natives comprised  percent of Alaska’s 
population, but by  they made up only  percent of it.²¹
 The Cold War threatened to alter Alaska through the uses of nuclear 
and thermonuclear energy. In , the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 
approved Operation Plowshare as part of an effort to find nonmilitary uses 
for nuclear explosives. A year later, the AEC devised Project Chariot as part 
of Operation Plowshare. Project Chariot was to use hydrogen bombs to blast 
out a harbor near Point Hope on Alaska’s northwest coast at the northern 
reaches of the Bering Strait. A considerably scaled-down plan using nuclear 
bombs was presented to Alaskans in early , and a still more modest 
scheme was laid out in . Even the smaller  plan would have used 
bombs having an explosive power over twenty times that of the blast that had 
destroyed Hiroshima. To be exploded underground, the bombs would allow 
the AEC to experiment with nuclear weapons as a possible tool for building 
canals and harbors. With military spending in Alaska winding down a bit, 
all of Alaska’s chambers of commerce and most of the territory’s political 
leaders initially supported Project Chariot.²²
 Little thought was given to the Eskimos eking out a subsistence existence 
in the area, but by their actions the Eskimos changed that situation. Very 
worried by reports of harm to Pacific Islanders caused by nuclear tests, they 
publicized possible negative outcomes of the blasts. They also were alarmed 
by the fact that the federal government would reserve a considerable amount 
of land for Project Chariot, making it difficult for them to acquire lands to 
which they were entitled. In late , the Point Hope village council voted 
unanimously against Project Chariot and turned to other Alaskan Natives for 
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support. At a meeting at Point Barrow in , Eskimos and Alaskan Natives 
united in opposition to Project Chariot. In , they held their first state-
wide conference, resulting in the establishment of the Alaskan Federation of 
Natives two years later. This organization was an important factor in later en-
vironmental and Alaskan Native issues. In their opposition, Alaskan Natives 
were joined by a pioneering Alaskan environmental organization, the Alaska 
Conservation Society, and by national groups such as the Wilderness Society 
and the Sierra Club. When environmental studies revealed that proposed 
blasts might harm birds and caribou upon which the Eskimos relied for food, 
and that the explosions might also release unacceptable amounts of radio-
activity into the atmosphere, the AEC backed off from Project Chariot and, 
despite continued support for the project from many of Alaska’s business and 
political leaders, abandoned it.²³
 Opponents were less successful in halting nuclear and thermonuclear 
weapons tests on the Aleutian Island of Amchitka. The AEC and the Depart-
ment of Defense chose the uninhabited island as the site for a series of above-
ground and below-ground tests, but the adherence of the United States to an 
international treaty prohibiting atmospheric tests in  meant that explo-
sions would be underground. Global developments thus intruded into the 
Pacific. Opposition to the first test in  was muted, as Cold War concerns 
ruled the day. Plans for additional tests generated more controversy. Scien-
tists and environmentalists pointed out that Amchitka lay near a geologic 
fault line and that nuclear testing might set off earthquakes and tidal waves. 
For those reasons, too, the governments of Japan and Canada opposed the 
tests. Environmental groups, including the Sierra Club and Friends of the 
Earth, joined Alaskan Native bodies to try unsuccessfully to block the tests 
through court appeals, as did the Aleut League in a suit of its own. The tests 
went ahead in  and . Fortunately, although Amchitka and its wildlife 
were damaged, no seismic activity occurred. One result later to have signifi-
cance throughout the Pacific and the world was the formation of the en-
vironmental group Greenpeace. Set up initially to halt the explosions, the 
group adopted its name in .²⁴
 With World War II and the Cold War drawing more people into their 
territory, Alaskans voiced successful calls for statehood. In , President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the proclamation admitting Alaska as the 
forty-ninth state in the Union. Statehood brought important changes to the 
management of natural resources. The new state’s constitution urged gov-
ernmental officials to “encourage the settlement of its land and development 
of its resources by making them available for maximum use consistent with 
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the public interest.” Federal officials agreed to give the state  million acres 
from the public domain,  percent of Alaska’s area, with state officials to 
select the land over twenty-five years. The state also gained control over Alas-
ka’s continental shelf and the waters above it for a distance of three miles out 
to sea. To administer hunting and fishing, the state government created an 
Alaskan Board of Fish and Game. One of the board’s first jobs was to enforce 
a ban on fish traps, hated by independent Alaskan salmon fishermen as a 
symbol of outside interests. The traps had been provisionally outlawed by a 
 ordinance and were permanently banned three years later.²⁵
 However, even after statehood the federal government remained very 
important in Alaska. Of the , working Alaskans in , some , 
were employees of the federal government. All of the public domain not 
selected by the state and all of the waters above the continental shelf more 
than three miles from shore remained under federal control. The federal gov-
ernment extended its authority over fishing activities beyond the three-mile 
zone up to six miles out to sea in , and much farther out in the s and 
s.
 Statehood did not automatically bring boom times to Alaskans. The 
search for stable economic growth continued. The salmon industry continued 
a decline begun in the s. Not even the imposition of limited-entry fish-
ing, which used a system of permits to regulate the amount of fishing gear in 
use, helped much. Beset by problems of its own making and by the overfish-
ing of salmon stocks on the high seas, the Alaskan salmon industry became 
less important to the Alaskan economy than it had been in prewar times. 
After peaking at more than  million cases in , the Alaskan salmon pack 
plummeted to fewer than  million cases by  and rebounded to only 
 million cases a decade later. Not even a later recovery in salmon fishing 
fully revived the fortunes of fishermen, as prices dropped. Military spending 
in Alaska peaked in the mid-s and then fell in real terms. Nor did min-
ing, fur trapping, or farming offer much hope for economic growth.²⁶
 There were some bright spots. One was the lumber industry. Alaska’s 
first large pulp mill opened in Ketchikan in , and five years later a sec-
ond mill, owned by a Japanese firm, began operations in Sitka. Both were 
supplied with logs from the nearby Tongass National Forest. By , Alaska 
produced $ million worth of wood products. Then, too, the development 
of new fisheries such as king crabs partially offset the decline in the salmon 
industry. By , the wholesale value of Alaska’s fish catch came to $ 
million. Tourism, which became one of Alaska’s key industries in later years, 
was in its infancy. So was the state’s oil industry. By , five oil and gas 
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fields had been developed in Alaska, and the state had taken in $ million 
in payments from oil companies.²⁷
 Despite the promise of expansion in fisheries, lumber, tourism, and oil, 
Alaskan economist George W. Rogers was correct when he stated in  
that there was an “urgency for understanding” economic development mat-
ters that was “greater in Alaska than in the nation as a whole.” In fact, he 
continued, “Every Alaskan is aware of the need for economic development if 
our state is to survive and prosper as a viable political entity.” He was heart-
ened that “The political leaders and candidates of both parties campaign 
under the banner of economic development.”²⁸ Yet matters were more com-
plex than Rogers suggested. While most Alaskans continued to favor putting 
their state’s natural resources to use with little thought for the future, some 
were beginning to question this approach—as the defeat of Project Chariot 
suggested. Developments in king crab fisheries along the Aleutian Islands 
and in the Bering Sea raised important questions about resource usage and 
conservation over the next four decades.
Conservation in Alaska’s King Crab Industry
As fishery expert Terry Johnson explained in , “Commercial fishing in 
Alaska is a diverse, colorful, tough, dangerous, thriving and—with skill and 
luck—lucrative enterprise.” Alaska’s varied fisheries accounted for about half 
of the United States’ seafood harvest, with a dockside value of about $. bil-
lion. “Not only does the Alaska seafood harvest outrank in quantity and the 
value of the harvest of the rest of the United States’ combined,” Johnson ob-
served, “this bounty outranks the individual harvests of Norway, Denmark, 
Iceland, and Canada.” Alaska’s fisheries products industry employed about 
, workers. Crabs composed about a quarter of the value of Alaska’s 
fishery products, with most of the crabs taken along the Aleutian Islands and 
in the Bering Sea.²⁹
 The Aleutian Islands and the Bering Sea comprise western and south-
western Alaska. Extending almost , miles west from the Alaskan Penin-
sula toward Russia and Japan, the Aleutian Islands are mainly volcanic in 
origin. They have vegetation described by scientists as consisting of “alpine 
heath meadows and lichen communities, with moist tundra at some lower 
elevation sites.” There are few trees. The islands and the Bering Sea just to 
their north endure weather that is foggy, rainy, and stormy. However, weather 
on the whole is less severe than that of the interior of Alaska. Temperatures 
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fall below °F only occasionally in the winter and rarely rise above °F in 
the summer. Covering an area as large as the United States west of the Mis-
sissippi, the Bering Sea benefits from climactic conditions, currents, and geo-
graphical features that make it one of the most productive fishing grounds 
in the world. Much of the sea is shallow. Its continental shelf to a depth of 
 feet covers , square miles, and a section of the shelf the size of 
California lies fewer than fifty feet under the surface.³⁰
 It was in the coastal waters of Alaska, especially those around the Aleu-
tian Islands and in the Bering Sea, that king crabs were found.³¹ Largely un-
exploited by Americans before World War II, king crabs were heavily fished 
after the war. No one was more active in fishing these waters for king crabs 
than Lowell Wakefield. As overfishing developed by the s, Wakefield and 
others involved in the industry strove to ensure their future through con-
servation measures. The resolution of conflicts over the utilization of the 
Alaskan king crab fishery—disputes between Alaskan fishermen and fishing 
companies headquartered outside of the state and contests pitting American, 
Japanese, and Soviet fishermen against each other—illustrated how complex 
conservation issues had become.
 Lowell Wakefield pioneered the development of the Alaskan king crab 
industry through the formation of Wakefield Seafood. Wakefield came from a 
family with an extensive background in Alaska’s salmon and herring fisheries. 
Lowell Wakefield (left)  
with two other founders of 
Wakefield Seafood in the 
Aleutian Islands in the 1950s. 
(Author’s collection)
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He became acquainted with king crabs through exploratory efforts made by 
the federal government in the s. Searching for new sources of protein for 
the American public and the armed forces during World War II, the govern-
ment sponsored fishing expeditions along the Alaskan coast. These ventures 
suggested that king crabs could become a significant fishery. Surveys were 
conducted in front of a Wakefield cannery and revealed a large number of 
crabs in the water. Wakefield’s knowledge of the surveys and his realization 
that Alaska’s herring and salmon industries were in decline led him to aban-
don his family’s business and set up his own company.³²
 Wakefield spearheaded the formation of his new enterprise under the 
laws of the state of Washington in . Breaking with past experience, he 
assigned a single ship to catch, process, and freeze king crabs and bottom 
fish. Previous operations had employed small ships to catch crabs and fish, 
which they then transferred to shore plants or large mother ships for pro-
cessing and canning. Processing on board the catching vessel, a specially 
built ship named the Deep Sea, was favored by Wakefield as highly efficient. 
He expected to reduce costs greatly by decreasing spoilage and by integrat-
ing previously separated stages of fish processing into one continuous-flow 
operation. Freezing, which came into common use for food processing in 
America in the s and s, appealed to him as an ultramodern method 
and as a way to differentiate his crab from the canned crab of competitors. 
After processing, the crab and fish would be stored on board the ship in re-
frigerated holds until they could be packaged and sent to market.³³
 Getting started proved difficult. Unable to secure financing for his 
speculative venture from commercial banks, Wakefield turned to the fed-
eral government. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), a federal 
agency set up to help businesses during the Great Depression, agreed in  
to grant a substantial loan to Wakefield Seafood. Family and business ties 
brought in additional needed funds. The founders and investors were young 
men in their twenties and thirties on the make. World War II had disrupted 
their lives, and they found themselves at loose ends at the conclusion of the 
conflict. All were extremely optimistic, expecting that their new company 
would be returning hefty profits within two or three years of starting opera-
tions. Motivated by more than money, they were looking for adventure in 
setting up their new business.³⁴ The expected quick profits did not material-
ize, for the company encountered difficulties in every stage of its operations. 
The problems nearly brought Wakefield Seafood to its knees. Only a timely 
loan from Wakefield’s father and a charter of the Deep Sea for work for the 
federal government saved the firm from bankruptcy in .³⁵
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 Wakefield Seafood emerged as a profitable enterprise in the mid-s. 
Several related elements accounted for that success. The company’s officers 
eagerly embraced technological advances, many of them spin-offs from 
World War II. Their ship was the first to use radar, sonar, and loran (a navi-
gational aid) in fishing. The captain of a minesweeper in the Aleutian Islands 
for several years during World War II, the skipper of the Deep Sea was well 
versed in advanced nautical technologies. Then, too, those starting the com-
pany were willing to endure hard times. When unable to attract fishing and 
processing crews, the owner-managers manned the nets and processing lines 
themselves. Moreover, the personal ties that had been important in starting 
Wakefield Seafood helped account for the firm’s survival. Friendships be-
tween the founders of the company and the heads of the Seattle branch of the 
RFC, Seattle’s commercial banks, and the suppliers of fishing gear secured 
extensions on loans. Though internal factors help to explain the success of 
Wakefield Seafood, so do external elements. As on many western American 
frontiers and throughout America’s Pacific possessions, the federal govern-
ment was significant in many ways in the development of Alaska’s king crab 
King crabs on board the Deep 
Sea preparatory to butcher-
ing, cooking, and freezing.  
(Author’s collection)
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frontier, from financing the initial fishing surveys to the provision of the 
RFC loan.³⁶
 In developing its operations, Wakefield Seafood was one of a handful of 
fishing ventures to employ Aleut Indians at that time. Most of the Deep Sea’s 
processing crew was composed of Aleut natives from Akutan Village just 
northeast of Dutch Harbor. Both humanitarian and practical considerations 
led Lowell Wakefield to hire them. Wakefield’s background was important. 
He had done graduate work at Columbia University in anthropology, study-
ing with the famed Franz Boas. After finishing there, he worked for the Inter-
national Labor Defense. He became involved in the Harlan County, Ken-
tucky, coal disputes—“Bloody Harlan”—and in the Labor Defense’s southern 
organizing drive before returning to Alaska. He hoped the king crab industry 
would provide jobs for Aleuts, who had few employment prospects. Then, 
too, he imagined that employing locals might burnish his firm’s luster with 
Alaskans at a time when some were beginning to see the company as a preda-
tory outside interest. All was not sweet harmony, however. After serving on 
board the Deep Sea for a month or more, non-native deck crew members cast 
aside inhibitions when they received shore leaves. They drank to excess and 
caroused. They brought liquor into native villages and cohabited with native 
women, acts about which Aleut village chiefs bitterly complained.³⁷
 No sooner had Wakefield Seafood escaped from near-bankruptcy than 
it expanded its operations dramatically. Relying increasingly on independent 
fishermen to catch crabs, the firm built shore plants in the Aleutians to pro-
cess and freeze the crabs. Wakefield Seafood’s success attracted competition. 
In , the company put up  percent of the American king crab pack, but 
by  it accounted for only  percent. Nor was competition confined to 
American firms, as Japanese and Soviet ventures reentered Alaskan waters. 
In , American companies accounted for two-thirds of the king crabs 
caught in the Bering Sea and from waters above Alaska’s continental shelf, 
but in  the share of American firms had dropped to just over half. With 
more ships placing more fishing gear in the water, Alaska’s king crab catch 
soared from , pounds in , to . million pounds in , to  
million pounds in , and to  million pounds in , a high point. 
The catch crashed to just  million pounds in  and to only  million 
pounds in .³⁸
 To deal with their problems, especially the decline in the crab catch, 
fishermen turned to state and federal governments, and conservation mea-
sures often became tools for economic competition, just as had occurred 
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earlier in the salmon industry. Of most immediate concern in the s were 
regulations governing the catching of crabs within Alaska’s three-mile limit. 
Most of the initial fishing regulations sought to mediate fishing-gear con-
flicts. Wakefield Seafood’s ships were mainly trawlers, which dragged nets 
across the ocean bottom scooping up everything in their paths. By way of 
contrast, most of the smaller boats manned by independent Alaskan fisher-
men employed crab pots. Like very large lobster pots, they were lowered to 
the ocean floor. Once crabs crawled into the baited pots, they could not get 
out. Raised to the surface, the pots were emptied on board the boats, which 
then delivered crabs alive to the nearest processing plant. As early as the 
mid-s, clashes occurred in Cook Inlet, especially Kachemak Bay, with 
local fishermen claiming that the trawls operated by the ships of Wakefield 
Seafood were destroying prime fishing grounds and their pots. Federal and 
territorial authorities were able to work out compromises regulating when 
and where different types of gear could be employed.³⁹
 When Alaska gained statehood, control over near-shore fishing was 
transferred to state agencies. Pushed by Kodiak fishermen, the state took a 
number of actions that hurt the larger non-Alaskan firms. The state banned 
trawling operations completely in  and severely limited the movement 
of ships from one fishing area to another. As local crab shortages began to 
show up in some fishing areas, state agencies sought to limit the number of 
crab pots a boat could carry. This effort proved ineffective as a conserva-
tion measure, for it placed no restrictions on the number of boats entering 
the fisheries. The state then moved in the direction of limited-entry fish-
ing, as desired by Lowell Wakefield and executives of other large companies. 
 Limited-entry fishing restricted the number of boats that could fish for crabs, 
usually by granting licenses only to boats already engaged in the fishery.⁴⁰
 However, little was achieved until after the crash in the crab catch in the 
late s, for the smaller, local companies viewed limited-entry fishing as 
an infringement on their economic rights. In the s, the state established 
a quota system by dividing Alaska’s king crab grounds into six areas, setting 
a maximum allowable catch (MAC) for each and closing the grounds to fish-
ing each season once the MACs were reached. This system seemed to work. 
By , the crab catch was back up to  million pounds, and in the late 
s it averaged  million pounds per year.⁴¹
 The state scheme was helped by changes in national and international 
fishing regulations. Even as they fought each other over the regulation of 
near-shore fishing, Alaska’s king crabbers united in opposition to Soviet 
and Japanese fishermen. Clashes first occurred over the types of gear to be 
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used. The Japanese employed stationary tangle nets across large reaches of 
the ocean, much to the annoyance of American fishermen trying to move 
through the same fishing grounds with trawls. Then, too, American fisher-
men wanted their Japanese counterparts to agree not to fish for crabs east 
of  degrees west longitude, a line that would exclude them from much of 
the Bering Sea. The Japanese had agreed to such a restriction with regard to 
salmon and halibut. Led by Lowell Wakefield, American crabbers took their 
concerns to the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission (INPFC). 
Set up in  with the United States, Japan, and Canada as signatories, the 
INPFC was charged with studying and regulating fisheries resources in the 
North Pacific. Arguing that the king crab fishery was not fully developed, 
the Japanese refused to accept limitations on their high-seas crab fishing in 
the s. International conflict flared up anew in the early s, when large 
Soviet crab fleets, some with as many as two hundred vessels, entered Alas-
ka’s offshore waters. Gear conflicts multiplied, and local shortages of crabs 
became common.⁴²
 Actions by the United Nations helped resolve matters, with consequences 
that extended far beyond the North Pacific. In  and , the UN spon-
sored Law of the Sea Conferences. Of greatest importance for American king 
crabbers, the conferences adopted a convention giving coastal nations almost 
exclusive control over the exploitation of their continental shelves—specifi-
cally over oil, minerals, and some fish (sedentary creatures on the bottom) 
found on or under them to a depth of  meters.⁴³ Backed by many third-
world nations but initially opposed by the United States, whose leaders were 
concerned about global access for its fishermen and about navigation rights 
for its commercial and military vessels, this convention had a major impact 
on king crabbing. King crabs were deemed to be sedentary, for they crawl but 
do not swim. Thus, the crabs were judged to be attached to the continental 
shelf. Consequently, this convention would place crabs in the mostly shallow 
waters of the Bering Sea and the Aleutian Islands in American hands. By 
, enough countries—including the United States, which had reversed 
its earlier position, and the Soviet Union, but not Japan—had ratified the 
convention to put it into effect.⁴⁴ In , Congress gave the convention bite 
by passing legislation confirming the United States’ ownership of creatures 
on the nation’s continental shelf, over vehement protests from Japan. Further 
talks with Japanese and Soviet representatives in  and  led to their 
reluctant acceptance of the continental shelf convention and restrictions in 
their fishing for king crabs.⁴⁵
 Additional international agreements helped the American king crab in-
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dustry. Here global matters merged with Pacific ones. What fisheries expert 
Terry Johnson has recently called “the most profound change in the world’s 
commercial ocean fisheries” occurred with the adoption of -mile exclu-
sive economic zones (EEZs) by a growing number of nations in the s. 
After first opposing the concept, the United States proclaimed such a zone 
in  with the passage by Congress of the Federal Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act (reenacted, with some changes, in ). This legisla-
tion extended the federal government’s control over fishing  miles out to 
sea from American shores, regardless of ocean depths. Eight regional man-
agement councils set Total Allowable Catches (TACs) for different types of 
fish in their areas. Foreign vessels could fish within the -mile zone only 
if American ships did not take all of the TACs. Lowell Wakefield acted as 
an industry representative at UN Law of the Sea Conferences in –, 
at which many of the concepts embodied in the -mile EEZs were dis-
cussed.⁴⁶
 Another UN Law of the Sea Conference in  resulted in global rec-
ognition of -mile EEZs.⁴⁷ Objecting to some of the details set by the con-
ference governing the management of the EEZs, the United States did not 
sign this convention, but did insist on its -mile economic exclusionary 
zone. The  convention was implemented without American adherence 
in . By then some  nations had signed it,  nations by . Many 
Pacific Island nations declared -mile EEZs, and by the s some were 
beginning to reap substantial benefits from them, as they leased fishing and 
mineral rights to people from other countries.⁴⁸
 Not all actions represented progress toward conservation, however. A 
UN Law of the Sea Conference in  failed to regulate fishing on the high 
seas beyond the -mile limit. This meeting was called the UN Conference 
on Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. A follow-up meet-
ing in  gave rights to manage such fish to regional fishery organizations, 
but it gave those organizations no right to exclude anyone from fishing and 
gave the bodies no enforcement powers. The – conferences were 
toothless in their outcomes.⁴⁹
 None of these agreements ensured that global or regional fishery re-
sources would be used in a sustainable manner, and many world fisheries, 
including some in the Pacific, were overfished. Too often nations controlling 
the -mile EEZs permitted more fishing than fish stocks could sustain, 
and beyond the -mile limits just about anything went. New England’s cod 
fishery, which in the mid-s accounted for  percent of the entire global 
fish catch, crashed a few years later and has not recovered.⁵⁰ One careful in-
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vestigator observed in , “After a steady rise from twenty million tons per 
year just after World War II, the production capacity of the ocean peaked at 
 million tons in  and then flattened out. The catch has grown no fur-
ther despite the fact that the world’s fishing nations are pumping $ billion 
a year into fleets to produce seafood worth about $ billion.”⁵¹
 By the s, the world’s fisheries were in a state of crisis. As early as 
, U.S. News & World Report carried a lengthy article on “the rape of 
the oceans,” exposing to the general public what was already well known 
by fishing-industry members. Three years later, the Economist reported that 
navies around the globe were gearing up to defend fishing rights. An article 
in the same journal in  observed, “The world’s fish catch may be much 
smaller than previously thought.” In , the Economist wondered if it was 
“the ocean’s eleventh hour” for fishing. There were valid reasons for con-
cern. According to the American Academy for the Advancement of Science, 
the global fish catch of  was only half that of fifty years before, despite 
a tripling of the world’s fishing effort. In June , a thousand scientists 
signed a letter asking the UN to declare a moratorium on industrial fishing 
techniques, which they suspected were sweeping the high seas clean of fish. 
The letter was submitted to the UN Law of the Sea Conference in Costa 
Rica.⁵²
 Alaskan fisheries experienced roller-coaster rides in the s and s. 
There was tremendous optimism that the proclamation of a -mile EEZ 
there would aid the fisheries. Fortune Magazine exuded faith in  that “op-
portunities in the northern Pacific region appear almost boundless.”⁵³ And, 
indeed, the Alaskan king crab catch did reach new heights in the late s. 
But then it crashed in the early s, falling by  percent in  alone. The 
catch recovered somewhat later in the s, only to collapse again in the 
mid-s.⁵⁴ No one fully understood the dynamics of the king crab popu-
lation as the twenty-first century opened, but research showed that develop-
ments in different fisheries were interrelated and suggested that a seemingly 
small change in climate might have “cascaded” in its effects to produce large 
changes in them.
 A possible scenario went as follows. There was a rise in the tempera-
ture of Alaskan waters amounting to °C in . The warmer water caused 
plankton to disappear. Tiny copepod and krill, which feed on plankton, soon 
also disappeared. Shrimp and crab, deprived of their food, nearly vanished—
hence the king crab crash in the early s. Nor were they the only species 
affected. Lacking food, Steller sea lions declined in numbers. There were 
about , sea lions in Alaskan waters in the s, but only , by 
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the s; and in  the Steller sea lion was declared an endangered species. 
Killer whales, which had fed mainly on sea lions, turned instead to sea otters. 
In the s, there were about , sea otters living along the Aleutian 
chain, but by  just , remained.⁵⁵
 As a result of their continuing problems, many in the king crab indus-
try had in the early s come to favor the establishment of Individual 
Transferable Quotas (ITQ), also called Individual Fishery Quotas (IFQ), for 
fishermen going after crabs. Successful as a conservation measure in fisheries 
in Iceland, New Zealand, and some other nations, ITQs gave fishermen prop-
erty interests in their fishery resources, a nearly assured percentage of the 
TACs. The ITQs thus placed fisheries on sustainable bases.⁵⁶ Successful in the 
Alaska halibut fishery, ITQs were extended to the state’s snow and king crab 
fisheries as well, even to the extent of giving some ITQs to processors who 
received delivery of catches.⁵⁷
 Not all species suffered. Salmon, which adjusted better to the warmer 
water than did king crabs, exploded in numbers. Recovering from their low 
points in the s and s, salmon catches rose in later decades, again 
for reasons not completely understood. American fishermen, protected from 
foreign competition by the -mile EEZ, swarmed into Bristol Bay in the 
Bering Sea and other Alaskan waters. They often entered into joint-venture 
agreements with Soviet, Japanese, and Korean companies. Americans caught 
the salmon (and halibut and pollack), which they then sold to factory ships 
owned by foreigners for processing. By the mid-s, the catch was too 
large. The number of salmon landed in Alaska rose from  million in the 
mid-s to  million two decades later. In , the Wall Street Jour-
nal reported that “Alaska is awash in salmon.” Record Alaskan catches, along 
with the development of fish farming for salmon in some nations, glutted 
world markets. Prices plummeted, leading Alaskan officials to conclude, 
once again, that their state’s salmon industry was on the ropes.⁵⁸ Their very 
success also brought fishermen into conflict with Alaska’s oil prospectors, 
setting the stage for additional conservation controversies.
Fish and Oil
Although drillers had discovered oil and gas in Alaska earlier, it was Atlantic 
Richfield’s announcement in  that its roughnecks had hit paying quan-
tities of oil at Prudhoe Bay on Alaska’s North Slope that set off the state’s oil 
boom. The discovery turned out to be mammoth, the largest ever found in 
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North America and the twelfth largest in the world, ten billion barrels of re-
coverable oil. (By way of comparison, an earlier gigantic field, the East Texas 
Field, had contained about two billion barrels of petroleum.)⁵⁹ There were 
considerable technical challenges in developing the Prudhoe Bay field: how 
to drill in the frozen arctic and how to transport the crude oil to market. 
Equally daunting were political challenges, especially how to deal with land 
claims by Alaskan Natives. Once these matters were addressed, the success 
of the oil companies on the North Slope led the firms to look intensively 
for petroleum throughout Alaska, including the state’s continental shelf. This 
quest brought oilmen into conflict with fishermen.
 The state of Alaska sold oil-drilling leases on  tracts of North Slope 
land to several consortia of oil companies in the fall of  for a whopping 
$ million. All of the previous twenty-two oil leases had brought in less 
than $ million to the state’s coffers. Alaskans immediately had visions of 
what the oil bonanza could finance: schools, hospitals, community centers, 
roads, and scholarships—the list seemed endless. Technical problems, while 
formidable, could, most believed, be overcome. A long-distance pipeline, the 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), would carry the oil south to a termi-
nal at Valdez, a warm-water port not far from Anchorage. However, long-
standing land claims put forward by Alaskan Natives for some of the land 
that the pipeline had to cross halted construction of TAPS. Claims also called 
into question the matter of future leases for oil exploration and production. 
Until the claims were settled, no development could occur.⁶⁰
 What followed was a scramble to craft congressional legislation to deal 
with and extinguish native claims. Many parties needed to be satisfied: Alas-
kan Natives, federal and state government officials, oil-company executives, 
Alaskan businessmen and workers, and environmentalists. Historian Peter 
Coates, who prepared a comprehensive account of North Slope oil devel-
opment, observed, “The pipeline proposal spawned a debate commensu-
rate to the size of the project . . . the most passionately fought conservation 
battle in American history since the controversy (–) over the city of 
San Francisco’s proposal to dam Hetch Hetchy Valley in Yosemite National 
Park to provide itself with a water supply from the Sierra Nevada.”⁶¹ For 
three years, proposals were bandied about Congress, until the passage of the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) in . ANCSA gave Alas-
kan Natives title to  million acres of their state’s public domain, provided 
them with $ million in compensation for the settlement of all land claims, 
and established twelve regional corporations owned by Alaskan Natives to 
administer this settlement.⁶² ANCSA also called for an additional  million 
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acres of Alaska’s public domain to be set aside for public purposes. This last 
provision led to renewed debate among environmentalists, business leaders, 
and others inside and outside of Alaska for nearly a decade, until issues were 
resolved with a second major piece of congressional legislation, the Alaska 
National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) of . ANILCA set 
aside  million acres of Alaska’s public domain for national parks, wild-
life refuges, national monuments, conservation areas, and wild and scenic 
rivers.⁶³
 With native land claims addressed and with land issues in general settled, 
pipeline construction could begin. Authorized by Congress in , TAPS 
was quickly built, and oil began flowing in .⁶⁴ By , oil revenues ac-
counted for  percent of the state of Alaska’s income, and a decade later still 
comprised around  percent of state revenues. The success of drilling on the 
North Slope led to a surge in interest in oil exploration elsewhere, including 
possible underwater reserves in the state’s continental shelf. Much of that 
interest focused on drilling in the continental shelf north of Prudhoe Bay, 
but many other regions or, as they were called in the oil industry, “basins,” 
attracted notice.
 The same principles that regulated Alaskan fisheries governed oil explo-
ration and production on Alaska’s continental shelf, but specific laws regu-
lated the actual granting of oil and gas leases. State governments regulated 
leasing and drilling on the continental shelf three miles out to sea, with the 
federal government doing the same at distances beyond the three-mile limit. 
Congressional legislation governed leasing and drilling by companies be-
yond the three-mile limit, and those terms were often followed by state gov-
ernments setting terms for near-shore leases. Under the terms of the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act of , the Department of the Interior sold 
leases on the basis of a cash-bonus bid plus an annual royalty on produc-
tion fixed at one-sixth of the value of that production. Twenty percent of the 
bonus bid had to accompany the bid, with the remaining  percent paid, 
along with the first year’s royalty, when the lease was assigned. Oil companies 
were given five years to begin developing leases, or forfeit the leases. If oil 
was found, leases were generally extended for as long as oil (and/or gas) was 
produced.⁶⁵
 Leasing laws changed in , when Congress passed the Outer Conti-
nental Shelf Lands Act to amend the bonus-bid system required in the  
legislation. The  law allowed the Department of Interior more flexibility 
in structuring leases. Pushed by environmentalists in the wake of a major oil 
spill in California’s Santa Barbara Channel and passed over the protests of 
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most oil companies, this law stressed the need for “orderly” and “balanced” oil 
development, with more protection for marine and coastal environments. At 
the same time, the Alaska Legislature enacted a similar law designed to give 
state officials more leeway in arranging near-shore leases and increasing its 
revenues from those leases, an action again taken over the protests of oil com- 
panies. The state and federal laws specified eight possible bidding systems 
and tightened government regulatory controls over the oil companies.⁶⁶
 Under this mélange of laws, development of oil and gas on America’s 
continental shelf proceeded. The earliest offshore production occurred just 
off the coast of California in . A major oil field was developed in the 
Gulf of Mexico in  and another one there in . By , some , 
wells in federal waters had produced . billion barrels of oil and  trillion 
cubic feet of gas.⁶⁷ In Alaska, the continental shelf beyond the huge North 
Slope strikes attracted the most attention from both oil company executives 
and governmental officials during the s and s.⁶⁸ It was under the 
waters of the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas that the greatest quantities of off-
shore oil and natural gas were expected to be found.⁶⁹ Even so, considerable 
notice went to continental shelf regions in south-central Alaska, the Aleu-
tian Islands, and parts of the Bering Sea. Cook Inlet, the Kodiak Basin, and 
the North Aleutian Shelf, along with a number of basins in the Bering Sea 
seemed promising.⁷⁰ In fact, a few were already being developed by oil com-
panies, and these actions brought them into conflict with well-established 
fisheries businesses.
 Offshore oil leasing and drilling began early in Cook Inlet. Between  
and , the state leased . million acres there, and the Cook Inlet Basin 
had yielded  million barrels of oil and  billion cubic feet of natural 
gas by . Already in the s, offshore wells and wells on the adjacent 
Kenai Peninsula were pumping $, per day in taxes and royalties into 
the state’s coffers. Small oil spills occurred as a result of this activity. In the 
decade after , some  “incidents” dispersed , barrels of oil onto 
the inlet’s water. Although some environmentalists had their doubts, most 
Alaskans accepted the spillage as a small price to pay for what they viewed 
as economic progress.⁷¹
 Despite the development of offshore oil production there, Cook Inlet 
remained a very productive fishing area. Cook Inlet, and especially its 
Kachemak Bay, it will be recalled, had been the scene of many fishing-gear 
conflicts in the s. By the mid-s, Cook Inlet was producing annual 
salmon catches totaling , metric tons worth $. million to fishermen, 
king crab catches of about , metric tons valued at $. million, catches 
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of shrimp coming to , metric tons worth $. million, along with catches 
of halibut, herring, and some other types of crab and fish. The bulk of these 
catches came from Kachemak Bay and nearby Kamishak Bay.⁷² Those catches, 
many feared, might be damaged by oil spills likely to accompany increased 
oil exploration, drilling, and production. A spill resulting from a tanker dis-
charging ballast crude oil into the ocean near Kodiak Island in  sullied 
, miles of beaches in the northern Gulf of Alaska, killed , sea birds, 
and oiled fishing gear. This incident turned many fishermen against oil de-
velopments at sea.⁷³
 In the s, additional government plans for offshore oil activities 
caused heated disputes in Cook Inlet. Controversies first revolved around 
the state of Alaska’s offer to sell oil and gas leases to , acres in Lower 
Cook Inlet, including , acres in Kachemak Bay, in late . This offer 
created what historian Daniel Nelson has rightly called “a firestorm.”⁷⁴ 
Fishermen complained bitterly that state officials ignored their protests and 
failed to keep them informed of plans for the region. They pointed out that 
the state refused to hold public hearings on proposed oil and gas leases, even 
when biologists for the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADFG) and 
the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) requested a delay to examine 
the impact of oil and gas activities on fishing. An ADFG scientist observed, 
“We believe, and have evidence to support our belief, that Kachemak Bay . . . 
is one of the most highly productive marine environments in the world,” 
and a NMFS scientist added that one of the proposed drilling locations was 
“located in a spot that is a very critical habitat” for shrimp. Beyond objecting 
that oil exploration and production might pollute fishing waters, fishermen 
added that increased boat traffic would lead to the accidental destruction of 
fishing gear, especially crab pots.⁷⁵ Nonetheless, the leases won approval in 
December .
 That was far from the end of the matter. Local fishermen, some state 
legislative leaders, themselves fishermen, and scientists raised an increasing 
number of questions about the compatibility of oil and fish.⁷⁶ A  analysis 
by Alaska’s leading economist supported the fishermen, noting that oil and 
gas “operations and transportation will inevitably cause varying degrees of 
destruction to fisheries, chiefly through contamination of water by chronic 
discharges and accidents.” The report suggested that the state might earn 
greater revenues in the short term from oil and gas leasing than from taxes 
on fishing, but pointed out that the oil resources would be exhausted in ten to 
twenty years, whereas fish were a renewable resource and thus a better long-
term bet for Alaska’s economy.⁷⁷
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 What to do with Cook Inlet became a hotly contested issue. Eager for 
revenues, the state went ahead with its leasing plans for the inlet in the mid-
s. This was several years before the huge royalties started rolling in from 
the North Slope leases, and Alaska’s government needed income. Fishermen 
initially failed in their effort to halt the drilling when an Alaska district court 
refused to hear their case against the leasing. Still, their protests continued 
and found a political solution, which altered how the development of Cook 
Inlet was carried out. With a new governor elected, in part through a promise 
to be more environmentally sensitive than earlier governors, the state legis-
lature designated Kachemak Bay as a marine sanctuary in . Oil and gas 
leasing was prohibited. Over the next few years, the state used its powers of 
eminent domain to buy back leases.⁷⁸
 The federal government thus inherited a legacy of protest when it began 
leasing oil tracts beyond the three-mile limit in Cook Inlet. First made in 
, federal leases covered , acres and brought in nearly $ mil-
lion to the nation’s treasury. A second and even larger sale of leases was set 
for . However, protests and lawsuits from fishermen and environmental-
ists proved effective in imposing fairly strict restrictions on the development 
of the tracts covered by the  leases and in delaying indefinitely leasing 
the tracts proposed in .⁷⁹ In its environmental impact statement for the 
proposed  leases, the federal government recognized that there was “a 
large potential for resource-conflict between the oil and gas industry and 
commercial and sports fisheries.” The  Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
Act established a Fishermen’s Contingency Fund of $ million to reimburse 
commercial fishermen for any damage to their vessels or gear due to oil and 
gas activities.⁸⁰
 Much of the conflict between fishermen and oilmen shifted to the 
Bering Sea in the s and s. As early as , a journalist observed, 
“Like a new species colonizing a remote bay, the oil folks were starting to hit 
Dutch Harbor.” Five of the seven basins there—the Navarin Basin, the North 
Aleutian Basin, the St. George Basin, the Norton Basin, and the St. Matthew-
Hall Basin—were believed to contain commercially recoverable amounts of 
oil. The Minerals Management Service (MMS) of the Department of Interior 
estimated that the basins contained  billion barrels of oil and  billion 
cubic feet of gas. Many of the basins were also prime fishing grounds for 
king crabs, salmon, halibut, herring, and other fish species. An investigation 
by the Department of the Interior reported in  that the St. George Basin 
“supports a large and growing king crab fishery,” that the Northern Aleutian 
Shelf (western Bristol Bay) “is the immigration route for the majority of the 
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sockeye salmon that support the largest salmon fishery in the world,” and 
that the Navarin Basin had “an expanding king crab fishery.” All of these 
fisheries would be affected by oil and gas development activities, as would 
subsistence fishing by Alaskan Natives. Nonetheless, the federal government 
sold leases for  million acres in the mid-s.⁸¹
 The sales led to conflict with fishermen. Graffiti in the men’s room at 
the bar of the King-Ko Inn in King Salmon on Bristol Bay read, “Stick your 
oil money up your ass, Bristol Bay will sail again.” When wells in most of 
the basins produced insignificant amounts of oil and gas, exploration in 
those regions lessened. Abetting the decisions of oil companies to stop drill-
ing was an action taken by environmentalists. In , actor Robert Red-
ford’s Institute for Resource Management, a nongovernmental organization 
(NGO), interceded to work out a compromise among oilmen, fishermen, 
environmental groups, and Alaskan Natives on how to develop much of the 
continental shelf underlying the Bering Sea. Some  million acres in the 
Navarin Basin, the St. George Basin, and Norton Sound, especially sensitive 
near-shore areas, were placed off-limits to oil and gas development. In re-
turn, environmental groups and fishermen agreed not to oppose the leasing 
of  million offshore acres in other areas.⁸²
 Exploration then came to focus on the North Aleutian Basin on the edge 
of western Bristol Bay, one of the most productive fishing grounds and a 
region that was not subject to the agreement negotiated by Redford’s orga-
nization. In , oil companies bought twenty-three leases there. However, 
continuing protests from fishermen operating in those waters, a $-billion-
per-year fishery, led Congress to approve a one-year moratorium on oil and 
gas exploration there in .⁸³
 There was, in fact, growing sensitivity on the part of MMS officials to 
the harm oil could do to fisheries. In , it sponsored a symposium on that 
issue. MMS officials observed that “The coastal and offshore waters of the 
United States are a source of abundant natural resources.” “This abundance,” 
they further noted, “does not preclude conflict among those who use these 
waters.” One of the papers presented at the conference specifically singled 
out the North Aleutian Basin as a region where “some impact assessments 
prepared by the U.S. Minerals Management Service have incorrectly pre-
dicted the adverse affects of oil spills by greatly underestimating the area 
covered by potential spills.” The moratorium passed by Congress in  was 
implemented by the MMS a year later. It was later extended one year at a time 
and currently remains in effect until . The oil companies relinquished 
their leases in . This was not quite the end of matters. The MMS began a 
 Alaska 
five-year leasing program for part of Norton Sound in , and the state of 
Alaska leased some near-shore areas for exploratory drilling.⁸⁴
The Beringia Heritage International Park
The movement to create a Beringia Heritage International Park was another 
flash point in the northern Bering Sea and nearby regions during the s. 
Proposed as a joint Soviet-American venture, the park, sponsors hoped, 
would celebrate the end of the Cold War and encourage the scientific study 
of the vast region of Beringia. “A Beringian park,” observed a National Park 
Service (NPS) historian in , “could be a showcase where the warmth of 
international cooperation offsets the arctic chill.”⁸⁵ After promising begin-
nings, however, legislation to establish the park stalled in Congress, and no 
such park existed as the twenty-first century began. Instead, park advocates 
regrouped, started a series of joint Russian and American activities called 
the Shared Beringia Heritage Program, and renewed their efforts to set up 
an international park.
 The proposed park was huge, encompassing the waters over and adja-
cent lands of an ancient land bridge that had once linked Alaska and Siberia. 
During extended cold periods in the past, tremendous volumes of water had 
been locked in ice and snow, causing the levels of seas and oceans to fall. The 
Bering Sea dropped by about  feet twelve to fifteen thousand years ago, 
opening a land bridge a thousand miles wide between Asia and the Ameri-
cas. By the s, Beringia was seen in scientific circles as having composed 
a coherent region extending from the Kolyma River in the Russian Far East 
to the Mackenzie River in the Northwest Territories in Canada. It was across 
this land bridge, nearly all scientists believe, that people first traveled to the 
Americas, and it was a large segment of this region that advocates wished to 
include in a Beringia Heritage International Park.⁸⁶
 Park ideas took several decades to attract meaningful support. Walter 
Orr Roberts, who had been a special consultant to President Harry S. Truman 
and who was the founding director of the National Center for Atmospheric 
Research in Boulder, Colorado, proposed the idea of a joint park in the s. 
In an international climate colored by the Cold War little was immediately 
accomplished. Still, some steps were taken. In , the United States and 
the Soviet Union signed an “Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of En-
vironmental Protection” and set up a working group to investigate the “con-
servation and management of natural and cultural heritage[s].” That group 
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developed “themes” to investigate further, and in  one theme specified 
the “research, conservation, and management of the Beringian heritage” as a 
goal to be pursued. Meanwhile, the two nations agreed to treaties governing 
the management of migratory birds, whales, polar bears, fur seals, and fish 
in their northern waters. In , an American woman was allowed to swim 
across the Bering Strait, and the next year Alaskan Natives were permitted to 
visit the Chukotka region in the Soviet Union across the strait from Alaska. 
In , American and Soviet planning teams presented the concept of an 
international park during joint visits to native villages on both sides of the 
Bering Strait. Published as the Beringian Heritage Reconnaissance Study in 
, the results of the work of the planning teams set the stage for an inter-
national agreement to create the park.⁸⁷
 President George H. W. Bush and Premier Mikhail Gorbachev signed a 
joint statement endorsing the establishment of an international park bridg-
ing the Bering Strait on June , . Bush asserted that such a park would 
“preserve the unique natural, environmental, and cultural heritage of the 
Bering Sea region” and added, moreover, that it would serve as “a bridge of 
hope” between America and Russia. Gorbachev echoed Bush’s sentiments, ar-
guing that the park would help the two nations in “moving toward a healthier 
international environment.” Legislation to establish the park was submitted 
to Congress in the fall of . The measure authorized the president to des-
ignate an already existing .-million-acre Bering Land Bridge National Pre-
serve as the American portion of the park (with additional lands to be added 
later) as soon as a similar protected area was created by the Russians on the 
Chukotka Peninsula. Endorsed by the native population on the Chukotka 
Peninsula, park planning went ahead in Russia, with the Leningrad State 
Institute of Urban Planning as the agency designated to prepare actual park 
plans.⁸⁸ By way of contrast, park planning languished on the American side 
of the Bering Strait.
 Congress did not act on the enabling legislation when several important 
groups opposed the establishment of the park. Only partly reconciled to the 
national legislation settling land issues in Alaska, oil and mining compa-
nies fought “locking up” any more Alaskan acreage in parklands. At the time 
American mining executives were pursuing the possibility of joint ventures 
with Russian counterparts and spoke against creating the park. The head of 
the Alaska Miners Association added, “We have no respect for the National 
Park Service,” because he thought the NPS had broken promises to miners 
in the establishment of other national parks in Alaska. Then too, Alaskan 
Natives, unlike their Russian counterparts, were generally against the estab-
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lishment of the park. As a member of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference 
explained, “Parks haven’t always been good for us.” Continuing, he observed 
that “park officials won’t let us use snow machines to get to our fishing 
streams in the Bering Land Bridge National Preserve.”⁸⁹ Representatives of 
the NPS belatedly realized that they had not done enough to urge interested 
parties to support park legislation. As they observed, the legislation failed to 
win approval in Congress in , and “subsequent attempts to redraft the 
legislation with the cooperation of native groups in Northwest Alaska and 
conservation organizations were not successful.”⁹⁰
 The evolving situation in Alaska with regard to the Beringia Heritage 
International Park provides a valuable contrast to the much more inhu-
mane treatment meted out to Native Americans in the earlier creation of 
many national parks on the American mainland. In the establishment of the 
Yellowstone, Yosemite, Grand Canyon, and Glacier national parks in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Native Americans living on park-
lands were simply thrown out.⁹¹ Nor did native groups always fare well in the 
establishment of national parks in Alaska.⁹² However, times change, and, at 
least in the case of the Beringia Heritage International Park, the NPS came 
to recognize, as one of its spokespersons explained, “that it was necessary 
to encourage more local support and involvement in the activities that an 
international park designation would promote, before efforts to introduce 
legislation that would be supported by a wide range of interests would be 
successful.” Organized Alaskan Natives, now full participants at the political 
table, could not be ignored.⁹³
 From the mid-s, the NPS made sustained efforts to involve Alaskan 
Natives in decisions about the proposed park. In , it set up a five-member 
Beringia Panel to make recommendations on priorities for the funding of 
Beringia projects. Even though no park existed, the NPS received annual 
appropriations for a Shared Beringian Heritage Program. Two panel mem-
bers represented the NPS, but the others were representatives of three of the 
twelve regional native corporations set up by ANCSA, corporations owned 
by Alaskan Natives in north and northwestern Alaska. The Shared Beringian 
Heritage Program stressed goals important to Alaskan Natives: “to provide 
for the continued opportunity for customary and traditional subsistence 
uses of resources within Central Beringia, and recognition of unique and 
traditional activities by indigenous people”; “the reestablishment of cultural 
traditions”; “to meaningfully involve indigenous people and local commu-
nities of the Beringia region in the administration and management of pro-
grams”; and “to encourage and assist in the return, retention, storage, display, 
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and interpretation of native artifacts from the Beringian region in or near 
the communities from which they originated.”⁹⁴
 By the early twenty-first century, Russian and American leaders had 
made renewed progress toward the creation of an international park, a sign 
of the modern reintegration of the Pacific. The NPS reported that several 
projects had been “developed and initiated at the local level,” ranging in 
scope “from cultural celebrations to educational opportunities for village 
youths.” An official of the NPS had also instituted a Beringia Days celebra-
tion every October in Anchorage to provide visibility for this work. After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation reaffirmed support for 
the park, and the regional Chukotka Administration established a Nature-
Ethnic Park Beringia. The Chukotka Administration also commissioned a 
feasibility study for the creation of the Russian component of the Berin-
gia Heritage International Park, which might encompass the Nature-Ethnic 
Park Beringia. The results of that study are due soon.⁹⁵
Conclusions
The controversies surrounding fishing rights, oil exploration, and the cre-
ation of parks in Alaska illustrate how complex economic development and 
environmental issues have grown in the Pacific and in the world since World 
War II. State, national, and international governmental bodies were involved 
in working out arrangements among the various interest groups, and the 
number and variety of those groups had exploded from earlier times. Alas-
kan fishermen battled out-of-state companies, just as they had in territo-
rial days, but more than in the past they also had to contend with Japanese 
and Russian competitors. Nor was that all. By the s and s, other 
industries, most notably the oil industry, found the Aleutians and the Bering 
Sea enticing, forcing fishing firms to seek agreements with companies from 
those industries. Much of this type of conflict had taken place between dif-
ferent interests seeking to use the public domain in earlier periods in Ameri-
can history. As historian Samuel P. Hayes has shown in his classic study of 
conservation during the Progressive Era, ranchers, farmers, timbermen, and 
others battled for rights over the public domain.⁹⁶
 More was involved in Alaska after World War II, however. Alaskan 
Natives gained seats at the political bargaining tables, as the recent fight over 
the Beringia Heritage International Park has amply demonstrated. Then, too, 
environmental groups and NGOs played expanding roles in the north. Inter-
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ested in a broad spectrum of topics, these groups increasingly championed 
quality-of-life issues, such as the right of natives to continue using snow ma-
chines in their travels, as well as the conservation of natural resources.
 Changing attitudes lay behind altered practices in Alaska with, again, 
events occurring along the Aleutians and in the Bering Sea serving as valu-
able barometers of those alterations. In their attitudes toward king crabs, 
those who established Wakefield Seafood closely resembled Americans surg-
ing west across the North American continent and into the Pacific in how 
they viewed the natural resources: they hoped to put them to immediate 
profitable use, with little thought for the future. Whalers, oilmen, timber 
operators, and others in Alaska shared that point of view as they developed 
their industries, and some continue to adhere to that outlook to the present 
day. Old attitudes died hard. In , Alaskans expanded their hunting of 
wolves from airplanes, a form of hunting renewed in  after years of 
being outlawed.⁹⁷ New ways of thinking, on the other hand, resulted in a 
changed appreciation of Alaska’s environment, including the state’s natural 
resources. Some Alaskans, often prodded by out-of-state individuals and 
groups, adopted a longer-term approach to resource management. Lowell 
Wakefield came to recognize that new methods were needed. Writing in 
, he observed in a thoughtful essay, “Commercial fishing has not pro-
gressed very far beyond buffalo hunting on the Western Plains.” However, 
he continued, “just as homestead rights and grazing leases have stabilized 
and greatly increased production from the plains, some such approach will 
one day come for the oceans. . . . The sort of thing that I can picture will be 
fishermen’s cooperatives.”⁹⁸ What he was searching for, of course, was a way 
to break free from the “tragedy of the commons,” a path, unfortunately, never 
fully followed, with today’s world fisheries crisis as a result.
 As Alaskans sought a balance between economic development and en-
vironmental preservation, they rejoined the Pacific economy and, more gen-
erally, the Pacific world. Alaskans had never completely left that world, but 
between about  and  they had been tied more closely to Washing-
ton, Oregon, and California than to other parts of the Pacific. World War II 
reaffirmed Alaska’s full Pacific presence, and after the conflict ties between 
Alaska and other Pacific regions were tightened. For example, much of the 
pulp from the Tongass National Forest went to Japan. No doubt North Slope 
oil would have done so as well, had it not been for national legislation for-
bidding that trade. Salmon roe from the native fisheries in the Yukon was 
consumed in Asian-Pacific regions. The movement of people across national 
boundaries in the North Pacific may be just beginning. Alaskan Natives have 
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paid ceremonial visits to Chukotka. Less heralded has been the movement 
of Russians back into Alaska. In the s, a small group of Staroveri (Old 
Believers), whose ancestors had left Russia in the s, established several 
villages on the southern Kenai Peninsula and near Kodiak. Some became 
“major participants” in the Bristol Bay salmon fishery. Moreover, with the 
breakup of the Soviet Union, “many people” emigrated from Russia to Alaska, 
where they took up jobs, including some in the salmon industry.⁹⁹
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C HA P T E R  
Southern Japan during  
American Occupation
Hiroshima and Okinawa
 At : a.m. on August , , an atomic bomb destroyed Hiroshima.  Michihiko Hachiya, the director of the Hiroshima Communications  Hospital, described what he saw in his diary: “The morning was still, 
warm, and beautiful . . . shimmering leaves, reflecting sunlight from a cloud-
less sky, made a pleasant contrast with shadows in my garden.” Then came 
the bombing: “Suddenly, a strong flash of light startled me . . . garden shad-
ows disappeared. The view where a moment before all had been so bright and 
sunny was now dark and hazy.” Hachiya quickly realized that his clothes had 
been blown away and that he had been injured by the bomb’s blast. “To my 
surprise I discovered that I was completely naked,” he recorded, “all over the 
right side of my body I was cut and bleeding.”¹ Though injured, Hachiya was 
more fortunate than the tens of thousands of people immediately killed. The 
bomb leveled much of Hiroshima, and fires burned most of those parts of 
the city not immediately destroyed by the blast. Hiroshima’s major business 
district, government and military centers, and some industrial and residen-
tial areas were obliterated. Only the port, because of its distance from the 
bomb’s hypocenter, the point at which it exploded, survived unscathed.²
 This chapter examines the rebuilding of Hiroshima, a process requiring 
decades to complete. It begins by looking at Hiroshima’s development be-
fore  and then explores the human and physical damage resulting from 
the atomic bomb as a prelude to examining the difficult choices made in 
rebuilding. Those choices involved environmental and economic trade-offs 
that have affected the city to the present day. Shinzō Hamai, Hiroshima’s 
mayor, stands out as an influential political actor in the crucial late s. Na-
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tional legislation passed by the Japanese Diet in  with American support, 
for which Hamai strenuously lobbied, was essential in laying the ground-
work for rebuilding. After assessing the impact of postwar planning on Hiro-
shima, the chapter describes recent efforts to turn part of Hiroshima into a 
high-technology city, a less successful venture in planning. While modeled 
to some degree on Silicon Valley, the attempt to create a technopolis helped 
Hiroshima’s development very little, in marked contrast to the more success-
ful high-technology efforts in South Korea. The chapter closes by compar-
ing reconstruction in Hiroshima to that which occurred in Okinawa, where 
Americans played even larger roles.
 This chapter investigates Hiroshima in the context of urban planning in 
Japan and American involvement in that planning. Until recently, scholar-
ship on Japanese city planning, especially that available in English, has been 
limited. Andre Sorensen, a Canadian political scientist, however, has done a 
great deal to correct this situation. His The Making of Urban Japan presents 
a valuable overview of city growth and urban planning in Japan, emphasiz-
ing continuities, especially the centralized nature of such planning.³ Japa-
nese historians have made many of the same points. Yorifusa Ishida, for in-
stance, has observed that city planning in Japan “had long been centralized 
under the national government” by the time of the Second World War and 
remained so after the conflict.⁴ Other scholars have joined Sorensen and 
Ishida in explaining Japan’s urban experience, especially postwar rebuilding. 
Still, much remains to be accomplished.
 Looking specifically at Hiroshima, historian Cherie Wendelken has ob-
served, “Surprisingly little has been written on the planning and rebuilding 
of Hiroshima.”⁵ The Japanese scholar who has studied Hiroshima’s rebuild-
ing most fully has observed, “Hiroshima shares some characteristics with 
other war-damaged cities, but, at the same time, together with Nagasaki, has 
its unique characteristics as an atomic bombed city.”⁶ One difference lay in 
the degree of American involvement in reconstruction, which was greater in 
Hiroshima than in most Japanese cities, although not as great as in Naha City 
on Okinawa. Another difference was the considerable amount of local initia-
tive in reconstructing Hiroshima, especially in the early postwar years. While 
it is certainly true that national planners were important, so were people at 
the local level.
Hiroshima’s Prewar Development
Before the mid-sixteenth century, few people were living at the future site 
of Hiroshima. A handful of fishermen inhabited hamlets loosely linked as 
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an entity called “Gokason” (Five Villages) on islands in the delta of the Ota 
River where it poured into the Inland Sea. At that time, Niho, Eba, and Ujina 
(later Motoujina) were islands in a shallow bay. Connecting these islands and 
filling in the river delta created the space on which much of Hiroshima was 
later constructed. Hiro means wide and shima means island in Japanese, so 
Hiroshima may be translated as “broad island.”⁷
 Improvements began with the creation of Hiroshima as a castle town 
in . That year, Terumoto Mori left Koriyama Castle in nearby Yoshida 
to build a new castle near the mouth of the Ota River. In , he had the 
grounds for the castle, its moat, and the beginnings of a castle town laid 
out at Hiroshima. At the time, his family was seeking to extend its influence 
from its home base and hoped to control traffic on the Inland Sea from the 
new castle at Hiroshima. As the castle went up, a town developed around it. 
The castle lay at the center of the growing town, and planning by the Mori 
clan defined the use of urban spaces, as roads, bridges, and canals were con-
structed outward from the castle. Markets for fruits and vegetables and for 
handicrafts such as tatami mats and baskets operated in designated places, 
and neighborhoods developed that remained important until they were de-
stroyed in . However, in  the Mori clan found itself on the losing 
side in a civil war that raged throughout Japan and was forced by the vic-
torious Tokugawa clan to give up its control of Hiroshima and its castle. 
The end of the civil war ushered in a period of peace and political unity 
called the Tokugawa period in Japanese history, roughly the years – 
.⁸
 Dominated from  by the Asano clan, allies of the Tokugawa, Hiro-
shima continued to develop as a castle town. The Asano family added land 
by filling in shallows in the Ota River delta and by leveling nearby hills. Hiji-
yama, Nihonshima, and Eba, all originally islands, became part of Hiroshima. 
Hiroshima developed a rich samurai or military culture as a castle town but, 
as was typical of castle towns in Japan, also possessed a commercial culture. 
In Hiroshima and the nearby area, trade and early industry focused on salt 
making, fishing, shipbuilding, and iron making. In the last industry, artisans 
exploited iron sands along streams in the mountains. Quarrying iron often 
resulted in the heavy flow of silt in the rivers, which became clogged and 
flooded, destroying the rice paddies of farmers downstream. This environ-
mental issue was solved by refraining from mining during planting times. 
Eventually, mining upstream from Hiroshima was forbidden by the Asano 
leadership. All of these economic activities, together with nearby farming, 
brought growth to the town. Hiroshima had about seventy thousand inhabi-
tants by the mid-s.⁹
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 During Tokugawa times, Japan had about two hundred castle towns like 
Hiroshima, of which some thirty to forty supported populations of at least 
ten thousand, as merchants and artisans moved in to serve them. The castle 
towns functioned as military and administrative centers, but they were also 
foci for economic development, at least into the s, when smaller villages 
became relatively more important. The growth of many of the castle towns, 
including Hiroshima, represents a case in development from above. The local 
lords, called daimyo, following directions from the shogun, Japan’s supreme 
military ruler, determined where the towns would be sited, how they would 
be laid out, and how they would function. The desires of the daimyo were, 
especially initially, more important than the free flow of social and economic 
forces.¹⁰
 While some urban centers in Japan grew up in a haphazard manner, 
there was also a tradition of planning. In  A.D., the emperor constructed 
the port city of Naniwa, where present-day Osaka stands, with a gridiron 
street system modeled on the Chinese city of Chang-an. In , the succeed-
ing emperor moved the capital to Fujiwara and again ordered a city con-
structed with a gridiron street pattern. Fujiwara soon became too small, and 
in  the capital was moved to Nara. Measuring about two and one-half by 
three miles in size, Nara was divided by a major north–south boulevard and 
subdivided into eighty districts of sixteen sections each. Finally, in  the 
emperor relocated the capital to Kyoto, where it remained until . Kyoto, 
influenced by urban designs in China, was also laid out in a gridiron fashion, 
with a north–south boulevard separating the city into halves corresponding 
to the division of the government between the Ministry of the Left and the 
Ministry of the Right.¹¹
 Centralized urban planning was a major legacy of the Tokugawa period 
that would influence the rebuilding of Hiroshima. In castle towns like Hiro-
shima, daimyo were important to the selection of sites and in the determi-
nation of spatial layouts. In Japan’s capitals, the emperor performed much 
the same functions. However, not all choices were made in a fully central-
ized manner. Merchants and artisans had some options and influenced some 
developments. Even daimyo had to consider their desires if they wanted to 
attract them to their castle towns and thus encourage economic develop-
ment in their regions. So, although centralized decision making was typical 
of the Tokugawa era, the leaders making those decisions had to recognize the 
wishes of other groups in society.
 In the s and s, when Japan was forcibly opened to expanded 
trade with the West, the Tokugawa regime lost control of the nation and 
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modernization intensified. The Emperor Meiji officially returned to power 
and moved his capital from Kyoto to Tokyo in what was known as the Meiji 
Restoration of . In fact, most of the political power in Japan was shared 
by a group of oligarchs and, a bit later in the nineteenth century, by a two-
house legislature called the Diet, modeled on the British Parliament. As 
Japan modernized, the new regime launched successful wars against China 
in – and Russia in –.¹²
 Japan’s expansive overseas policy brought prosperity to Hiroshima, which 
continued to develop as a military and economic center. Crucial was the con-
struction of a major harbor at Ujina. Ignoring the opposition of fishermen 
who rightly feared the loss of traditional fishing grounds, the prefectural 
governor of Hiroshima, successor to the local daimyo, had the harbor built 
between  and . In the process, dredging operations formed some 
two million square meters of new land near what had been Ujina Island. 
Railroads linked the harbor and the city of Hiroshima to other parts of 
Japan. Its harbor and railroads made Hiroshima a major embarkation point 
for troops bound overseas in Japan’s conflicts with China and Russia. In the 
Sino-Japanese War, the emperor moved to Hiroshima, where he set up im-
perial headquarters and planned military strategy. The Diet held meetings in 
a building on the west drill ground of the Hiroshima castle. Transportation 
links also made Hiroshima significant as a center of commerce and home 
to stock exchanges, banks, and mercantile establishments. Heavy industry 
came to Hiroshima. Large factories for Toyo Industries, a maker of cars and 
trucks, Mitsubishi Shipyards, Mitsubishi Machinery, Nippon Steel, and two 
rayon-making plants operated in Hiroshima’s suburbs or at its harbor. As it 
matured, the city also hosted the Hiroshima Teachers’ College in  and 
the Hiroshima College of Science and Literature, later Hiroshima University, 
in .¹³
 With Hiroshima’s growth came efforts at planning. About , people 
lived in the city in  and , in . Covering twenty-seven square 
kilometers in , Hiroshima had expanded to sixty-nine square kilometers 
forty years later. As part of the formation of the new national government 
in the Meiji Restoration, old political designations were abolished and Japan 
was divided into large districts called prefectures and smaller districts—
cities, towns, and villages—in the s. The prefecture of Hiroshima was 
established, administered by a governor, with the town of Hiroshima con-
sisting of four smaller subdivisions, each administered by a municipal officer. 
Hiroshima was officially recognized as a municipality by Japan’s national 
government in , along with thirty-eight other urban centers, and a physi-
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cian was appointed as mayor. In that year, too, Hiroshima opened its first 
city hall.¹⁴
 These changes occurred, as they did throughout Japan, in a top-down 
manner. Prefectural governors, mayors of cities, and other city officials were 
generally appointed, not elected by local residents. The Home Ministry of 
the national government tightly controlled regional and local governmen-
tal developments, with prefectural governors usually appointed from that 
ministry’s roster of bureaucrats. Decisions made in Tokyo and prefectural 
offices were most important in shaping Japan’s expanding urban areas. Those 
decisions emphasized efforts to “reduce the risk of fire, build broad, straight, 
paved streets, and improve the water supply,” as Japan sought in urban affairs, 
as in other matters, to catch up with the West.¹⁵
 The primacy of Japan’s central government in urban planning was most 
apparent in the Diet’s passage of City Planning and Urban Building Laws for 
the entire nation in . Administered by the Home Ministry, the laws al-
lowed little room for local variance. Growing out of earlier efforts to remake 
Tokyo and influenced by western ideas, these laws were a first attempt at a 
“comprehensive planning system that applied to whole urban areas and all 
major cities, that could structure activity on the urban fringe, and provide 
controls on individual buildings.” With only minor changes, the measures 
remained in effect into the late s.¹⁶
 The  laws had five major provisions. First, they divided urban lands 
into four zones: residential, commercial, industrial, and unrestricted. This 
effort came about a decade after a number of major American cities, led by 
New York and Los Angeles, had embraced zoning. However, the system in 
Japan differed from zoning in the United States in two major ways. In Japan, 
zoning was imposed from above—in the United States each city worked out 
its own zoning scheme—and was much less exclusive than American zoning 
schemes. That is, there was much greater intermixture of land uses in Japan 
than in the United States; for example, workers’ housing continued to be 
built right next to factories. Second, the legislation set building codes for 
construction in the different zones—such as allowable building materials, 
building heights, and building lot coverage. Third, the laws established build-
ing lines by designating the edges of roads as building lines and stipulating 
that construction could occur only on lots fronting those lines. Fourth, the 
measures provided for the designation and construction of public facilities 
ranging from parks to sewer systems. Finally, the laws, expanding on earlier 
practices and stiffened by additional legislation passed in , included land 
readjustment schemes, especially for the development of land on the out-
 Japan during American Occupation 
skirts of cities. The government could require landowners to donate up to 
 percent of their holdings for public purposes—such as the construction 
of roads—without compensation, the assumption being that they too would 
benefit from the improvements.¹⁷
 The measures accomplished less than had been hoped in remaking cities. 
The destruction of much of Tokyo by an earthquake and fire in  made 
it imperative that Japan’s government focus planning efforts and funding on 
the capital for the rest of the decade, which left little in the way of national 
planning expertise and money for other cities. Moreover, the opposition 
of local landowners to land readjustment schemes stymied some planning 
efforts. Finally, despite the growth in population and size of their cities, many 
Japanese simply did not think that their areas yet needed much in the way of 
planning and found ways to delay its onset. Zoning was adopted only slowly, 
with just twenty-seven of the largest ninety-seven urban areas having estab-
lished zoning plans by .¹⁸
 Hiroshima was one of the cities to adopt zoning. The City Planning 
and Urban Building Laws of  were applied there in  with the estab-
lishment of a city planning area, and zoning into residential, commercial, 
industrial, and unrestricted districts began. In , city planning roads were 
designated, though not actually built, in the form of a grid pattern of east–
west streets across branches of the Ota River intersecting with north–south 
streets running down each of Hiroshima’s main islands. In , areas were 
targeted for land readjustment, and in the late s and early s locations 
for public facilities, including parks and green areas, were added to Hiroshi-
ma’s basic city plan. However, as was true in most of Japan’s hinterland cities, 
planning in Hiroshima remained in the form of wishes, not reality—lines on 
maps, not actual roads, parks, or other facilities—before the Second World 
War. One major accomplishment, however, was begun as a wartime measure, 
the construction of a hundred-meter-wide boulevard traversing Hiroshima 
east to west as a firebreak.¹⁹
 On the eve of Japan’s entrance into World War II, Hiroshima was a major 
military, commercial, and industrial center and was becoming more spatially 
differentiated. Military headquarters were in the castle and buildings near 
Hiroshima’s center, with barracks close by. A retail area blossomed not far 
from the castle, expanding from the Nakajima district that had existed in 
Tokugawa times. Industrial establishments grew up in several areas. The 
city’s five largest manufacturing firms employed nearly half of Hiroshima’s 
workforce and were located mainly on the outskirts of town. There were also 
hundreds of small manufacturing companies near the city center. Residen-
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tial areas were interspersed with retail and industrial ones, but many were 
located a kilometer or two out from the city center, with developing suburbs 
such as Koi farther away. As Hiroshima’s population mushroomed, govern-
mental officials struggled to put in place an adequate infrastructure of roads 
and water and sewer lines, but they fell behind burgeoning demands. As 
in most Japanese cities, for example, human waste was collected by nightly 
“honey” wagons, for few sewer lines existed until well after the Second World 
War. As abortive efforts at providing parks suggested—many were planned, 
but none were built for lack of funding—there was also a growing concern 
about the quality of life for Hiroshima’s residents. Shrubs and plants along 
or sometimes down the center of streets, and along river banks, government 
officials began to realize, were not adequate.²⁰
Destruction and Recovery
Hiroshima continued to develop as a military center during the Second World 
War. Navy headquarters were established in the port of Ujina in , with 
military units stationed up and down the coast near the city. As Japan suf-
fered defeats in the Pacific, the home islands were divided into two parts for 
defense purposes. The Second General Headquarters, established to defend 
southern Japan from invasion, was set up in Hiroshima’s castle just north of 
the city’s center. There were ,–, people in Hiroshima when the 
atomic bomb was dropped on the city. These consisted of a resident popula-
tion of ,–, and some , additional Japanese workers from 
nearby areas, including junior high school students brought to Hiroshima as 
laborers. On August , many were tearing down houses to prepare fire lanes. 
Hiroshima residents lived in one of only a handful of major Japanese cities 
not yet heavily bombed and were trying to prepare for expected fire bomb-
ing. There were also about , Second Army troops in Hiroshima.²¹
 Exploded in the air  meters above the center of Hiroshima, the 
atomic bomb released energy equivalent to , tons of TNT. Heat, shock, 
and radiation waves shot out from the hypocenter, which formed a fireball. 
Intense heat from the bomb ignited many fires, and still others began when 
braziers, upon which many Hiroshima residents were preparing breakfast, 
overturned. The bomb’s shock wave traveled outward at a speed of two miles 
per second for a short distance before slowing to the speed of sound, knock-
ing down buildings in its path. Gamma rays carried radiation from the bomb 
outward for several kilometers. Later in the day, a “black rain,” composed of 
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water and minute particles of carbon from the fires, fell to the north and 
northwest of Hiroshima, carrying radiation well beyond the initial range of 
the gamma rays.²²
 The atomic bomb left much of Hiroshima as what observers at the time 
called an “atomic desert.”²³ About five square miles of the city were laid 
waste. Hiroshima had been chosen as the number one target for the atomic 
bomb in part because of its topography. Aside from a few small hills, the city 
proper was flat. Moreover, it was surrounded on three sides by high hills 
that were expected to contain the blast and perhaps amplify it. Only a small 
area of Hiroshima near the hypocenter, the Danbara section that was par-
tially shielded from the blast by the hill Hijiyama, survived without extensive 
damage. Elsewhere nearly all of the wooden buildings in Hiroshima were de-
stroyed or extensively damaged, and most concrete buildings were damaged. 
Only  percent of the city’s buildings remained usable after the blast and fire. 
Some , homes were destroyed or damaged. The destruction included 
the prefectural office, the city hall, most fire stations, the railroad stations, 
the post offices, the telegram and telephone offices, and the broadcasting 
station. Streetcars, electricity, gas, water, and sewage systems were put out of 
operation. Some six hundred of the city’s smaller industrial facilities were 
destroyed near the city center. Larger factories on the outskirts of town were 
damaged but not destroyed. Eighteen emergency hospitals and thirty-two 
first-aid clinics were destroyed.²⁴
 The death toll was huge. The heat and shock waves killed outright many 
residents within one or two kilometers of the bomb’s hypocenter. Thou-
sands more died of radiation poisoning from the initial blast, and still others 
contracted deadly radiation poisoning when they entered Hiroshima from 
nearby areas to aid the bomb’s victims or to look for lost family members. 
Some  percent of the doctors and  percent of the nurses in Hiroshima 
died in the blast, limiting the immediate availability of medical aid needed by 
survivors. The exact number of deaths caused by the atomic bomb in Hiro-
shima is a matter of debate. The most reliable estimate puts the number at 
about , dead by the beginning of November . Radiation sickness 
continued to kill people after that date, and by  perhaps , resi-
dents of the city had died as a result of the bomb. A significant number of 
the dead were non-Japanese: , Koreans forcibly brought to the city as 
conscript laborers, several hundred Chinese workers, an unknown number 
of the , Japanese Americans living in Hiroshima, ten American POWs, 
and a handful of Europeans.²⁵
 The death toll in Hiroshima was unprecedented, not in absolute num-
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bers but as a proportion of a city’s population. Heavy bombing of Tokyo 
in March  resulted in about , deaths among the city’s estimated 
population of  million, a death rate of  percent; the rate was as high as  
percent in Tokyo’s Fukagawa ward. However, in Hiroshima the death rate was 
even higher,  percent for men and  percent for women within the city’s 
boundaries. About  percent of those within one kilometer of the bomb’s 
hypocenter died. Deaths caused by the atomic bomb, combined with the 
movement of survivors out of Hiroshima after the bombing, depopulated 
much of the city. Between February  and November , Hiroshima 
lost  percent of its people.²⁶
 Less affected than the people in Hiroshima or the city’s physical plant 
were Hiroshima’s flora and fauna. Temperate in climate, and washed an-
nually by summer monsoon rains, the city boasted a wide range of plants. 
Rice paddies dotted nearby fields, and orange groves blanketed hillsides on 
islands in the Inland Sea close to the city. The impact of the atomic bomb in 
this respect was relatively mild. Mosquitoes, birds, and carp in shallow ponds 
near the hypocenter were killed. So were many trees, plants, and shrubs. Rice 
plantings as far as four to five kilometers from the hypocenter were damaged, 
as was bamboo to a distance of five to six kilometers. However, little lasting 
damage occurred. Indeed, Hiroshima residents soon found that they could 
grow bountiful truck crops of tomatoes, eggplant, and soybeans in their city’s 
ashes.²⁷
 Rebuilding the lives of the survivors and reconstructing the city of Hiro-
shima occurred in two stages. For several years the emphasis lay in providing 
for the immediate physical needs of the people remaining. Only from about 
 onward did more long-term reconstruction take place.
 Right after the bombing, survivors had to rely on their own resources 
and those of nearby communities. “Despite the desolation of the cities and 
the sufferings of the A-bomb victims, the response from the Japanese gov-
ernment was exceedingly passive,” Japanese scholars have noted.²⁸ The mag-
nitude of the war damage across their nation slowed relief efforts by the na-
tional government. American bombing and naval shelling had damaged  
Japanese cities, not including those in the Ryūkyū Islands. In , the Japa-
nese government decided that  of those cities, including Hiroshima, were 
so heavily damaged that they needed to be rebuilt with central-government 
planning. The destruction in those cities covered about , acres and 
included . million houses. Some , citizens living in those areas had 
been killed, with another , injured. About . million Japanese were 
homeless. With the Japanese economy in tatters—in  the nation’s indus-
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trial output was only one-tenth of what it had been in —funds simply 
were not forthcoming from the national government to help localities.²⁹
 There was also an initial reluctance to make special provisions for just 
one or two cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the face of tremendous overall 
national needs, the central government found itself stretched precariously 
thin. In Japan’s capital of Tokyo alone, some , acres and , houses 
had been destroyed. Nor did Americans immediately step into the breach. As 
one scholar has correctly observed, “On the American side, there was a ten-
dency to avoid placing any stress upon atomic bomb aftereffects, and when 
the problem was attacked, an emphasis was more on research than treat-
ment.” More generally, American authorities viewed the bombing of Japa-
nese cities as just compensation for Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and the 
high rate of casualties inflicted by Japanese forces in battles at Okinawa and 
Iwo Jima.³⁰
 The most urgent need was medical aid. Those few surviving doctors and 
hospitals in Hiroshima were overwhelmed. Typical was the situation at the 
damaged Red Cross Hospital, Hiroshima’s most modern and largest, with six 
hundred beds. On the day of the bombing, about ten thousand people sought 
aid there. Only six of the hospital’s doctors were able to function, as were 
just ten of the more than two hundred nurses. One of the few unwounded 
doctors soon found himself working as “an automaton, mechanically wiping, 
daubing, winding [bandages], wiping, daubing, winding.”³¹ He labored for 
three days with only brief snatches of sleep. Two days later, doctors at the 
Red Cross Hospital were joined by a fresh doctor and ten nurses from the 
nearby town of Yamaguchi, who brought with them sorely needed antisep-
tics and bandages. Several days later, another physician and a dozen more 
nurses came in from the town of Matsue. Even five weeks after the bomb-
ing, an American doctor visiting the hospital observed, “Rooms and equip-
ment have been unbelievably damaged and there are many patients, again 
attended by the families, amid shattered surroundings.”³²
 In the first weeks after the bombing, medical aid arrived in Hiroshima 
piecemeal. Military units from Ujina, the nearby islands of Ninoshima 
and Etajima, and the close-by naval base at Kure sent doctors and first-aid 
workers. Civilian first-aid teams from towns throughout the Hiroshima and 
Okayama prefectures followed. Fifty-three first-aid stations were established 
in school buildings one or two kilometers from the bomb’s hypocenter. 
About a month after the bombing, Red Cross supplies, including fifteen tons 
of medical supplies, reached the city, and more followed later. Finally, help 
came from the American occupying forces that entered Hiroshima in num-
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bers in early October, though a few teams of American doctors had arrived 
earlier.³³
 After medical care, water, food, and shelter were the most pressing 
needs. By the early afternoon on the day of the bombing, a filtration plant 
about two miles from the bomb’s hypocenter was supplying parts of the city 
with some water. Nonetheless, this plant proved inadequate, since many of 
the city’s underground pipes had been destroyed, making distribution diffi-
cult. Thirst remained a real problem in Hiroshima for months, and drinking 
polluted water from the Ota River threatened to spread disease. Food was 
another problem. Some produce came into Hiroshima from the surround-
ing countryside, but not enough. Nor was the amount of food supplied by 
aid organizations sufficient. Children went to newly reopened schools with 
empty stomachs.³⁴ Shacks in which to live went up helter-skelter. Aided by 
government-provided seeds, many survivors planted small truck gardens 
around them. An American army doctor working in the city recorded in a 
diary entry for mid-October, “bamboo scaffolding was beginning to appear 
on some of the larger buildings.” Reconstruction had begun.³⁵
 Some essential city services were soon restored. Within two days of the 
bombing, electricity generated in an undamaged station in Danbara reached 
Ujina and that part of Hiroshima near its main railroad station. Railroad 
lines connecting the city to the outside world were back in operation within 
two weeks. Some streetcar and bus lines were reopened within three days of 
the bombing, and many of the telephone exchanges were back in operation 
at new locations within a week and a half. Radio broadcasting resumed the 
day after the bombing from a studio in the suburbs.³⁶
 The speedy restoration of these services was a remarkable achievement, 
and Hiroshima residents long employed the analogy of a phoenix rising 
from ashes when describing the rebirth of their city. There is considerable 
truth to this interpretation. Hiroshima did recover from its disaster fairly 
rapidly in certain respects. Part of the explanation lies in the fact that some of 
its infrastructure escaped destruction. Some transportation facilities, water 
plants, and so forth either survived or could be quickly repaired. Then, too, 
the prefectural and city governments were soon reestablished, developments 
crucial for a society accustomed to centralized decision making.
 Setting up a new government began even while Hiroshima’s ashes 
were still hot. On the evening of August , thirty surviving political, mili-
tary, and business leaders, together with a representative of the prefectural 
police, formed a temporary prefectural government, which asked for help 
from the national government, aid from nearby prefectural governments, 
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and assistance from military bases.³⁷ Together with what little remained of 
the military command in Hiroshima—most military bases and offices had 
been destroyed by the bomb, notably the Second Army Command at the 
castle—the prefectural government sought to coordinate relief activities. The 
marine transport commander from Ujina was especially important as well, 
as he became the acting police chief for Hiroshima. Military and prefectural 
authorities supervised the disposal of corpses and the provision of food and 
water from surrounding areas. Most military aid ended, however, with Ja-
pan’s surrender on August .³⁸
 It was more difficult to reestablish a workable city government. Located 
just . kilometers from the atomic bomb’s hypocenter, Hiroshima’s city hall 
was gutted, leaving only the outer reinforced concrete structure standing. 
Most civil servants, some  in all, along with Hiroshima’s mayor, died in 
the blast. By mid-August, about  city officials had joined their counterparts 
in the prefectural government in overseeing relief activities. In October, a 
reconstituted city assembly chose a new mayor, a politician who had long 
represented Hiroshima in the Diet. Described by some as “a sickly old man,” 
the new mayor, Shichiro Kihara, was much less important than the person 
chosen as vice-mayor, who by his actions pushed Kihara aside.³⁹
 That man was Shinzō Hamai. Formerly a municipal section head born 
in Hiroshima, but educated at the elite Tokyo University, Hamai got things 
done. A young man in his thirties, he was a bundle of energy and an inspira-
tion to those around him. At his home three thousand meters from the hypo-
center at the time of the bombing, Hamai entered the city’s center almost 
immediately after the bombing, only to find city hall in flames. As soon as 
the fire died down, he set up an office in one of the few rooms still intact and 
began working with prefectural and military authorities on relief measures. 
He worked, ate, and slept there for weeks, venturing forth only to oversee 
the provision of food and medical aid. Learning that Hiroshima’s mayor was 
dead, he took over the reins of the city government without hesitation. “They 
say I shouted at and directed the deputy mayor and other officials who were 
my superiors,” he later remembered, “I did not know I was doing this, as I was 
working like a man in a dream.” Hamai was lucky; in Hiroshima’s harbor he 
discovered a tanker filled with vegetable oil; in town he located a warehouse 
full of food; elsewhere he discovered military uniforms, which could be used 
as clothing. He distributed all of these supplies to aid those suffering in Hiro-
shima. Hamai was popularly elected mayor of Hiroshima in April  and 
was a leader in the city’s government for the next two decades.⁴⁰
 As they labored for Hiroshima’s recovery, prefectural and city authorities 
 Pathways to the Present
did so in a new political framework. Laws passed by the Diet, at American 
insistence, reshaped relationships among the national, prefectural, and city 
governments, at least on paper. In an effort to encourage democracy, Ameri-
can authorities had the Diet pass a Local Autonomy Law in , which for 
the first time provided for direct elections for prefectural governors and 
mayors of cities. It was under the terms of this law that Hamai won election. 
The law also expanded the powers of prefectural and city assemblies, espe-
cially by giving them some authority to levy taxes. The Home Ministry was 
abolished in the same year. Even so, the national government retained much 
of its power over urban planning. Prefectural governors often thought of 
themselves as serving the national government more than the local citizens 
who had elected them. A new Ministry of Construction took over the plan-
ning responsibilities of the old Home Ministry, with little change in person-
nel or ideas. Local governments could not issue bonds to fund improvement 
projects without approval from the Ministry of Construction. In short, little 
in the way of power really devolved to local citizens.⁴¹
 Even with the reestablishment of a workable government, relief and re-
building were more difficult than a celebratory view of Hiroshima’s recovery 
suggests. Although many basic city services were available fairly soon, it re-
quired several years for Hiroshima to renew its population base. By , 
people who had fled to the outskirts of the city and nearby towns were re-
turning to the edges of Hiroshima’s burnt-out sections. Most settled on the 
fringes. Far fewer moved into the area near the atomic bomb’s hypocenter. 
As late as mid-, the large section of Hiroshima within two kilometers of 
the hypocenter contained only about  percent of its prebombed popula-
tion. The suburbs were crowded. Sections of Hiroshima three or more kilo-
meters out contained twice as many people as before the bombing. By the 
late summer of , Hiroshima as a whole had regained the population it 
had possessed three summers before.⁴²
 Still other population changes occurred, which raised environmental 
justice issues, at least in hindsight. Hiroshima’s burakumin or eta, a group of 
“untouchables” shunned by most Japanese as unclean because they slaugh-
tered animals and worked with leather against the teaching of Buddhism, had 
lived in their own enclaves on the outskirts of town. With the bombing, other 
Hiroshima people moved into these areas and mingled with the burakumin. 
Similarly, the burakumin found opportunities to leave their ghettos. In like 
fashion, Koreans and Chinese in Hiroshima were reclassified as members 
of liberated nations with Japan’s defeat, against whom the Japanese police 
were not entitled to act. They soon formed gangs that fought pitched battles 
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with Japanese gangs around Hiroshima’s main railroad station for control of 
a black market in food and other necessities. These alterations proved only 
temporary, however, as most of the Koreans and Chinese were soon repatri-
ated and most of the burakumin retreated to ghettos.⁴³
 At the same time that Hiroshima was experiencing internal population 
shifts, the city was upset by the arrival of outsiders eager to take advantage 
of its destruction. Survivors of the atomic bomb, who came to be known as 
hibakusha, found themselves challenged by newcomers.⁴⁴ There was “a surge 
of ‘outsiders’ ” who “quickly repopulated the city.” These included “Hiroshima 
natives stationed elsewhere during the war, people deprived of their homes 
in overseas possessions now taken from Japan, others from the nearby Kan-
sai area and especially from business districts around Osaka.” Osaka had 
long been the mercantile center of Japan—the city was often characterized 
by Japanese as the mouth or, sometimes, the stomach of Japan—a metropo-
lis known for the shrewd dealing of its inhabitants. Physically stronger than 
most of the hibakusha, who often suffered from radiation sickness, and 
coming from a part of Japan with an aggressive subculture, the newcomers 
from Osaka elbowed their way into Hiroshima.⁴⁵
 Life in Hiroshima during  and  was remarkably fluid. New 
groups jostled for power; recovery existed side by side with continuing prob-
lems over water and food; and lawlessness seemed to rule the day in parts of 
the city. Still, with aid beginning to come in from the outside, and through 
their own efforts, survivors managed to eke out an existence. In this day-to-
day scramble to live, little care was taken for Hiroshima’s natural environ-
ment. Nor did quality-of-life matters concern people. Only when their im-
mediate problems of daily living were brought under control were residents 
able to return to a consideration of broader issues that had begun cropping 
up in the s and s, such as zoning and other forms of planning. When 
they did so, however, they accomplished more than did residents in most of 
Japan’s other war-damaged cities.
The Hiroshima Peace Memorial City Construction Law
Even as officials in Hiroshima’s city and prefectural governments were strug-
gling with immediate relief, some began to think about long-term rebuilding. 
At first, suggestions about planning did not achieve much, for neither city, 
prefectural, nor national governments possessed the necessary resources. 
Only in  did the Diet pass, with substantial American approval and sup-
 Pathways to the Present
port, a national law providing funding and authority for the rebuilding of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki along new lines. Only later in the s and s, 
as economic prosperity returned to Japan, was that reconstruction accom-
plished.
 As they approached reconstruction, those in Hiroshima faced new na-
tional measures that framed their actions. In December , the Diet ap-
proved a Basic Policy for War-Damaged Areas Reconstruction Law, which set 
ambitious targets for urban rebuilding. This measure established guidelines 
for reconstruction, including strengthened land-use and building-standards 
controls. The measure urged that  percent of all urban areas be reserved as 
parks and that cities be surrounded by extensive greenbelts. In addition, it 
called for the creation of broad boulevards as firebreaks and streets capable 
of handling increased automobile traffic. In September , the Diet passed 
the Special City Planning Act, which created a War Damage Reconstruction 
Board to examine rebuilding projects nationally and which altered the land 
readjustment provisions of earlier legislation. Under the  legislation as 
much as  percent of a landowner’s property could be taken without com-
pensation by the state,  percent more than previously allowed. This part of 
the law, however, was altered at American insistence in  to provide com-
pensation to landowners for any lost properties. In , two years after Japan 
had become fully independent, new legislation reversed the situation, once 
again setting the proportion of land that could be taken without compensa-
tion at  percent. Though amending details of the  laws, the legislation 
of – did not fundamentally change them.⁴⁶
 New planning laws might have gone much further, as Japanese archi-
tects, planners, and others discussed sweeping changes. However, a lack of 
funding, ministerial disagreements in the national government, disputes 
over property ownership, and American opposition doomed more exten-
sive planning. American occupation authorities, in particular, thought that 
flamboyant planning simply was not appropriate for their former enemy and 
concluded that retrenchment and austerity should be the order of the day 
for the Japan.⁴⁷ In the end, only about , of the , acres designated 
for reconstruction in Japanese cities were rebuilt in a planned way. Only a 
few wide boulevards were constructed, and only a handful of new parks and 
greenbelts were created. The zoning plan of just four designations, inherited 
from the  legislation, remained in force.⁴⁸
 Hiroshima proved to be an exception to the rule that relatively little 
was accomplished in postwar Japanese cities—even more than in Nagasaki, 
which had weaker local political leaders. Because of its destruction by an 
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atomic bomb, more notice, especially American attention, focused on Hiro-
shima than on most damaged Japanese cities. Then, too, Mayor Hamai, urged 
on by local citizens, argued forcefully for national aid. Even so, while more in 
the way of planned rebuilding was accomplished in Hiroshima than in most 
other Japanese metropolises, reconstruction was a tortuous path.
 Soon after the bombing, surviving Diet members from the Hiroshima 
region set up a War Disaster Restoration Committee, which in turn estab-
lished a War Disaster Restoration Group composed of business and politi-
cal leaders in Hiroshima. The group, according to a city publication, “stimu-
lated public discussion on the restoration work and generally strengthened 
the commitment to vigorously pursue the reconstruction goals.”⁴⁹ But what 
would those goals be?
 In late  and early , well before the Diet passed the Special City 
Planning Act, both the city and prefectural governments began grappling 
with the issue of what type of city Hiroshima would become. Less damaged 
than the city government, the prefectural government made preliminary re-
construction plans in very late , led by Satoshi Nagoshima, who had 
been involved in urban planning at Nagoya. City officials soon followed this 
lead. In January , a Hiroshima Restoration Bureau (sometimes called the 
Reconstruction Office) was set up as a new section within the city govern-
ment, headed by a civil engineer with experience in city planning. Within a 
month, this section of the city government was making recommendations 
to the mayor. Cooperation between prefectural and city officials followed. 
In February , the prefectural governor invited a number of the city’s 
leaders to a Hiroshima Restoration Symposium to discuss plans for Hiroshi-
ma’s future.⁵⁰
 At that symposium, Hiroshima residents expressed a wide variety of 
views. A writer testified that he hoped that the banks of Hiroshima’s rivers 
would “become green areas and parks” and that trees would be replanted 
throughout the city. Housing should be built, he observed, on the outskirts 
of Hiroshima for “the A-bomb victims who are now compelled to live in 
shacks.” A painter echoed his thoughts about greenbelts and added that he 
wanted Hiroshima to become “a modern city displaying the highest quality 
of original Japanese culture.” The head of broadcasting for NHK in Hiro-
shima hoped that culture would not be lost sight of in the rebuilding and 
called for the construction of libraries, movie theaters, and playhouses. A 
Buddhist priest urged that major roads be immediately rebuilt and that Bud-
dhist temples be constructed in the various sections of town, where they 
could be used as community centers.⁵¹
 Pathways to the Present
 Not everyone favored reconstructing Hiroshima along new lines, or 
even rebuilding the city at all. The deputy mayor of nearby Kure City stated 
that he wanted “to keep the vast expanse of the burned-out area intact as 
a memorial graveyard for the sake of everlasting world peace” and added 
that he had “reservations about building a city on the place where countless 
numbers of people ha[d] died.” In fact, he thought it would be a good idea to 
“search for a new place in the suburbs and construct a new Hiroshima there.” 
The president of Asahi Industries urged the preservation of an area within 
a two-mile radius of the bomb’s hypocenter as ruins, with a new city built 
outside of those limits. A scholar of religion added that he was “opposed to 
the idea of rebuilding Hiroshima as a large city.”⁵²
 Debates continued at meetings of the city government at which a broad 
spectrum of ideas was floated. Some thought that Hiroshima’s future lay with 
tourism to its nuclear wasteland. Others argued that the city should become 
mainly a governmental center. Still others believed that Hiroshima should 
be made into an Asian Venice, with canals connecting the branches of the 
Ota River upon which imported gondoliers might ply their craft. A few sug-
gested that Hiroshima be rebuilt as a Japanese Monte Carlo, with casinos for 
the wealthy. One person urged that Pablo Picasso be invited to Hiroshima to 
preside over the establishment of an artist colony.⁵³
 Foreigners also offered advice. Major S. A. Jarvis, an Australian adviser 
greatly influenced by American city-beautiful ideas, played a significant role. 
Building on plans put forward at the various conferences, he urged Hiro-
shima residents to think big in reconstructing their city. Tam Deling, an 
American park planner, was among the first to suggest the preservation of 
bombed-out buildings near the hypocenter as a memorial. Miles Born, the 
vice president of the United Press, was among the first to urge the construc-
tion of a Peace Park in the Nakajima district.⁵⁴
 For a while, all things seemed possible. Nonetheless, little was immedi-
ately accomplished, for funding was not available. Revenue from taxes fell by 
 percent in Hiroshima in the years right after the bombing, and rents and 
public fees dropped  percent. The city government had to depend even 
more than in the past on funds from Japan’s national government for its 
operations. City officials estimated that they needed at least $ million to 
initiate planned reconstruction, but they had only $,.⁵⁵ When city 
officials appealed to the national government for a special subsidy in the 
summer of , they were rebuffed. Strapped for funds, the Diet had no 
money to spare.⁵⁶
 Even so, planning ideas survived. Late in , the national government’s 
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War Disaster Restoration Institute called upon the architect Kenzō Tange, 
then just thirty-three years of age, to develop a plan for Hiroshima. Born in 
, Tange graduated from the University of Tokyo in . After working 
for four years in the office of an important disciple of the Swiss modern-
ist Le Corbusier, he returned to the University of Tokyo to study city plan-
ning. A believer in discipline in planning, Tange thought that cities should 
be designed to expand along straight lines and not be allowed to grow in 
a hodgepodge fashion. Influenced greatly by Le Corbusier, he thought that 
form should follow function. Also like Le Corbusier, he believed in the value 
of large “brutalist” buildings to impress the public. In  Tange was an as-
sociate professor at Tokyo University serving part-time as a land-use plan-
ner for the national government. After working on a plan for Hiroshima, he 
would go on to other noteworthy projects: a Tokyo Plan for an assembly hall, 
park, and two towers in ; Tokyo’s Olympic stadium in ; the Osaka 
Expo  in ; a new Tokyo city government complex in ; and the 
Fuji Television Building in . Outside of Japan, Tange was well known for 
work in Singapore, the United States, China, and Western Europe. In , 
he became the first Japanese to win the coveted Pritzker Architecture Prize. 
Upon his death in , his obituary in the New York Times observed that 
“Tange may best be remembered for his transformation of Hiroshima.”⁵⁷
 For Hiroshima, Tange urged the construction of a major east–west boule-
vard one hundred meters wide stretching across the city from Hijiyama to 
the suburb of Koi. The boulevard would facilitate the flow of traffic and act 
as a firebreak. A second boulevard was planned to cross the southern section 
of the city. Trunk roads would run down the length of each island. Tange also 
called for the building of numerous parks, including a seaside park at Ujina, 
and the preservation of green areas along Hiroshima’s riverbanks. Open 
squares and plazas would, Tange hoped, dot Hiroshima’s landscape. His plan 
also called for an airport at Kanon. Few of these ideas were brand-new. The 
boulevard and street system had been proposed before the World War II and 
had been revisited at the various symposia and meetings in early . One 
boulevard had already been partly constructed as a firebreak during the war. 
Many Hiroshima residents had begun thinking of the need for more parks 
and open spaces.⁵⁸ While unable for financial reasons to implement Tange’s 
plan in , Hiroshima’s city and prefectural governments won approval for 
it from the national government as the guide for future development. They 
also agreed to the terms of the Special City Planning Act passed by the Diet 
in that year, which reinstituted zoning in the city. City officials later labeled 
the return to zoning “the start of reconstruction in Hiroshima.”⁵⁹
 Pathways to the Present
 Rebuilding had in fact already begun, with, however, little adherence to 
Tange’s plans or zoning of any sort. When some commentators suggested that 
Hiroshima be abandoned as an urban site, Mayor Hamai noted with pride 
that people were constructing shacks and shops amid the ashes.⁶⁰ “Without 
inquiring too closely into property rights or paying too much attention to 
the city administration’s blueprints,” noted one contemporary observer, “the 
homeless built house after house.” This construction was done on an ad hoc 
basis: “First a post would be driven into the chosen plot, and to this would be 
nailed a board bearing the future householder’s name, electrical cables would 
be connected, only the most conscientious citizens bothering first to obtain 
permission of the Electricity Workers, and in three or four weeks yet another 
family had a roof over its head.” A reporter for the U.S. Army newspaper 
Stars and Stripes concluded that Hiroshima resembled a Wild West mining 
camp during a gold rush.⁶¹ A shopkeeper later recalled how he had evaded 
restrictions: “There was a law at first, that no building covering an area more 
than fifteen tsubo [roughly  square feet] could be constructed. Well, I had 
enough property, so I built three buildings of fifteen tsubo each—and then 
later I knocked the walls down between them and had a store. . . . That’s the 
way we had to do things in those days.”⁶²
 Even as they started reconstruction, Hiroshima residents began to agree 
on an ideological mission for their city: that it be known as a “City of Peace.” 
On August , , sirens were sounded all over Hiroshima, and people 
stopped whatever they were doing to observe a minute of prayer for hibaku-
sha. A simple ceremony was held in front of a tower built in remembrance of 
the souls of the dead. A year later, Mayor Hamai established the Hiroshima 
Peace Memorial Service held at what would become Hiroshima’s Peace Park, 
a dignified convocation. Hamai read the first “Peace Declaration,” in which 
he stated that nuclear weapons “must lead us to the realization of [the need 
for] unconditional peace and to the birth of a new way of life and a new 
world.” General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander GHQ, sent 
a message saying, “The sufferings of the Day of Destiny will act as a warn-
ing to people of all races.” A United Press reporter used the expression “No 
More Hiroshimas” in his writing. Published in Stars and Stripes and then re-
printed in many American newspapers, those three words became the motto 
for Hiroshima. Even so, the Remembrance Day took on something of a car-
nival atmosphere in , with jazz music being played over loudspeakers 
and the use of flashing neon signs to advertise goods in “atomic shops” of all 
kinds.⁶³
 Only in  was August  fully institutionalized as a peace memorial 
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day. “I pray at the bottom of my heart,” intoned Mayor Hamai in his annual 
“Peace Declaration,” that “No More Hiroshimas will be created on this earth.” 
Hamai may not have initially supported the establishment of August  as a 
special day. According to some accounts, he did so only after the head of the 
newly formed Association for the Advancement of Tourism for Japan talked 
with him about the matter as a way of stimulating economic growth. At any 
rate, Hamai’s words, translated into English, were displayed on a Peace Tower 
in large letters. From that time on, the phrase “No More Hiroshimas” has en-
capsulated what many of Hiroshima’s leaders have thought their city should 
stand for.⁶⁴
 With residents in their city more ideologically unified than before and 
with Tange’s plan available as a guide, Hiroshima leaders viewed  as a 
propitious time to renew their quest for planned rebuilding. In August, mem-
bers of the Hiroshima City Reconstruction Bureau invited the submission 
of designs for a Peace Memorial Park near the atomic bomb’s hypocenter in 
the Nakajima District. Proposals for such a park had been made repeatedly 
at meetings of the city government and its advisory bodies. Some  plans 
were considered, but the joint plan of four faculty members at Tokyo Univer-
sity, one of whom was the same Kenzō Tange who had put forward a city plan 
two years before, was chosen. The plan called for a one-hundred-meter-wide 
boulevard running east–west through Hiroshima and skirting the south side 
of a Peace Park. The Peace Park would, according to the plan, have meeting 
halls, an arch-shaped peace memorial monument, and open spaces. To the 
north of the park there would be, the plan anticipated, a natural forest park 
and large plaza at which residents of the city could meet.⁶⁵
 Political lobbying helped make these plans reality. Mayor Hamai and 
others in the city government formed a “League” or “Peoples Lobby” contain-
ing “representatives of every section of society” to obtain help for Hiroshima. 
They traveled to Tokyo to meet with ministers and representatives of the 
Diet, asking for two closely related actions. First, they wanted the national 
government to return large tracts of land once held by Japan’s military to the 
city. Special legislation was needed for this action. Simple land readjustment 
schemes, they realized, were not adequate for the tasks at hand. Second, they 
hoped for legislation greatly boosting financial aid from the national govern-
ment for the actual reconstruction of Hiroshima. They wanted Hiroshima, 
as a casualty of atomic bombing, to be treated differently from other Japa-
nese cities. Initially rebuffed, Hamai reentered the fray in  with a lengthy 
petition in which he wrote of how declaring Hiroshima an official “Mecca 
of Peace” would help in the recovery of all of Japan. His timing was good. 
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Japan’s leading political party was under particularly severe attack by other 
parties, and to regain lost ground its leaders were looking for dramatic ways 
to appeal to Japan’s voters. Then, too, the American government, worried 
about the emergence of a communist government in China, was trying to 
make Japan a pro-western bastion in Asia. Without doubt, helping people in 
Hiroshima to rebuild their city fit in well with the needs of both American 
leaders and important Japanese politicians.⁶⁶
 Justin Williams, General MacArthur’s representative to the Diet, actively 
supported the legislation with MacArthur’s full backing, which practically 
ensured its passage. Mayor Hamai, whom Williams labeled “a man with bull-
dog tenacity,” had approached Americans for aid in rebuilding Hiroshima in 
late , only to be turned away. At that time MacArthur did not want to 
set a precedent that might lead to many similar requests from other com-
munities. American considerations had changed by , and Williams rec-
ommended Hamai’s plans favorably to MacArthur, who gave a “go-ahead 
signal.”⁶⁷
 As a result of this convergence of interests, the Diet passed the Hiro-
shima Peace Memorial City Construction Law in May . The legislation 
proclaimed Hiroshima to be a “City of Peace” and returned former military 
land in Hiroshima to the city, with the stipulation that it be used for parks, 
green areas, sports fields, railways, sewage and water plants, canals, ceme-
teries, and libraries. Moreover, the measure appropriated large sums for the 
rebuilding of the city along planned lines, with additional funding promised 
in the future. Similar legislation honored Nagasaki as a “City of International 
Culture” and set aside a smaller sum for that city’s rebuilding, about one-
third the amount given to Hiroshima. The smaller sum resulted from less 
effective lobbying by Nagasaki’s leaders. The laws established a City of Peace 
and Culture Commission within the Ministry of Construction to oversee 
the rebuilding of the two cities, with the Ministry of Finance empowered to 
supervise the transfer of military lands to Hiroshima. A poll of Hiroshima’s 
residents in July found a majority in favor of the legislation, and it went into 
effect on August , . The first of seven articles of the measure proclaimed, 
“This law aims at the construction of Hiroshima as a Peace Memorial City, a 
symbol of the ideal of making lasting peace a reality.”⁶⁸
 Hiroshima was fast becoming a worldwide symbol of peace. Nonethe-
less, in building their new city, Hiroshima residents used much from the 
past. Many of the features of Tange’s plans had been talked about for years, 
even decades. As Hiroshima’s residents planned the future of their city, they 
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continued to respect top-down planning. They had little choice, of course, 
except to abide by the terms of national legislation. However, they were able 
to influence how that legislation was applied locally, as various groups and 
individuals at the local level took a stronger hand in matters than before.
Economic Growth, Urban Development, and City Planning
An astute visitor to Hiroshima in  observed, “The shadows are fading in 
Hiroshima today, and the visible scars are few.” He noted further that “Hiro-
shima is bigger and more prosperous than before, and within it is a new gen-
eration of young adults who do not remember or care.”⁶⁹ While a symbol of 
peace for many, to others Hiroshima came to mean even more as a locus for 
economic development. Beginning with the Korean War in the early s 
and continuing through the s, Hiroshima participated in Japan’s high-
speed economic growth, and planners found themselves having to accom-
modate the  legislation defining Hiroshima as a “City of Peace” to the 
realities of rapid economic development. National, prefectural, and city offi-
cials, with considerable local input, refined the  law. As it was elaborated, 
the plan for Hiroshima consisted of new parks, boulevards and roads, and 
infrastructural improvements. Onto these elements were soon grafted addi-
tional planning measures designed to encourage economic expansion.
 At the center of the rebuilding lay the Peace Park in the Nakajima Dis-
trict, close to the hypocenter of the atomic bomb. This region had been 
Hiroshima’s main business center into the s, boasting stores, theaters, 
restaurants, and inns. Nakajima possessed some  shops and , resi-
dents before its destruction by the atomic bomb. By the early s, the city’s 
major business district had shifted eastward into Hatchobori, but Nakajima 
remained a significant commercial district. The  law called for the con-
struction of the Peace Park in Nakajima and nearby Saiku-machi, covering 
an area of about thirty acres. By this time, the region was “full of shacks,” 
perhaps as many as four hundred. The squatters were removed, according 
to a city government publication “with much difficulty,” and given substitute 
lots in other parts of Hiroshima. Expansion of the Peace Park led to the re-
location of more squatters in the late s and early s, which sometimes 
required bringing in police to force the clearances.⁷⁰ Thus, environmental 
justice issues were raised as a result of park construction, just as they had 
in the United States, where Native Americans and Alaskan Natives were re-
 Pathways to the Present
moved from national parks. While the removals disturbed some Hiroshima 
residents, designs for buildings and monuments in the Peace Park upset still 
more.
 Conflict over whether to preserve what became known as the A-Bomb 
Dome epitomized the many cross-currents of public opinion. Just across a 
branch of the Ota River from the Peace Park, the Dome had been a com-
mercial exhibition hall constructed in . Located almost directly under 
the hypocenter of the atomic bomb, the hall, made of reinforced concrete, 
was severely damaged by the blast and then gutted by fire, leaving only a 
skeleton, including the domed roof. As restoration work proceeded, many 
commercial and civic groups urged that the ruins of the building be torn 
down. Some business leaders saw the Dome as an unfortunate reminder of 
their city’s past, a relic that might tarnish the image of economic growth they 
were eager to burnish. Many hibakusha—and, of course, this group included 
a number of business leaders—agreed. They resented how the Dome was 
becoming a tourist attraction and saw it as an inauthentic symbol of their 
experiences. However, most residents of Hiroshima, including a majority of 
hibakusha, called for the preservation of the Dome, and its preservation was 
Preserving the A-Bomb Dome 
was controversial. (Author’s 
collection)
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part of Tange’s plans. Generally, peace advocates wanted the Dome saved as a 
reminder of the horror of the atomic bomb. “I would rather see it preserved,” 
observed one survivor, “without it, we would tend to forget the event com-
pletely and be simply easygoing.” In , Hiroshima’s city council voted to 
preserve the Dome’s ruins, which were stabilized and remain to the present 
day.⁷¹
 Other controversies swirled around buildings and monuments in the 
Peace Park itself. Begun in  and finished four years later, the Peace Mu-
seum and Memorial Hall, designed by Tange and his associates as center-
pieces for the park, faced some opposition from business groups eager to put 
the war behind them and from some hibakusha, who decried what they saw 
as contributing to the deleterious growth of tourism in Hiroshima. Thus, the 
buildings were viewed negatively by some Hiroshima residents for the same 
reasons that they disliked the preservation of the A-Bomb Dome. Even more 
controversy engulfed the construction of a large, high-rise ANA hotel just 
outside the park, for many of the same reasons. Constructed in –, 
an A-Bomb Cenotaph attracted heated discussion on two counts. Originally 
intended to hold the remains of all of the victims of the atomic bombing, the 
cenotaph was reduced in size at the order of the Ministry of Construction, 
whose members decided that a large structure would cost too much. They 
The Peace Museum, here decorated for the 1985 remembrance, served as a focal point for Hiro-
shima’s Peace Park. (Author’s collection)
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concluded that only the names of the victims need be included. Taking the 
form of an ancient Japanese house, the cenotaph was intended to shield the 
souls of the victims from rain. Much more deeply resented was an inscrip-
tion placed on the cenotaph, which reads (in translation): “Rest in Peace. 
The mistake shall not be repeated.” Many hibakusha thought these sentences 
implied that they were responsible for the bombing.⁷²
 An eternal flame of peace, a pond and fountain, a memorial to children, 
and other buildings aroused little controversy. Over time, nearly everyone in 
Hiroshima came to accept, indeed cherish, the Peace Park and its buildings 
as central to their city’s culture and economy. The cenotaph, eternal flame, 
and Dome formed a straight line in the eyes of viewers, making a north–
south axis for the Peace Park, just as Tange had intended. With the passage 
of decades, concerns over appropriate forms of tourism, economic growth, 
and ideological values were successfully reconciled.
 The  law for the reconstruction of Hiroshima, as later elaborated, 
called for the use of land, much of it former military ground, as parks and 
green areas, well beyond the land set aside for the Peace Park. Planners de-
cided to include seventy-nine parks and eight green areas spread over about 
 acres as part of Hiroshima’s reconstruction. Most significant was the 
creation of a central park of  acres where the castle and military head-
quarters had once stood. Rebuilt of ferrous concrete, the castle now stands 
at an edge of this park. Then, too, green areas laced the banks of many of 
the branches of the Ota River, as many Hiroshima residents had urged dur-
ing their discussions in . These green banks are unique to Hiroshima 
among Japanese cities. However, not all early ideas came to fruition. Many 
had hoped that a forested area would blanket the region just to the north of 
the Peace Park, and a provision for the forest was included in the  law. 
Instead, a major public housing development and sports-cultural complex 
went up in the Motomachi District. Nor did a seaside park at Ujina materi-
alize.⁷³
 The  law envisioned more than the creation of parks and green 
spaces, and numerous infrastructure improvements flowed from the mea-
sure. The oft-discussed east–west boulevard, running along the southern 
edge of the Peace Park, was built. About a hundred meters wide, this Peace 
Boulevard, as it was named, helped make Hiroshima’s street system more 
efficient and provided a touch of nature in the heart of the city, for trees ran 
down its center. The boulevard became the focus for citywide celebrations, 
such as the parade for a Flower Festival held each spring from . Even so, 
the highway attracted criticism in its early years. Its eastern end terminated 
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at the foot of the hill Hijiyama, upon which the Atomic Bomb Casualty Com-
mission, jointly sponsored by the American and Japanese governments, had 
in  constructed facilities to study the results of the atomic bomb on its 
victims. The Peace Boulevard was called by its detractors a “Royal Road” built 
for the convenience of those in the commission. Other thoroughfares were 
less controversial. The  law called for the construction of twenty-seven 
major new roads, and many were built in the s and s, though not a 
southern boulevard. As a group, these roads and streets composed a new grid 
system within the city, especially in the downtown Hatchobori District. The 
construction of the street system, combined with the use of the Nakajima 
area for the Peace Park, completed the migration of Hiroshima’s downtown 
into this district. New comprehensive sewer and drainage systems were also 
constructed in the early s and s.⁷⁴
 Still other projects not originally part of the  law won approval. A 
“Major Hiroshima Construction Plan of ” applied to  square kilo-
meters (about  square miles) of the city and its nearby hinterland. Many 
improvements were additions to transportation. Hiroshima opened a com-
mercial airport on land reclaimed from the Inland Sea in  at about the 
same place Tange had designated, welcomed its first bullet trains three years 
later, and made numerous improvements to its port at Ujina throughout the 
s and s.⁷⁵ The provision of housing was also taken up by planners. 
Altogether, city authorities had , shanties removed by , replacing 
those shacks with public housing.⁷⁶
 Nowhere was the effort to create public housing more apparent than in 
Hiroshima’s Motomachi District just north of the Peace Park, an area that had 
been quarters for the Japanese Army’s Fifth Division. Here city authorities put 
up  small, temporary prefabricated wooden houses in –. Illegally 
constructed, nongovernment houses in the area came to about ,. The city 
built an additional  small apartments in , moving in people from the 
deteriorating wooden houses. However, some three thousand families in the 
district still had inadequate housing. To meet their needs city officials decided 
in  to build a group of high-rise public apartment buildings. To clear the 
land, squatters were removed and their homes demolished. The director of 
Hiroshima’s City Planning Bureau explained at the time that the new apart-
ments were necessary to improve the quality of life for Hiroshima residents. 
“The first element of the construction of a comfortable city,” he observed, “is 
the development of a living infrastructure in relation to the construction of 
a community based on the principle of setting a value on civil life.” Made of 
concrete and steel, the apartments replaced the older wooden apartments 
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and houses. Situated in buildings eight to twenty stories tall, the , new 
apartments were constructed in a fashion that took the natural environment 
into account: the layout of the buildings was altered from the original design 
to preserve a camphor tree that had survived the atomic bomb; public spaces 
including flower gardens and parks were incorporated into the plans for the 
apartments; and the skyline of the buildings was designed so “as not to give 
a feeling of oppression.” Completed in , the Motomachi apartments pro-
vided middle-class living for their residents.⁷⁷
 It was Japan’s high-speed economic growth that made the planned re-
construction of Hiroshima possible. By , Japan’s real national income 
was six times greater than it had been in the mid-s and industrial output 
was ten times larger.⁷⁸ With greater tax revenues resulting from the nation’s 
economic growth, Japan’s national government could help to fund Hiroshi-
ma’s rebuilding. (United States aid was also of considerable importance in 
spurring Japan’s economic growth, especially American spending in Japan 
for supplies for United Nations forces in the Korean conflict during the early 
and mid-s. Like so many of those Pacific regions affected by the United 
States, Japan benefited from American military spending.) The contribution 
of Japan’s national government to local government finances tripled from 
 billion yen in  to  billion yen in , and to , billion yen 
in .⁷⁹ Hiroshima reestablished itself as one of Japan’s leading industrial 
centers after the Second World War, as part of the nation’s “Pacific Belt” of 
heavy industry, a locus for shipbuilding and automaking in particular. By 
, about one-third of the city’s residents were employed directly in manu-
facturing establishments, a high proportion.⁸⁰ The economic boom attracted 
more people to Hiroshima, until by  the city had , residents. Ten 
years later, the number had climbed to ,.⁸¹ With more tax revenues, 
the city government, like the national government, could better afford recon-
struction projects.
 More than financing was involved, however. Equally important was 
the ability of government officials to assemble sites for the reconstruction 
projects—bodies of land for the Peace Park, other green areas, roads, and 
public housing. In addition to providing initial funding for reconstruction, 
the  law and later legislation granted former military land to Hiroshima 
for many of these purposes. Land readjustment projects also helped. By the 
late s, the city had acquired some , acres in these ways.⁸² In contrast, 
it was difficulties in site assembly that often made city planning hard in San 
Francisco and Seattle.
 Still more factors accounted for the relative success of planning in Hiro-
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shima, chief among them being ideological unity. Over time, most Hiroshima 
residents came to see that through planning—ranging from the creation of 
the Peace Park to the construction of infrastructural improvements—their 
city could benefit from economic growth while also serving as a symbol of 
peace. An international incident in  aroused renewed awareness on the 
dangers of nuclear weapons when a hydrogen bomb test by the United States 
at Bikini Atoll in Micronesia dusted the crew of a Japanese fishing boat, the 
Lucky Dragon, with radioactive fallout. All of the crew members soon com-
plained of illnesses, and one died. It was this incident that led Eskimos in 
Alaska to oppose nuclear engineering through Project Chariot. Immediately 
after this atomic dusting, the Hiroshima Prefectural Diet called for the pro-
hibition of nuclear weapons and international control of nuclear energy, re-
quests endorsed by the national Diet.
 Hiroshima then became a center for world peace movements. Foreign 
visitors, ranging from Jawaharlal Nehru of India in  to Pope John Paul 
II in , made a point of traveling to the Peace Park in the interest of fur-
thering world peace. Regional and global peace organizations held meetings 
in Hiroshima, beginning with a World Conference against Atomic and Hy-
drogen Bombs in . Hiroshima’s mayor made a “Peace Declaration” every 
August  in a ceremony at the Peace Park, and those ceremonies became 
major international events. The one held in  to commemorate the forti-
eth anniversary of the bomb attracted tens of thousands of people, including 
the famous author of the book Hiroshima, John Hersey.⁸³ The fiftieth anni-
versary attracted still more.⁸⁴
 This is not to say that all of the residents of Hiroshima approved of the 
directions their city was taking. Especially in the s, some decried the 
increasingly fast pace of life. Others derided Hiroshima as a “Second Chi-
cago” and denounced the continuing influx of outsiders.⁸⁵ Even so, more 
than people in most modern cities, Hiroshima residents, effectively led by 
Hamai as their mayor, generally agreed that urban planning was a valuable 
tool in Hiroshima’s growth. The fact that planning came to encompass attrac-
tive public housing helped a great deal in this respect.
Toward Becoming a Technopolis?
Many of the same issues that concerned planners in the first two decades 
after World War II attracted attention during the s and s. More than 
in the past, however, planners took a regional approach to these matters, in 
 Pathways to the Present
line with shifts in emphasis in planning throughout much of the world. Then, 
too, as they moved into the s, some planners sought to turn Hiroshima 
into a “technopolis,” a high-technology city. As they continued their work in 
Hiroshima, they did so within a new legislative framework. The Diet passed 
laws in  and  that sought to alter urban planning in Japan funda-
mentally, the first major changes since . Responding to grassroots citi-
zens’ protests and legal suits about air and water pollution, resulting diseases 
and deaths, and continuing rampant urban sprawl, the laws aimed to give 
much more authority to local municipalities to control growth, including the 
power to force developers to pay for infrastructural improvements. The laws 
also expanded the nation’s zoning system to eight land-use types.⁸⁶
 In their attempts to make Hiroshima one of Japan’s most livable cities, 
planners paid attention to the provision of parks and infrastructural im-
provements. In the late s, the director of Hiroshima’s City Planning Bu-
reau observed that “the natural environment” was very important to urban 
life and noted that Hiroshima was fast becoming “a city with abundant water 
and greens.”⁸⁷ By the early s, Hiroshima possessed  parks and four-
teen green areas covering , acres, far more than had been envisioned 
by the  law, making the city a leader in Japan in the provision of open 
spaces for its citizens. The same was true of the city’s infrastructure. By the 
early s,  kilometers of major new roads had been built in Hiroshima. 
Whereas many of those constructed in the immediate postwar period aimed 
at creating a gridiron street pattern within the city, especially in its down-
town area, many of the roads built in the s and later sought to develop 
better connections with the surrounding regions and with a national high-
way system. An effective mass transit system of buses and streetcars operated 
on those roads and highways. Similarly, better sewers and drainage systems 
continued to be constructed. Particularly important in this respect was the 
movement toward a regional approach through the adoption in  of a 
“Sewerage Improvement Total Plan” for the Ota and Seno river basins.⁸⁸
 New planning efforts lay behind Hiroshima’s continuing development. 
In , city officials, working with business leaders, drafted a “Comprehen-
sive City Plan” including a new scheme for Hiroshima’s traffic, which, while 
by no means as congested as traffic in larger cities such as Tokyo and Osaka, 
was more crowded than in the past. On their own initiative, business leaders 
donated a public hall and large baseball stadium to the city, along with statues 
for green areas along the banks of the Ota River. In , Hiroshima’s regional 
planning area was extended to cover two nearby cities, along with seventeen 
towns close to Hiroshima City. Two years later, extensive discussions among 
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city officials, prefectural authorities, and local business leaders resulted in 
the formulation of a “Hiroshima Basic City New Plan.” Amended slightly in 
, this scheme merged thirteen towns and villages into Hiroshima City, 
bringing the city’s population to , and its size to  square kilometers 
(almost  square miles). Within the new city boundaries, areas were des-
ignated for urbanization promotion, urbanization control, and zoning dif-
ferentiating multiple types of residential, commercial, and industrial areas, 
elements required by the legislation that the Diet had passed in .⁸⁹
 City officials listed six ambitious goals in their  plan: “To achieve 
world peace; to conserve and carefully utilize nature; to create safety and a 
high standard of living; to assure a healthy and happy life; to cultivate human 
fulfillment; to create a stable living.” Emphasizing social and cultural goals 
more than economic ones, this plan reached well beyond earlier bricks-and-
concrete plans for Hiroshima’s future. In , Hiroshima won recognition 
from the national government as the tenth Government Ordinance Desig-
nated City of Japan, which bestowed the official designation of “metropo-
lis” on Hiroshima, a source of tremendous local pride. City officials saw this 
designation as proof that Hiroshima had fully recovered from the destruc-
tion of the atomic bomb. By this time, Hiroshima’s population had reached 
,.⁹⁰
 As they were implemented, the plans for Hiroshima included ambitious 
area redevelopment and housing projects. The scope of the new projects went 
well beyond what had been achieved earlier in the Motomachi District. The 
Western Districts Development Project reclaimed  acres from the Inland 
Sea just west of the city for industrial, commercial, and residential uses. De-
signed to relieve traffic congestion and help make Hiroshima “a pivot of eco-
nomic distribution,” this development involved slicing away  acres of hill-
side for terraced housing. The Koyo New Housing Town Development put 
up housing on  acres upstream on the Ota River, about twelve kilometers 
north of the center of Hiroshima. Although the Koyo development included 
parks and playgrounds, it also obliterated a large natural area along the river. 
Similarly, the Suzugamine New Housing Town Development Project devel-
oped  acres of hillsides in western Hiroshima for additional housing.⁹¹
 Perhaps most ambitious were plans to redevelop the Danbara District, 
just two kilometers from Hiroshima’s center. Shielded by the hill Hijiyama, 
this was the only close-in area not destroyed or heavily damaged by the atomic 
bomb. Neglected by city authorities who faced more urgent rebuilding tasks 
in the destroyed parts of their city, Danbara deteriorated in the s and 
s, having no city sewerage facilities, public assembly halls, parks, or play-
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grounds. Many of the streets were dirt. Danbara also became congested, as 
twenty thousand people lived on its  acres. Under Hiroshima’s  city 
planning measure, it was decided to redevelop this district through the pro-
vision of , model houses and many new premises for local businesses. 
Parks, playgrounds, new streets, and sewer connections were also part of the 
plan. Begun in , the redevelopment was completed in the s.⁹²
 The processes involved in planning the new towns and the redevelop-
ment of Danbara and the other districts reveal an underside to planning, 
demonstrating that planning had become more of a top-down affair by the 
s and s than it had been right after the destruction of Hiroshima, 
despite the passage of new national legislation in  and . There was 
still local input into planning, but not everyone was consulted. In the case of 
Danbara, many residents desired a redeveloped area with modern amenities. 
However, not all did. Some preferred what they described as an older, more 
relaxed, if also more crowded, way of life. They liked the flowers growing in 
their dirt streets and resented being told to change their ways. Then, too, the 
building of the Koyo and Suzugamine new towns and other projects suggests 
that, although city authorities had a genuine desire to integrate the natural 
environment into the new Hiroshima, when push came to shove, that desire 
took a back seat to economic development. Filling in more of the Inland Sea 
near Hiroshima cost fishermen more fishing grounds. The new towns, and 
the new suburbs, while having small parks and playgrounds in their plans, 
could be built only by degrading their regions’ natural environments by slic-
ing away hillsides and filling in the ocean.
 Even so, Hiroshima was a more livable city than most other major me-
tropolises in Japan. Its parks and green spaces, its public housing, and its 
infrastructure generally worked. These accomplishments came as a result of 
mediation in planning among municipal, prefectural, and national authori-
ties. Locals, to be sure, had to follow national mandates. However, at least 
in the case of Hiroshima, local residents, despite some apparent return to 
centralized planning in the s, had considerable say in the development. 
Not all had an equal voice, however, as bureaucrats in city and prefectural 
planning offices overrode the desires of local residents, especially those of 
poor people such as residents of Danbara.⁹³
 From the late s on, heavy industry declined in significance in Hiro-
shima, as elsewhere in Japan, and some deindustrialization occurred.⁹⁴ Hiro-
shima prospered increasingly as a center for new high-technology firms. 
The city emerged as one of the few centers for computer software writing 
in Japan, possessing  software companies in  and  four years later. 
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Then, too, high-technology businesses grew up in plastics, printing, and 
some other fields. Hiroshima possessed an entrepreneurial energy not found 
in all Japanese cities—a result, perhaps, of the movement of new people into 
Hiroshima after the Second World War. Most of the firms they founded were 
small; some two-thirds of them started with less than $, in capital. In 
this important respect, they resembled the small firms in Silicon Valley.⁹⁵
 Japan’s Diet encouraged high-technology efforts through the passage of 
a Technopolis Law in . The government hoped to create almost from 
scratch nineteen communities (the number was later raised to twenty-six) 
devoted to the development of new technologies needed for continuing eco-
nomic growth in Japan. Located near larger “mother” cities, the new commu-
nities were to be home to relocated national universities, government research 
laboratories, and innovative businesses, all working together to develop new 
products for world markets. Beyond force-feeding the rapid growth of high-
technology districts in the hope of creating new Silicon Valleys, an important 
objective was to move people out of overcrowded Tokyo and thus decentral-
ize the population base of Japan.⁹⁶
 In , the national government chose an area thirty kilometers to the 
east of Hiroshima City called Higashi-Hiroshima (higashi means “east” in 
Japanese) to become a technopolis. Encompassing  acres, this site was 
divided into an academic city including a fully relocated Hiroshima Univer-
sity by , two industrial parks, and a residential town. Hiroshima, wrote 
Rebuilt Hiroshima featured parks along the Ota River. (Author’s collection)
 Pathways to the Present
scholars who studied the city in the early and mid-s, “represents a case 
of a large, aging industrial city where technopolis activity has acted as a sub-
urbanizing magnet for relocation of activity from the city center, as well as 
a pole of attraction for branch plants.” Higashi-Hiroshima attracted mainly 
large firms, as companies such as Chugoku Electric Company, Matsushita 
Home Electronics, and Panasonic built branch plants and some research 
facilities in the parks.⁹⁷
 The expected economic stimulus for Hiroshima did not fully material-
ize. Researchers in the large relocated firms did not cooperate as well as had 
been hoped with scholars at Hiroshima University. This failure is not surpris-
ing. Contrary to what some observers have written, the culture of academic–
business collaboration that exists in the United States is more muted in 
Japan. Most scholars in Japan treasure their independence from business. As 
a result, few research breakthroughs occurred in Higashi-Hiroshima. What 
did happen was that the city of Hiroshima lost its university to the new area, 
along with a number of corporate research and production facilities. Be-
tween  and , Higashi-Hiroshima gained sixty-eight new plants and 
increased its employment from , to more than , workers, mainly 
at the expense of Hiroshima. Hiroshima also lost its airport, which relocated 
from within the city to an area near Higashi-Hiroshima. In the end, the city 
proper gained little directly from the creation of a technopolis.⁹⁸
Rebuilding on Okinawa
Rebuilding on Okinawa offers a valuable comparison to developments in 
Hiroshima. Between  and , when Okinawa and the other Ryūkyū 
Islands reverted to Japan, American authorities exercised extensive controls 
over that island. Reconstruction there “resulted from a synthesis of influ-
ences,” including “Japanese city planning practices and American efforts to 
shape planning, control the actual construction, and regulate the flow of 
building.”⁹⁹ Between  and , the U.S. Navy and Army were in charge 
of Okinawa. Military jurisdiction was superseded by civilian control with the 
creation of the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyus (USCAR) in . In 
, a full civil government composed of Okinawans was set up, but its ac-
tions needed to comply with USCAR’s guidelines and ordinances. American 
authorities had the right to intervene in Okinawan affairs until reversion.¹⁰⁰
 American occupation policies were most apparent in Naha, Okinawa’s 
capital, located on the southern end of the island. Naha’s prewar population 
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of , shrank to just several hundred after American bombing leveled 
the city in October . As in Hiroshima, recovery was fairly swift. By , 
people returning from refugee camps had swelled the city’s population to 
,, and a year later the return of Okinawans who had been evacuated 
to mainland Japan boosted it to ,. As in Hiroshima, the most pressing 
need was housing. In late , the American military set standards for the 
building of new homes. Between  and , , houses were con-
structed and given to refugees free of charge. Another , houses fol-
lowed in the s, financed mainly by American aid. In addition, roughly 
$ million flowed from Congress to the Okinawan government for infra-
structure improvements during the mid-s.¹⁰¹
 This substantial American aid stood in marked contrast to the situation 
in the rest of Japan, where most cities were thrust back onto their own re-
sources to rebuild. Even Hiroshima struggled until the  law was passed. 
It was America’s strategic plans for Okinawa that helps to explain the greater 
aid given that island. Especially with the “fall” of China to communism in 
, the United States came to see its large and growing military bases on 
Okinawa as essential to its position in Asia during the Cold War. More than 
mainland Japan, Okinawa came to be viewed by some military planners as 
almost an extension of the United States. As we shall see in the next chapter, 
the onset of the Cold War also greatly increased American military activity 
on Guam.¹⁰²
 Even as American authorities addressed housing needs, they turned to 
more comprehensive reconstruction. In , army officers devised a plan for 
Naha encompassing new highways that would divide the city into quadrants, 
with government offices and a shopping district at the center of the city, the 
creation of residential and industrial zones in outlying areas, and the estab-
lishment of parks. The plan called for the building of a water reservoir, a city 
hall, a theater, a hotel, a post office, and a fire station. However, this scheme 
was largely ignored in the haste to put up housing. Instead, comprehensive 
planning was soon turned over mainly to Okinawans.¹⁰³
 Planning devolved to local residents. In , Naha officials organized 
a city planning committee and held a city planning conference, from which 
came comprehensive plans. Harkening back to Japan’s  zoning law, and 
informed by Japan’s  legislation, the plan divided about , acres of 
Naha and nearby villages into residential, commercial, and industrial areas, 
along with a governmental district, and provided for roads, green areas, and 
parks. The plan won approval from American authorities, who insisted, how-
ever, that military areas be excluded from the plan and that major highways 
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be widened. Although not immediately enacted in full, this plan set the stage 
for later efforts. The Okinawan government adopted a road law and a build-
ing standards law in  and a city planning law in , all similar to legis-
lation passed by the Japanese Diet in –.¹⁰⁴
 Planned rebuilding of Naha occurred during the s. Local authorities, 
with American approval, established a planning area encompassing Naha 
and several nearby villages. Planners thought big, projecting a population 
for the region of , by  and , in  (there were , 
people in the area in ). The new plans were based on a gridiron street 
system, slum clearances, zoning, and land readjustment schemes. While the 
USCAR took a hands-off approach, basically approving Okinawan plans and 
providing guidance by preparing transportation, population, and industrial 
planning studies, it underwrote much of the cost of rebuilding. USCAR pro-
vided  percent of the costs of capital improvements for Naha, with the city 
government paying most of the rest.¹⁰⁵
 As in Hiroshima, the plans for Naha, and more generally for the Ryūkyū 
Islands, aimed mainly at stimulating economic growth, with much less atten-
tion paid to environmental protection. This was not at all surprising, given 
that survival and reconstruction were the order of the day. American plan-
ning studies in the s, for example, called for land reclamation from the 
ocean, including the reclamation of reefs near Naha. Japanese planners were 
far from alone in filling in coastlines. Only decades later did the preservation 
of reefs become important in some parts of America’s Pacific possessions, 
most notably in Hawai‘i and Guam.¹⁰⁶
 American influence in Okinawa extended well beyond reversion. Into 
the early s, the United States maintained major military bases on the 
island, sometimes leading to conflicts with residents. About , Ameri-
can personnel were on Okinawa in the s and s. When I served as 
a Fulbright Lecturer to Japan in the s, I gave several lectures at Ryūkyū 
University on Okinawa. An entry in a diary I kept then observed of the area 
around Moon Beach, “We saw Americans wherever we went—especially at a 
U.S.-style shopping center in Okinawa City where we stopped for ice cream 
at a Baskin and Robbins.” Okinawans welcomed American and Japanese-
government dollars spent to support the bases. As late as , , Japa-
nese worked at American military bases on Okinawa. In addition, the , 
Okinawans on whose land the bases were built received $ million annu-
ally in rent. Even so, Okinawans increasingly objected to the American pres-
ence on their island as an infringement on their sovereignty.¹⁰⁷
 The situation on Okinawa was complex, the result of more than a simple 
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contest between Japanese authorities and the American military. The Ryūkyūs 
had once been an independent kingdom, partly subservient to China, and 
became a Japanese prefecture only in the late nineteenth century. Many resi-
dents had long seen themselves as partially separate from Japan. The Okina-
wan government often found itself at odds with Japan’s national government 
about land-use matters. Americans took over about , acres of land on 
Okinawa for military purposes at the close of the World War II and seized 
even more in the s. Old villages were bulldozed to create military bases. 
Within the city limits of Kadena,  percent of the land was occupied by the 
largest U.S. airbase in the Pacific. Social issues, such as the occasional rape of 
Okinawan women by American servicemen, also arose. The prefectural gov-
ernment employed local animosity toward the American military as leverage 
to try to assert independence from national policies. In , after years of 
controversy, the U.S. Marines agreed to relocate a major airbase on Okinawa 
in accord with the wishes of local residents. Thus, the peripheral Okinawa 
government was often in opposition to the metropoles in Tokyo and Wash-
ington, DC, or, if one thinks of CINCPAC, in Honolulu.¹⁰⁸
Conclusions
Government officials were much more successful in rebuilding Hiroshima 
after World War II than they were in revitalizing the city through the cre-
ation of a nearby technopolis in the s and s. The national legisla-
tion passed in  to rebuild Hiroshima and Nagasaki offered adequate 
funding to accomplish its goals, and those objectives were limited to only 
two cities. Japan’s high-speed growth during the s and s, spurred 
in part by American military expenditures, provided tax revenues for the 
rebuilding. In contrast, the Japanese economy collapsed in the early s, 
and Japan endured economic hard times for over a decade, so the plans for 
technopolises had to be scaled back. Then, too, the creation of a technopolis 
at Higashi-Hiroshima never had solid support from Hiroshima residents. It 
was a case of top-down planning imposed with little consideration for local 
sensibilities. Many of the faculty members at Hiroshima University with 
whom I talked in the mid-s opposed the relocation of their university 
to Higashi-Hiroshima, an action which they said would force them into an 
inconvenient commute to work. One of the few benefits they saw as resulting 
from the move was that at its new site the university would have additional 
tennis courts. Of course, there was no unanimity at first over all aspects of re-
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building Hiroshima after the war. Nonetheless, considerable agreement soon 
evolved around the motto of “No More Hiroshimas.” Nothing comparable 
occurred with regard to Higashi-Hiroshima.
 To the extent that Hiroshima nurtured a high-technology district in Hi-
gashi-Hiroshima, that district differed markedly from what developed in Sili-
con Valley or in Seattle. As we saw in Chapter , Silicon Valley evolved over 
many decades as a district composed mainly of hundreds, even thousands, 
of small and medium-sized firms with permeable boundaries. In Seattle, a 
hub-and-spoke system of high-technology companies developed around 
three major centers—the Boeing Company, Microsoft, and the University 
of Washington. In Hiroshima, government-directed, top-down planning de-
creed the development of a new technopolis composed of a relocated univer-
sity and the research and production facilities of mainly large firms. Rarely 
have such government-directed efforts to create high-technology districts 
worked well. Success in South Korea was more the exception than the rule. 
And, when they have succeeded, they have done so with ample government 
funding, which the Japanese government did not provide in the s. Hiro-
shima gained more from the development of software companies and other 
high-technology businesses within the city than from the efforts to create a 
technopolis at Higashi-Hiroshima.
 If Hiroshima’s postwar development is revealing about what govern-
ment-generated growth can and cannot accomplish, it also elucidates im-
portant aspects of environmentalism in Japan. In many ways, environmen-
tal developments in Hiroshima paralleled changes taking place elsewhere in 
Japan. However, in some respects Hiroshima stood out as almost unique.¹⁰⁹
 In the s and s, high-speed economic development lay at the 
center of the work of the Japanese government. With militarism and territo-
rial expansion discredited, economic growth at almost any cost became the 
number one goal. Water and air pollution, along with the continued filling 
in of coastal areas for the sites of industrial plants, oil refineries, and power 
plants, were seen acceptable trade-offs in the quest for economic develop-
ment. “During the high economic-growth period, production efficiency was 
the primary concern in the uncritical and rapid adaptation of new technolo-
gies,” a leading Japanese environmental historian has written. “This stance,” 
he has concluded, “resulted in unprecedented damage to natural ecosystems 
and to human health and well-being.”¹¹⁰ Only in the late s and early 
s did local grassroots efforts to limit industrial pollution, stemming 
mainly from health concerns, coalesce into a significant national movement 
to place some environmental restrictions on economic growth. In , the 
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Diet, influenced much more by local indigenous movements than by foreign 
developments, passed meaningful environmental protection legislation.
 In Hiroshima, as in most of Japan, rapid economic growth took prece-
dence over environmental protection for decades after the Second World 
War. Resuming a process begun in Tokugawa times, Hiroshima residents 
filled in parts of the Inland Sea to create ground upon which new factories, 
an airport, and port facilities could be constructed. At first, there was not 
much concern about the pollution caused by these developments. Factories 
were seen as emblematic of a prosperous future for Hiroshima, even though 
they harmed long-established fisheries, such as the growing of oysters, a re-
gional specialty. As in American cities such as Pittsburgh and Saint Louis, 
factory smoke was seen as a symbol of industrial progress. Similarly, out-
lying green areas gave way to new housing developments, construction that 
often involved the cutting away of hills. Again, economic growth was seen 
as more important than environmental protection. Far from all the changes 
occurring in Hiroshima were environmentally insensitive, however. The pro-
visions of parks, boulevards, and green areas within the rebuilt city made 
Hiroshima more livable than most major Japanese cities. So did the build-
ing of new roads and other infrastructural improvements, along with public 
housing.
 Finally, it is worth stressing Hiroshima’s unique status as a center for 
world peace movements. This development provided considerable ideo-
logical unity within the city as time progressed. Even more, with the Peace 
Park as its physical manifestation, Hiroshima attracted attention from peace 
advocates throughout the Pacific and beyond. Like native Hawaiians seeking 
a new future for Kaho‘olawe, Hiroshima residents came to see their city in 
similar terms—that is, as having a mission to bring the message of peace 
to the world. Native Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders were among 
those attracted to Hiroshima as a peace center and, more generally, to Ja-
pan’s antinuclear stance. They were, of course, responding to the dropping of 
the atomic bomb. Guam also became a site of immense military actions by 
American forces and a focus for protests in the postwar period, the subject 
of the next chapter.

C HA P T E R  
Guam, the Philippines,  
and American Samoa
 Writing on behalf of the Guam Legislature in , that body’s sec-retary and speaker jointly observed, “The dominance of Ameri- ca’s presence in the Pacific explains so much of Guam’s economic 
growth and current land problems.” Continuing, they noted, “Although the 
U.S. interest in the Pacific dates back to the mid-th century, it was really 
World War II that precipitated the major involvement by the Americans in 
the Far East and Pacific realms.” Finally, they observed that “for the central 
Pacific much of the U.S. military administration and strike forces centered 
in Guam.”¹ They were correct. As in so many Pacific places, World War II 
was a watershed in Guam’s history. After the conflict, with the onset of the 
Cold War, the military presence of the United States became even more pro-
nounced in Guam than it was in the Hawaiian Islands or Alaska.
 After looking at Guam’s history as the framework within which later 
developments played out, this chapter explores how the increased American 
military presence on Guam affected the lives of Guamanians and how they 
responded to the changes caused by it. The chapter focuses on controversies 
on three interrelated issues: where to build a new ammunition wharf for 
the U.S. Navy, how to establish a national park to commemorate America’s 
World War II campaigns in the Pacific, and where to place a national sea-
shore in Guam’s waters. Divisions on these topics well illustrate how inter-
twined economic, environmental, and cultural matters had become. So, too, 
did efforts to understand and control the brown tree snake on Guam, the 
fourth major topic of this chapter. An alien species inadvertently introduced 
by the American military at the close of World War II, the brown tree snake 
proliferated to such an extent that it disrupted the social and economic well-
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being of Guamanians. The chapter also compares developments on Guam to 
those on the Philippine Islands and American Samoa.
 As in the Hawaiian Islands, conflicts with the navy on Guam and in the 
Philippines, and to a lesser extent American Samoa, reached a series of cli-
maxes in the s and s. Guamanians and Filipinos especially wanted 
to win economic independence from the American military. Guamanians, 
in particular, sought at the same time to protect the physical environment of 
their island and to preserve what remained of its native culture. In this com-
plex situation, American military authorities were far from simply acting as 
“heavies.” Navy officials, perhaps influenced by events in Hawai‘i, learned to 
be sensitive to the wishes of others while also pursuing their own agendas, 
making compromises the order of the day.²
Development in Micronesia and Guam
Micronesia means “tiny islands” in Greek, an apt description. Some , 
islands in the Caroline, Marshall, Gilbert, Mariana, and Southwest island 
groups compose Micronesia. Scattered over an area in the western Pacific 
larger than the continental United States, Micronesia is mostly ocean. It en-
compasses  million square kilometers of ocean but only , square kilo-
meters of land, an area smaller than the state of Rhode Island. More than any 
other segment of Oceania, Micronesia fits scholar and activist Epeli Hau‘ofa’s 
description of Oceania as a “sea of islands.”
 Guam is the largest and most populous island in Micronesia. It is one 
of the fifteen islands composing the Marianas, a north–south archipelago 
nearly  miles long located about , miles east of the Philippines. Other 
major islands in the Marianas include Rota, Tinian, and Saipan. Covering 
 square miles, about , acres, Guam is roughly thirty miles long 
and nine miles wide. By itself, Guam constitutes one-fifth of the dry land of 
Micronesia and over one-half of that of the Marianas. It narrows to about 
four miles in width at its center, giving it something of the shape of a bowtie. 
While northern Guam consists of a raised limestone plateau, parts of which 
have steep cliffs, southern Guam is a mixture of volcanic hills and valleys 
containing rivers and waterfalls. Swept by Southeast Asian monsoon rains, 
the island endures a typhoon once about every three years and a super ty-
phoon roughly once a decade. Some , people were residing on Guam 
in , and about , in all of Micronesia.³
 Micronesia was probably colonized by people from southeastern China 
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and Taiwan. Migrating to the Philippines, Indonesia, and the Malay Penin-
sula, they populated the Marianas perhaps five to ten thousand years ago. 
Archaeological sites discovered in the Marianas so far date firmly, however, 
to only about thirty-five hundred years ago. Making pottery and using looms 
to weave cloth, the inhabitants had a rich subsistence lifestyle based on culti-
vated agriculture—especially breadfruit, taro, sugarcane, yams, bananas, and 
a limited amount of rice—and near-shore and pelagic fishing using outrigger 
canoes called proa. As they moved into the Marianas, people altered their 
physical environments, though less so than in some other Pacific regions 
such as the Hawaiian Islands. They brought with them rats, but not the more 
destructive dogs and pigs (or chickens) that commonly made up the portable 
biota of later Pacific voyagers. Some Micronesians organized extensive trad-
ing and tribute empires that lasted for centuries. On Guam, they lived in 
settlements, usually near freshwater sources and wetlands for growing taro 
and other root crops. Known as the Chamorros, they used stone pillars called 
latte as foundations for their most prominent buildings beginning around 
, A.D. Organized in matrilineal clans, they were not a unified people, a 
fact that left them vulnerable to conquest by Europeans.⁴
 That conquest came in the s, ushering in three centuries of colo-
nial rule. “Discovered” by Ferdinand Magellan in , Guam was claimed by 
Spain in , but was not colonized until after the Chamorros were defeated 
in a series of battles in the late s. Organized resistance to the Spanish 
ended in , by which time the Chamorro population on Guam had been 
reduced to about two thousand from roughly twelve thousand in . Dis-
eases unintentionally introduced by the Spanish, as well as warfare, caused 
this precipitous decline, just as diseases introduced by westerners decimated 
the ranks of native Hawaiians and Alaskan Natives at later dates. Tinian, Sai-
pan, and Rota were also conquered by the Spanish. The Spanish transported 
all of the Chamorros to Guam and organized them into villages laid out 
in the Spanish fashion, with plazas, churches, government buildings, and 
schools. Only about a century later were some Chamorros allowed to re-
turn to their home islands. Beginning in the late s, Guam and the other 
Marianas entered what has been described by Robert F. Rogers, the foremost 
historian of Guam, as “a twilight period of  years of solitude until the 
next invasion.” The Spanish converted the Chamorros to Catholicism, but 
did little to develop Guam or the other Marianas economically. The Spanish 
empire was stretched thin, and Guam was useful to the Spanish mainly as a 
way station to the Philippines.⁵
 The United States purchased Guam, along with the Philippines and 
Puerto Rico, from Spain after its victory in the Spanish-American War in 
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. Germany established a protectorate over the Marshalls in  and 
bought the Carolines and Marianas (except Guam) in . The United 
States put its navy in charge of governing Guam, a situation that endured 
for decades. “The island would be administered as if it were a ship,” Rogers 
has written, “the ‘USS Guam,’ with the governor as captain, U.S. military per-
sonnel as crew, and the Chamorros as mess attendants.”⁶ Military not eco-
nomic development considerations dominated American thinking about 
Guam. Nonetheless, some favorable changes occurred, especially as sanita-
tion and medical services improved, leading to a resurgence in the Chamo-
rro population from , in  to , in . Even so, as Rogers has 
observed, Guam “still had a subsistence ‘bull cart’ economy” with the navy’s 
efforts to foster agricultural production “only marginally successful.” More-
over, the navy treated the Chamorros as a distinctly inferior people. Denied 
citizenship in the United States, they were for a time forbidden to marry 
whites.⁷
 Meanwhile, as a result of defeat in World War I, Germany lost its islands 
in Micronesia to Japan. Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, Japan was 
awarded all German lands in the Pacific north of the equator—including 
Tinian, Saipan, and Rota—as a Class C mandate of the League of Nations. 
Japan promptly integrated them into its growing Asian empire and devel-
oped them economically through commercial fishing, sugarcane planta-
tions, and copra production.⁸
 World War II brought major changes to Guam. Japanese forces bombed 
it on December , , and landed troops on the island two days later. The 
capture of Guam took less than six hours. The Japanese then tried to incor-
porate Guam into their empire. Japanese replaced English in the schools, 
and Chamorro men were mobilized to build airstrips. In general, people on 
Guam, Rogers has concluded, assumed an “attitude of guarded, submissive 
neutrality toward the Japanese, while hoping for the return of the Ameri-
cans.” A few helped American servicemen try to avoid capture, at great per-
sonal cost, even death. As the war wound down, living conditions worsened. 
Forced labor became brutal, food supplies dwindled, and a breakdown of 
Japanese military discipline led to the massacre of a number of Chamorros. 
In July , American forces invaded Guam, storming ashore at Asan just 
north of Apra harbor and at Agat a few miles south of the port. After fierce 
fighting, the island was secured in mid-August. The cost was high; , 
Americans and about , Japanese died. Some  Chamorros also lost 
their lives and another  were injured between  and , according 
to official claims later submitted to the United States Congress. In addition, 
many Chamorros lost their lands.⁹
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 The coming of peace led to major alterations to Micronesia. At the urg-
ing of the American delegation, the United Nations Security Council made 
most of Micronesia (but not Guam) a trust territory of the United States in 
, with the new dependency assuming the title of the Trust Territory of 
the Pacific Islands (TTPI). President Harry S. Truman vested control over the 
TTPI in the navy and appointed the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINC-
PAC) as the first high commissioner for it. CINCPAC administered the vast 
reaches of the TTPI from headquarters in Honolulu. Guam was not part of 
the TTPI. Instead, as a United States flag territory, it continued to be admin-
istered separately by the navy.¹⁰
 Micronesia and Guam did not return to their sleepy prewar existence, for 
the coming of the Cold War heightened their strategic significance. America 
hoped to build a network of bases in Micronesia to support a forward de-
ployment of military forces around the western Pacific. Then, too, the United 
States sought nuclear test sites in Micronesia, conducting atomic tests at the 
Bikini Atoll in  even before the TTPI was created. All-in-all, the United 
States had grand ambitions for Micronesia. As a leading historian of America 
in Micronesia, Hal H. Friedman, has observed, “Between  and , the 
United States sought to, and largely succeeded in, developing an exclusive, 
strategic sphere of influence in the Pacific Basin,” which turned much of the 
Pacific into an “American lake.”¹¹
 American actions, Friedman has noted, meant that the “military and 
economic development of Micronesia” during these years “demanded quite 
a bit of political and cultural change to be bequeathed or imposed on the in-
habitants of the islands.” Saipan, Tinian, and especially Guam were to support 
major American military bases, and some of the military plans envisioned 
removing indigenous peoples, or as the military described them, “natives,” 
from their lands. This action was never taken in full. It was anticipated that 
, acres, half of the land on Guam, would be needed for bases. Ideas were 
floated to turn Kwajalein Atoll into a hub for air transportation and to use 
Enewetok as a fleet anchorage. Most of the proposed changes took decades 
to complete, with military installations concentrated on Guam and Kwaja-
lein. The latter island group continued to be used as a nuclear test site by the 
United States into the late s and as a missile range into the s.¹²
 World War II, then, was of great importance for Micronesia and Guam, 
as it was for most of the Pacific. Above all, the war greatly heightened Ameri-
ca’s long-standing involvement in the Pacific and, more specifically, in Guam. 
The development of the Cold War, along with trade possibilities, meant that 
that increased interest would not fade away. Rogers summarized the situation 
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well. “The geopolitics of the Pacific,” he observed, “were thus transformed 
from the prewar situation, in which Guam was a lonely American outpost 
surrounded by hostile Japanese islands, to one in which Guam was the cen-
ter of an American-dominated lake that encompassed the entire western 
Pacific.”¹³ Not surprisingly, the American military, especially the navy, long 
remained the major force in Guam’s political and economic development.
 The wartime government of Guam was replaced in  by a peacetime 
administration, with Rear Admiral Charles A. Pownall, formerly the com-
mander of America’s naval air forces in the Pacific, as the appointed gov-
ernor. Shortly thereafter the Eighth Guam Congress, a locally elected body 
with limited powers, convened in a Quonset hut in Hagatna (Agana). Most 
Guamanians, as residents of Guam started calling themselves right after 
World War II, could not become American citizens at this time unless they 
entered America’s armed services. Guamanians could not qualify for citizen-
ship by being born in the United States, since Guam was an unincorporated 
territory; nor could they be naturalized as citizens of a foreign nation—a 
real Catch- situation. Disenfranchised except in local elections—and the 
appointed governor could veto any measures passed by the Guam Congress 
(later the Guam Legislature)—Guamanians had little say over their political 
lives.¹⁴
 Political impotence carried over into economic matters, especially land-
ownership. Despite the passage of legislation by the United States Congress 
in  and  designed to help them, Guamanians found it difficult to win 
reimbursement for losses incurred during World War II. The navy placed low 
ceilings on claims adjudicated by a Land and Claims Commission, and by the 
time the last claim was settled in  the federal government had paid out 
only $. million to , Guamanians. More galling was the loss of addi-
tional land. In , the same Congress that authorized Guamanians to press 
claims for World War II losses approved legislation allowing the American 
military to acquire private land on Guam for the creation of bases.¹⁵ The 
armed forces soon did so. When the United States had acquired Guam from 
Spain in , it took over Spanish crown lands on the island, about  per-
cent of the island’s land area. As the federal government purchased more 
land, its holdings rose to , acres in , roughly  percent of Guam’s 
total land area. Further acquisitions brought federal government landhold-
ings on Guam to about , acres, about  percent of Guam’s land, by 
. By , the federal government owned or leased  percent of the land 
area of Guam. As two Guamanian historians accurately noted about a decade 
later, “this was a cause of bitter resentment among Guamanians.”¹⁶
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 The loss of land troubled Guamanians for more than economic reasons. 
Family, not individual, landownership was central to Micronesian culture, 
and attacking that ownership was perceived as an assault on culture and 
family. As a leading scholar of Micronesian society has explained, “land was 
once . . . a cherished part of a group’s and an individual’s identity.” In fact, 
“to have rights to land—understood as including the offshore flats and reef 
or fishing areas—was to be able to meet all one’s basic needs: food, housing, 
transportation, and medicine. . . . People spoke of eating from their piece of 
land.”¹⁷ More was contested than simply the land itself, just as was the case 
with Kaho‘olawe in the Hawaiian Islands.
 Moreover, in its desire to maintain tight security, the navy restricted 
commercial development on Guam. Guam’s economy did well in the late 
s, due mainly to war-surplus sales and military construction. However, 
restrictions soon limited growth and diversification. Local firms could not 
employ alien workers, such as Filipinos (unlike the military, which did), and 
local businesses had to be at least  percent owned by Guamanians. More-
over, only Guamanians could purchase land on Guam or lease it for more 
than five years. Well-meaning efforts to protect local residents from outside 
exploitation, these ordinances nonetheless limited development. Perhaps 
most harmful, the navy required security clearances—in effect, visas—for 
anyone traveling to Guam, a circumstance that made the development of 
tourism unlikely.¹⁸
 Under mounting pressure from Guamanians, the federal government 
agreed to a major alteration in the island’s political status in . Through 
an Organic Act passed by Congress that year, a civilian government replaced 
the naval government and Guamanians were recognized as American citi-
zens. The new governor, who was appointed by the president until  and 
elected by Guamanians thereafter, still had veto power over measures passed 
by the Guam Legislature but usually tried to cooperate with members of that 
body. Because of security concerns, however, the navy controlled travel clear-
ances until , a circumstance that continued to retard tourism and also 
made it difficult for Guamanians to leave their island. It is worth remember-
ing that tourism is partly structured by state actions. Once travel restrictions 
were lifted, tourism began expanding, and many Guamanians, often the best 
educated, left Guam for mainland America as part of the Pacific diaspora, the 
movement of Pacific Islanders to America, New Zealand, and Australia.¹⁹
 Efforts to diversify Guam’s economy accompanied political liberalization. 
One section of the Organic Act provided that products made on Guam could 
enter mainland America duty-free. Business leaders on Guam had visions 
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of their island becoming a center of manufacturing, trade, and finance like 
Hong Kong. That never occurred. Guam lacked the resources and was too 
far from major consumption centers to develop much of an industrial base. 
Then, too, disputes with Congress over how much of a product needed to 
be made on Guam for that product to be classified as Guamanian and thus 
eligible for duty-free shipment limited exports.²⁰ Navy restrictions on the 
use of Guam’s only commercial harbor at Apra, about two-thirds of the way 
down the island’s west shore, also hurt. The placement of the navy’s muni-
tions wharf near the port’s commercial facilities meant that trade was re-
stricted, for a clear blast zone needed to be maintained in case an accidental 
explosion occurred. Relocating the ammunition wharf became a contentious 
issue in the s and s.
 Nor did agriculture thrive. With much of the productive farmland in 
military hands, little was left for cultivation. “Lack of good farming land is 
the most serious problem Guam’s farmers must contend with,” observed a 
publication of the Guam government in . “Condemnation of farm lands 
and the exodus of potential farm labor to occupations with the government 
or private firms have,” it noted, “handicapped the re-building of the agri-
cultural industry.” In , Guam had just , people employed in farm-
ing, and two years later only , acres were planted.²¹ Nor did agriculture 
prosper much in later decades. Another report sponsored by the Guam gov-
ernment observed in  that “agriculture has not been a growth industry 
during the sixties.” In fact, the amount of land under cultivation fell, and fish 
production declined.²²
 Thwarted on most other fronts, Guamanians pinned their hopes on tour-
ism, and in this endeavor they were partially successful. That Guam would 
emerge as a major tourist center in the Pacific was, however, not apparent 
in the s. The Guam Legislature established the Guam Travel Bureau in 
, but a year later even a booster publication admitted that “Guam today 
is definitely not the place for visitors.” The pamphlet observed that there were 
“no hotel facilities and little likelihood for any in the near future.” Guamani-
ans liked to think of their island as “the Crossroads of the Pacific,” but air 
transportation to Guam from mainland America was limited to two flights 
per week by Pan American Airlines and another two flights weekly by Phil-
ippine Airlines.²³ No flights yet connected Guam to Japan, which would later 
become the major source of tourists. Then, too, even Americans needed to 
have permission from the military in the form of security clearances to visit 
Guam.
 When the requirement for permission to visit Guam was dropped in 
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, the number of tourists traveling to the island from mainland America 
rose. Federal government actions were important in another way as well. After 
doing little for about twenty years after World War II, the government spent 
considerable sums cleaning up war debris throughout American possessions 
in Micronesia. In , about two thousand visitors called on Guam. Facili-
ties were limited, mainly to seventy rooms in the Cliff Hotel above Hagatna. 
Only later in the decade, with Japan’s economy doing well and Japanese tour-
ists coming to make up the bulk of those visiting Guam, did tourism begin to 
take off. The number of people visiting Guam mushroomed to seventy-five 
thousand in . About  percent of the tourists were Japanese, leading one 
writer to label the tourist boom “Japan’s new invasion of Guam.” Continental 
Airlines and TWA featured flights with jets between Honolulu, Guam, and 
Hong Kong, and Japan Airlines instituted service to Guam from Tokyo and 
Osaka. A growing number of hotels housed the tourists. Guam boasted eigh-
teen, a number of them Japanese-owned, with a total of , rooms, by . 
Many were along Tumon Beach, just north of Apra Harbor, an area destined 
to become overcrowded, much like O‘ahu’s Waikiki.²⁴
 Guam’s tourist boom continued into the s. High-rise hotels lined 
Tumon Beach, stressing the island’s electric-power, freshwater, and highway 
infrastructure. Increased air service, a runaway boom in Japan’s economy, 
and legal changes (in  a requirement that Japanese have visas to visit 
Guam for short trips was discontinued, once again underlining the impor-
tance of state actions to economic development) spurred development. In 
, Guam possessed over three thousand hotel rooms and , visitors 
came to the island.²⁵ As restrictions on foreign investment were lifted, Japa-
nese firms invested in the tourism of Guam and other parts of Micronesia, 
playing a leading role in the construction of new hotels in the s, just 
as they did in the Hawaiian Islands. By , Guam was hosting . million 
tourists annually, of whom  percent were Japanese, in four thousand hotel 
rooms. Some  commercial air flights entered or left Guam every week. A 
publication of the Guam government correctly observed in  that “Guam’s 
economy relies heavily on tourism revenue,” although the number of tourists 
visiting the island remained about the same as it had been eight years ear- 
lier. The s slump in the Japanese economy hurt tourism on Guam. How-
ever, in the early s, as Japan’s economy recovered, so did Guam’s. In , 
tourist arrivals topped one million for the first time in four years.²⁶
 The only partial success in economic diversification was not unique 
to Guam. The TTPI was dissolved in , and American trusteeship of 
 Micronesia began to end. In its place politically independent entities arose: 
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the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Belau (Palau), and the 
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). The northern Marianas became the 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, an American common-
wealth. The Republic of Nauru and the Republic of Kiribati became mem-
bers of the British Commonwealth. The Republic of the Marshall Islands 
and the FSM entered into a Compact of Free Association with the United 
States in , and in – the United States Congress renewed that 
compact. By contrast, Guam remained an organized but unincorporated ter-
ritory of the United States into , despite a long-standing desire of many 
Guamanians that their island become a commonwealth. Even with their new 
political arrangements, the islands of Micronesia have encountered great dif-
ficulty in achieving balanced economic growth. As in so many of America’s 
Pacific possessions, uneven growth has been the norm. A lack of varied re-
sources, great distances to markets, and colonial legacies have dogged their 
efforts.²⁷
 Economic diversification and economic freedom from the United States 
have proven to be elusive. Throughout most of Micronesia, governments, 
subsidized by the United States government, were the largest employers, 
often providing work to as much as  percent of those employed in wage-
earning jobs. Nor has full political freedom been achieved. In return for 
their political independence, the states formed from the TTPI have gener-
ally had to accede to American conditions: that no other country could use 
their islands for military purposes; that American military forces, including 
nuclear ones, would have free transit through the islands; and that the United 
States could establish military bases on the islands, including the continued 
use of the Kwajalein Atoll as a missile range. The United States paid for these 
rights, which made the new nations all that more dependent on America. 
Those payments, which were adjusted upward in the s and s, galled 
many Guamanians, who thought that they were not receiving their fair share 
of largesse from Uncle Sam.²⁸
 Continuing a long tradition, Guam’s largest single employer in  was 
government. The federal government employed , Guamanians, and the 
local government, known as GovGuam, gave work to an additional ,. 
This situation was not new. In , nearly  percent of Guam’s workers 
had found employment with the navy or other federal agencies on the island. 
Nor did this situation change much in later decades. Government—although 
now the local not the federal government—remained the largest employer in 
the late s. Not until , for example, was Guam’s telephone exchange 
privatized. GovGuam provided jobs to about , people.²⁹ They were not 
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low-paying ones, especially by Pacific Island standards. In fact, in  Guam 
moved ahead of a state in per capita income for the first time, as the per 
capita income in Guam of $, slightly exceeded that in Mississippi of 
$,. The per capita income for all of the United States was $,. This 
contrasted to a per capita income of $ in the Republic of Kiribati, the 
lowest in Micronesia.³⁰
 These jobs supported a growing number of residents on Guam. About 
, people lived on the island in , of whom  percent were Cha-
morros. By , Guam’s population had risen to roughly ,, of whom 
just  percent were Chamorros. Chamorros lived throughout Guam, but 
several old-time Chamorro settlements, Merizo and Umatac, were located 
in southwest Guam and became centers for debates about where to locate 
a national park and seashore on the island in the s and s. In , 
the island’s population stood at ,, including at least , residents 
who were foreign-born. Many of the immigrants had come from other parts 
of Micronesia, which under the terms of the Compact of Free Association 
had unrestricted immigration access to Guam. Yet, even as opportunities on 
Guam attracted other Micronesians, a perceived lack of opportunities pro-
pelled Guamanians from their territory. By , , Guamanians were 
living in mainland America, over one-half of them in California.³¹
 The unbalanced economy that Guam developed, one based mainly on 
the military, government, and tourism, influenced the interaction of envi-
ronmental and developmental issues on the island. Guamanians, like others 
throughout the Pacific, sought to find a workable balance between economic 
development and environmental preservation. They did so, however, in the 
shadow of the United States military. The past history of the American mil-
itary’s actions on Guam, especially its taking of land, greatly affected Gua-
manians’ perceptions of the issues.
Controversies about Military Facilities  
on Guam and the Philippines
Issues of military influence, economic development, environmental change, 
and indigenous people’s rights merged in the question of where to build a 
new ammunition wharf on Guam. From the s, the navy had maintained 
a pier known as Hotel Wharf well inside Apra harbor, at which ships un-
loaded ammunition for use by the navy and the air force. The ammunition 
was either trucked inland several miles to a storage magazine, which the 
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navy called NAVMAG Guam and which supported the Seventh Fleet, or was 
taken directly to air-force bases on the island. The air-force bases included 
Strategic Air Command bases for B-s armed with nuclear weapons. Sur-
rounded by an extensive breakwater known as the Glass Breakwater, Apra 
harbor was protected from the open sea.
 Problems arose in using Hotel Wharf as a munitions transfer point, 
especially as its usage intensified with the escalation of the Vietnam conflict 
in the s. B- bombers flew from Guam airfields, armed with bombs 
brought in through Apra harbor. Simply put, Hotel Wharf was too close to 
commercial installations. To guard against damage should an accidental ex-
plosion of conventional weapons occur, the navy needed to locate its am-
munition wharf about two miles from any such installations. Hotel Wharf ’s 
proximity to commercial facilities dampened development in Apra harbor 
just as tourism and other forms of economic activities were taking off, thus 
throttling efforts to make Guam’s economy less reliant on the military. More 
than development issues were involved in building a new ammunition wharf. 
Wherever the wharf was placed, whether somewhere within Apra harbor far 
from commercial installations or at a location elsewhere on the island, it 
would likely hurt Guam’s flora and fauna. It might also affect the activities of 
Guamanians, for any commercial building or home within a two-mile radius 
of the wharf would have to be relocated to clear the possible blast zone of 
people.
 Still more was involved in relocating the ammunition wharf, for that 
issue was closely related to two others: where to establish a national park on 
Guam and where to locate a national seashore. The issues impinged upon 
one another, as decisions made about any one affected each of the others. 
As was so often the case in the Pacific, a seemingly simple matter quickly 
became complex. At first, navy officials viewed the relocation of their am-
munition wharf mainly in technical terms. However, as Guamanians became 
involved in efforts both to develop their island economically and to preserve 
parts of its physical and cultural environments, navy officers had to broaden 
their outlooks, and over several decades viable compromises were worked 
out about where and how to construct a new ammunition wharf.³²
 The desires of military, especially navy, officials and the hopes of busi-
nesspeople on Guam coincided in pushing the federal government to end the 
use of Hotel Wharf as a munitions pier. The navy wanted the construction 
of a wharf capable of handling several ships simultaneously unloading up to 
 million pounds of ammunition, surrounded by a blast zone of , feet 
(this zone was called “an explosive safety quantity distance” or ESQD). Small, 
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obsolete, and too close to commercial piers, Hotel Wharf no longer sufficed. 
A ,-foot blast zone around the wharf included virtually all of the outer 
Apra harbor and part of the inner Apra harbor, including many areas where 
new commercial development was desired. In fact, Hotel Wharf could oper-
ate as an ammunition wharf only with a special safety waiver granted by the 
federal government. With new, fast large ammunition ships coming into use, 
the need to relocate the wharf was seen as especially urgent by the navy.³³
 Business leaders feared that blast-zone restrictions were hampering eco-
nomic development and strongly supported the navy’s desire to construct a 
new wharf. The Guam Chamber of Commerce gave “its wholehearted sup-
port and approval” to the navy’s proposal to move its wharf. Typical of the 
many Guamanian business leaders who testified favorably at public hearings 
was the general manager and vice president of Guam Oil & Refining. “The 
present location and the requisite restriction of operations in the harbor 
area,” he complained, “severely restricts the necessary and orderly develop-
ment and usage of the commercial port area” and thus acted as “a restrictive 
force on the economy of Guam.”³⁴
 Navy officials agreed. They observed that “the potential for economic 
growth is excellent” on Guam. Containerized cargo handling began in , 
strengthening Guam as a transportation hub, and “tourist steamers” were 
calling on the island in growing numbers. However, they also noted that “the 
lack of clear zones from explosives loading and unloading performed by 
the military is a considerable deterrent to commercial development of Apra 
Harbor.” This unfortunate circumstance, they further recognized, “prevents 
the government of Guam from realizing the full tax base and revenue poten-
tial of the harbor.” The relocation of the munitions wharf could open the way 
to economic growth.³⁵
 With business and military leaders in agreement, the only question re-
maining was where to construct a new wharf. Therein lay the rub. The selec-
tion of a new site proved difficult and time-consuming, and required com-
promises on the part of the many parties engaged in it. Specific site selection 
actions pitted the navy against Guamanians, but more was involved. As 
historian Michael Clement has written, the “controversy was just as much 
an internal conflict in the Government of Guam as it was a clash of mili-
tary and Guamanian desires.”³⁶ Technical considerations such as wind and 
wave directions, economic matters, especially the costs involved in building 
and maintaining a suitable wharf, and environmental and cultural issues all 
played important roles in the decisions of where to build the new wharf. Be-
tween  and , the navy investigated twenty-six potential sites, from 
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Ritidian Point in the north to Cetti Bay and Sella Bay in the southwest, in 
eight separate engineering and environmental studies.³⁷ Most possibilities 
were quickly discarded, but several received careful consideration.
 Sella Bay attracted considerable favorable attention in the late s and 
early s. Without consulting Guamanians, navy officials announced in 
 that they would build the pier at Sella Bay.³⁸ Compared to several other 
sites then also under review, it offered technical and cost advantages. Navy 
officials estimated that it would be less expensive to build a wharf, purchase 
land, and build roads at Sella Bay than at other places. Then, too, a wharf 
there could, they thought, be used  days per year, more days than at most 
other sites. Moreover, such a wharf would be close to the inland naval stor-
age magazine, just seven miles away by truck. Finally, only twenty homes fell 
within the projected blast zone, compared to as many as a thousand at some 
possible locations.³⁹
 Initially there was a fair amount of local support for the Sella Bay option. 
The executive vice president of the Guam Chamber of Commerce argued 
forcefully for construction there. As Clement has observed, “A key concern 
of businessmen at the time was to establish a private sector not dependent on 
the U.S. military.”⁴⁰ Above all, the chamber official stressed the need to move 
the munitions wharf out of Apra harbor to open that port to commercial 
development. The chamber’s executive vice president thought that techni-
cal considerations made Sella Bay a logical choice. Few people, he observed, 
would have to be relocated. Moreover, building the wharf at Sella Bay would 
protect the area’s physical and cultural environments. The blast zone sur-
rounding the pier would preclude any hotel or resort developments nearby, 
thus enhancing “the area for such use as recreation, conservation, ecological 
and marine research.” Sella Bay was at the time being considered for inclu-
sion in a new national seashore, and building the ammunition wharf there 
would, he further asserted, save “the area for the eventual development of 
the proposed National Seashore Park.” Moreover, he claimed that “artifacts 
in the area,” including Chamorro latte stone sites, then subject to vandalism, 
would be better preserved.⁴¹ Composed of Chamorros and non-Chamorros, 
the chamber backed the navy’s plan, more generally, as helping Guamanians 
build a modern, capitalistic economy.⁴²
 Far from all Guamanians agreed with these arguments. A growing num-
ber argued that the navy had already claimed too much land on Guam and 
that the beauty of the island needed to be preserved to help tourism develop. 
One Guamanian explained, “Sella Bay is one of the most scenic spots on the 
island, and we greatly need it to promote tourism.” He observed, moreover, 
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that “Our economic situation on Guam is primarily derived from military 
expenditures,” and concluded, “with the aid of tourism, our economic situa-
tion can be greatly enhanced.”⁴³
 Responding to such complaints, the Guam legislature acted. The body 
held two public hearings on the matter in  and passed a resolution “ex-
pressing deep concern over [the] ammo wharf” in July of that year. Addi-
tional protests led the legislature to pass a stronger resolution in early  
calling for the navy to abandon its plans for Sella Bay. Legislators pointed 
out that the American military already controlled much of Guam’s land and 
that the navy was proposing to acquire at least an additional , acres to 
support the construction of the wharf. The military, they complained, had 
already placed many of the best fishing and swimming beaches off-limits 
to the Chamorros who had once lived on them. The members went on to 
protest against any additional land acquisitions by the military, stating, “One 
of the most prevalent threats to the cause of preservation and conservation 
of the lands of the territory is the proposed acquisition by the Federal Gov-
ernment of Sella Bay and the surrounding area, one of the most scenic on 
the island, being ideal for open beaches and the recreation for the people of 
Guam.” Sovereignty was at issue. Far from protecting the ocean for inclusion 
in a national seashore or helping to preserve Chamorro culture, the wharf 
would cause serious environmental degradation. For several years the envi-
ronmental organization Friends of the Earth had opposed the location of the 
munitions wharf at Sella Bay, and the Guam legislature closed its resolution 
by calling upon that group “to use its best efforts, including the taking of 
any legal action which it might feel appropriate to help the people of Guam 
in opposing the acquisition of Sella Bay by the Federal Government for the 
development of an ammunition wharf.”⁴⁴
 That legal opposition was forthcoming. Members of the Guam legisla-
ture, together with representatives of several environmental bodies, sued the 
governor of Guam to prevent building the wharf at Sella Bay. In agreement 
with the navy and the Chamber of Commerce, the governor was trying to 
work out a land exchange—the navy would acquire extensive land holdings 
owned by the government of Guam around Sella Bay in return for ceding 
land elsewhere, especially in Apra harbor, to the government of Guam—
which would allow construction at Sella Bay to begin. Backed by a petition 
signed by fifteen thousand Guamanians to “Save Sella Bay,” those mounting 
the lawsuit were successful on appeal in  to the Ninth Circuit Court in 
San Francisco—the same court that later ruled in favor of native Hawaiians 
occupying Kaho‘olawe. Unable to acquire the shore land it needed, the navy 
reluctantly abandoned its efforts to establish a munitions pier at Sella Bay.⁴⁵
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 Individuals as well as organizations played important roles in decisions 
involving developmental and environmental matters throughout America’s 
Pacific possessions, a situation certainly true on Guam, as they acted through 
politics. Paul Bordallo emerged as the Chamorro champion for those op-
posing the navy’s plans for Sella Bay. A senator in the Guam legislature, Bor-
dallo had been educated at Stanford and Harvard Universities, from which 
institutions he had earned degrees in business administration. He was, in 
fact, a business leader on Guam. However, unlike most members of Guam’s 
Chamber of Commerce, he opposed the navy out of a sense of outrage about 
how Guamanians, especially Chamorros, had been treated by it. At Stanford, 
he had earned a minor in anthropology and as part of his work on that de-
gree had studied indigenous peoples of the Pacific. His father had been a 
member of the Guam Congress in the s. Bordallo explained in a  
interview that “the central issue” in the Sella Bay controversy was “identity” 
and “sovereignty.” “I conceived this Sella Bay,” he said, “as a point that could 
lead to not just verbal confrontation between the Chamorro people of Guam 
and the United States military,” but as one that contained “seeds to very seri-
ous consequences in Guam.”⁴⁶
 The Guam legislature, supported by a public outcry, forced the navy to 
look elsewhere, in a major power reversal from earlier times. “Perhaps the 
most significant factor which weighs against the Sella Bay site,” navy officers 
noted ruefully a few years later, “is the growing opposition of the local popu-
lace.” More than technical and economic matters needed to be addressed. 
“A major issue,” they continued, “is the proposal to use the Sella Bay area as 
an underwater conservation area.” Environmental and cultural matters had 
trumped technical and economic considerations.⁴⁷
 With Sella Bay no longer a possibility, the navy turned its attention to 
Orote Island, a large rock formation that forms the western tip of the Orote 
Peninsula, which in turn comprised the southern shore of Apra harbor. 
Some Guamanians had suggested this location as early as . Orote Penin-
sula terminated in high cliffs, which could, they thought, contain blasts from 
accidental explosions. Deep water for moorage was available, as was nearby 
land for the temporary storage of explosives. All of the peninsula and island 
was uninhabited federal land, making it unnecessary for the federal govern-
ment to acquire more land or to relocate people.⁴⁸ A commission established 
by the Guam legislature and the governor of Guam favored the site in no 
uncertain terms. Members of the commission pointed out that Orote Island 
was far enough from the commercial sections of Apra harbor, well beyond 
the blast zone, to allow port development to proceed with few restrictions. 
They noted that some  million dollars’-worth of projects were ready for 
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construction inside the Apra harbor on Cabras Island, owned by the Guam 
government, if that island could be shown to be outside of any blast zone.⁴⁹
 Navy officials agreed that Orote Island was a possible location. Two 
wharves capable of handling  million pounds of ammunition could be built 
for what they considered a low cost in a technically suitable area. Environ-
mental disturbances could be kept to a minimum, navy officials believed, al-
though twenty-one acres of a coral reef would have to be dredged to a depth 
of forty-five feet. Most important, navy officials observed, “Placing the pier 
at the isolated Orote Point site will insure that the expanding commercial 
port facilities in Apra harbor, coexisting with Navy requirements, can be ac-
commodated without endangering the lives of employees in this ‘industrial 
area.’ ”⁵⁰
 Even so, no munitions wharf was constructed at Orote Island. Plans for 
such a wharf were prepared in , only to be deleted from the federal gov-
ernment’s construction budget in , a victim of the general post-Vietnam 
conflict scaling back of the American military. More was involved than eco-
nomics. Some Guamanians and some federal government officials believed 
that the environmental impact statement about Orote Island grossly under-
estimated the damage to flora and fauna likely to occur and opposed build-
ing wharves there.⁵¹
 Opposition on environmental grounds, combined with economic con-
siderations, killed construction possibilities. As the navy later admitted, 
“When the Draft EIS was circulated in , the proposal drew heavy criti-
cism on the basis of its environmental impact,” and that criticism “plus a 
high construction cost led to the project being dropped in .”⁵² Historian 
Rogers later wrote of Orote Island, “It is a lovely place where I have hiked, 
fished and scuba dived many times. It would have been obliterated by the 
wharf complex, hence the objections to building the wharf there.”⁵³ The navy 
learned once again that it could not ignore environmental issues.
 Attention shifted to new areas in the s, as the presidential adminis-
tration of Ronald Reagan greatly increased federal government expenditures 
on the military. Two sites within Apra harbor, both having blast zones that 
would exclude most of the commercial sections of the port and both to be 
located on land already owned by the federal government, received careful 
scrutiny. One was a site on Adotgan Point on the Orote Peninsula just a short 
distance inside the harbor from Orote Island on the tip of the peninsula. 
The other possibility was a site on the Glass Breakwater, which formed the 
northern boundary of Apra harbor. Navy officials preferred the Adotgan site 
for economic and technical reasons. Learning from their past experiences, 
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they were quick to admit that there were environmental drawbacks to build-
ing wharves at the Adotgan site. However, the navy believed that mitigation 
measures could limit most of the problems.⁵⁴
 Testimony about the navy’s proposal to build its munitions wharf at 
Adotgan Point in the early s revealed divisions of opinion among both 
Guamanians and federal government officials. The testimony also showed 
that the navy had become more responsive to the desires of others. Every-
one agreed that it was necessary to relocate munitions handling from Hotel 
Wharf. The governor of Guam, the Guam legislature, and Guam’s represen-
tative to the United States Congress endorsed relocation wholeheartedly. All 
were glad that no more land would need to be acquired by the federal govern-
ment to construct a pier at either Adotgan Point or the Glass Breakwater.⁵⁵ 
While all could agree that relocating the munitions wharf was necessary, 
there was initially no consensus about which of the two sites was preferable. 
Not all favored the choice of Adotgan Point, as environmental and cultural 
issues again intruded.
 Questions quickly arose about the impact a wharf at Adotgan Point 
would have on Guam’s physical and cultural environments, despite the 
navy’s assurances about mitigation measures. Leaders of federal and terri-
torial agencies voiced objections. Officials of the Fish and Wildlife Service 
in the Department of the Interior had “serious concerns” about the effects 
of construction on coral reefs and saltwater fish, as did members of the Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service in the Department of Commerce. The head 
of the Environmental Protection Agency also wondered if Adotgan Point 
was the best location from an environmental point of view. Members of 
the Guam Planning Agency favored the Glass Breakwater, because placing 
a wharf there “would do far less environmental damage” and would help 
preserve “scenic vistas.” The chairman of Guam’s Division of Aquatic and 
Wildlife Resources agreed that the site at the Glass Breakwater was “the least 
environmentally damaging alternative” and concluded that there “was no 
justification in selecting the Adotgan Point alternative.” Likewise, the head 
of the Guam Environmental Protection Agency stated that he “[could not] 
agree with the choice of Adotgan Point,” for too much coral reef would be 
lost.⁵⁶ Guam’s Department of Parks and Recreation officials observed that 
important historic and prehistoric sites might be damaged in the construc-
tion of roads and other shore-based facilities to serve a munition wharf there. 
Members of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation in Washington, 
DC seconded those concerns and added that the pier would be “a visual in-
trusion” on historic sites.⁵⁷
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 Demonstrating sensitivity that they had not previously displayed, navy 
officials responded carefully to all of the objections, leading to acceptance 
for their plans. They went further. In the fall of , they agreed in a formal 
memorandum with the government of Guam to design any facilities on 
Adotgan Point in ways to minimize their impacts, including their visual im-
pact, on historic sites. A year later, they entered into a still more far-reaching 
memorandum of understanding in which they agreed to establish two sub-
stantial ecological reserves on federal land as compensation for any harm the 
construction at Adotgan Point might do to flora and fauna. One would be a 
cliff area on the Orote Peninsula, a special habitat for birds; the other would 
encompass shore lands, the home of several endemic Guamanian birds and 
the rare fruit bat, and a substantial reef area.⁵⁸ Embracing these concessions, 
nearly all of those who had initially questioned the Adotgan site now sup-
ported it. The new ammunitions wharf was completed with federal funding 
in the late s. Hotel Wharf was turned over to the government of Guam 
and in the s was used by cruise ships.⁵⁹
 Controversies about the location of the munitions wharf on Guam, 
together with the general matter of land occupied by military bases on that 
island, resonated with disputes about American military bases in the nearby 
Philippine Islands. When the Philippines achieved independence from the 
United States in , the American military retained military bases there. 
With the coming of the Cold War, and especially with America’s involve-
ment in the Vietnam conflict, political leaders in the United States viewed 
the bases, like those on Okinawa and Guam, as essential bastions against 
the spread of communism in the Far East. Filipinos were more circumspect 
about the presence of American bases on their soil. They saw it as a challenge 
to their national sovereignty. The issue of the bases was complicated, how-
ever; for it became tied up in two other disputed matters: American aid to 
the Philippines and trade tariffs. Filipinos generally pressed Americans for 
more economic aid and for trade legislation aimed at keeping the American 
market open to goods from the Philippines, while allowing Filipinos to levy 
tariffs on goods imported from the United States. In the minds of many Fili-
pinos, economic aid and trade concessions were necessary to reduce their 
nation’s dependence on the United States, a dependency, they argued, that 
had begun well before .⁶⁰
 The story of disputes over the bases was one of declining American, and 
growing Filipino, power. In , the newly independent Philippines granted 
the United States ninety-nine-year-long leases over a number of bases, most 
notably a large air base at Clark Field and a major naval installation at nearby 
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Subic Bay. In return, United States officials pulled American troops out of 
Manila, the capital of the Philippines, gave economic aid to the new nation, 
and met their Filipino counterparts partway on trade issues. During the 
s and s, the presidential administrations of Harry S. Truman and 
Dwight D. Eisenhower resisted Filipino efforts to assert any control over 
the bases, though Eisenhower acknowledged that ownership of the land the 
bases occupied resided with the Philippines. The U.S. Justice Department had 
claimed that the United States retained sovereignty to the bases’ lands when 
it transferred title to the rest of the islands to the Philippine government in 
. A bit later, the United States accepted new boundaries for the Subic Bay 
base to give jurisdiction over eighty thousand Filipinos in Olongapo to the 
Philippine government. As part of the base, those in Olongapo had had their 
lives governed by American law, for American, not Filipino, laws governed 
the bases—a major bone of contention. In the early s, Filipino leaders 
successfully renegotiated the length of the bases’ leases from ninety-nine to 
just twenty-five years. Further negotiations concluded in  reduced the 
size of the bases at Clark Field and Subic Bay, labeled the bases “Philippine,” 
and called for a review the bases’ situation every five years.⁶¹ By the late s, 
the bases employed seventy thousand Filipinos and contributed $ billion 
annually to the economy of the Philippines. Even so, mounting Filipino pres-
sures and a reassessment by Americans of the value of the bases led to Amer-
ica’s exit from the bases in the early s, ending the United States’ century-
long direct presence on Filipino soil.⁶²
 While the controversies involving American bases in the Philippines 
rarely touched on environmental issues, those concerning where to locate 
the munitions wharf in Guam did. Moreover, the debates about the wharf 
had ramifications far beyond that single issue. The heated arguments spilled 
over into contemporary discussions about the creation of a national park 
and a national seashore on Guam.
The Creation of the Guam National Seashore
In , Representative Harold Johnson of California, the acting chairman of 
the Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation of the House Commit-
tee on Interior and Insular Affairs, introduced a joint resolution to the Sen-
ate and House to create a national seashore on Guam. Intended to “preserve 
for public use and enjoyment certain areas possessing outstanding natural, 
historic, and recreational values,” the proposed seashore would encompass a 
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region mapped out for inclusion in a park in . That area was large, a total 
of , acres, of which , would be reef and water. The remaining nearly 
, acres would consist of land on Guam either already owned by the fed-
eral government or to be purchased by the federal government. Proposed for 
southwest Guam, the park would include the seashore from Nimitz Beach 
in the north down through Cetti Bay, Sella Bay, and Umatac Bay, all the way 
to Cocos Lagoon and Cocos Island in the south. The seashore would also in-
clude inland areas adjacent to the beaches, even embracing Mount Lamlam, 
the highest peak on Guam.⁶³
 Well aware of local antipathy toward the federal government, those pre-
paring the resolution included safeguards for Guamanians. Property owned 
by the territory of Guam could be acquired only with the consent of the Gua-
manian government. There were also limitations on how the federal govern-
ment could use its powers to purchase privately owned land for the seashore. 
For one year after the passage of an act establishing the seashore, the fed-
eral government was explicitly forbidden from using condemnation powers 
to buy lands in the villages of Umatac and Merizo, which were populated 
mainly by Chamorro people pursuing traditional lifestyles. Even after that 
time period had passed, condemnation would be difficult, hemmed in by 
many restrictions. It was assumed that considerable stretches of private land 
would always exist within the boundaries of the seashore, and that hunting 
and fishing would be allowed to continue within the seashore as long as the 
activities conformed to Guam’s laws.⁶⁴
 In early , Johnson and other members of his subcommittee traveled 
to Guam to hold a series of public hearings on the proposed seashore, and 
they revealed that, while support did exist for the seashore, Guamanians also 
harbored reservations about it. Paul Bordallo, chairman of the Committee 
on Agriculture, Resources, and Development for the Guam legislature and 
the same legislator who was most adamantly opposed to the relocation of the 
navy’s ammunition wharf to Sella Bay, summed up the feelings of many resi-
dents. Bordallo praised the congressmen for holding hearings on Guam and 
listening to local opinions, something, he pointedly said, navy officials never 
did. He then opened his testimony by observing that the Guam legislature 
“sincerely and enthusiastically” supported the creation of the seashore.⁶⁵
 However, Bordallo spent most of his time expressing doubts. “First,” he 
noted, “we think the proposed size of the park is too large.” It would be a 
mistake, he continued, “to deduct a substantial part of our limited area from 
the tax rolls and from the jurisdiction of our government,” for to do so would 
“seriously inhibit the development of Guam.” After denouncing the navy’s 
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effort to appropriate land in Sella Bay, he stressed “how much the people of 
Guam resent involuntary condemnation and how important it is that the 
Park Service negotiate with private landowners within the taking and permit 
them to remain within the seashore so long as they conform to the master 
plan.” He went further in his defense of the rights of Guamanians, saying that 
the National Park Service should share responsibility for the administration 
of the seashore with the government of Guam. Administrators should also, 
Bordallo asserted, give preference to Guamanians for jobs, especially in run-
ning concessions for the park. “We don’t want to see a system develop,” he 
concluded, “where the chiefs are all from the mainland United States and the 
Indians are all from the local reservation.”⁶⁶
 In his recommendations for the treatment of the Chamorro villages of 
Merizo and Umatac, Bordallo demonstrated ambivalence, as did many Gua-
manians. On the one hand, he urged that the seashore be established in ways 
that would not disrupt the lives of people in those areas. On the other hand, 
Bordallo said that park planners needed “to recognize the needs of the vil-
lages of Merizo and Umatac for normal growth.” It would not, he continued, 
be “appropriate to freeze these communities and preserve them like a fly in 
amber for all eternity.” Perhaps, he thought, controlled tourism, “not a Coney 
Island type of development,” in which the seashore could play a major part, 
offered a way out of this dilemma. The southern part of Guam, Bordallo fin-
ished his testimony, should remain “peaceful and serene.”⁶⁷
 The Guam legislature had in  passed a resolution introduced by 
Bordallo calling on all governmental bodies “to preserve and enhance the 
ancient features and traditions of the southern districts of Guam . . . most 
akin to the ancient Chamorro way of life.” However, the resolution went on 
to incorporate some of the same contradictions as Bordallo’s later testimony. 
It noted that “tourists find the atmosphere of the southern districts particu-
larly appealing and picturesque, which gives another reason to take whatever 
steps necessary to preserve this atmosphere and thereby maintain a great 
natural tourist attraction.” The resolution urged the construction “at an ap-
propriate site within the locale of an old Chamorro village, complete with 
thatched roof buildings, latte stone sites, and all else required to recreate 
in the southern part of Guam an authentic habitat of the autochthonous 
inhabitants of the Marianas.” It further called for the building of “a by-pass 
highway system so as to preserve the slow pace of the three southern villages 
and yet permit motor vehicles a rapid transit to the area.”⁶⁸
 Most Guamanians who testified agreed with Bordallo. Nearly all said 
that the creation of seashore could help preserve Guam’s environment. Many 
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noted with satisfaction that it would preclude the navy’s building an am-
munition wharf in Sella Bay while encouraging desired forms of economic 
development. They believed, that, if done carefully, the creation of a national 
seashore could help free Guam’s economy from dependence on the military. 
George Bamba, chairman of the Committee on Ecology and Environment 
for the Guam legislature, further explained that such a creation would keep 
the area out of the grips of outside entrepreneurs as well. He complained that 
“Japanese-run hotel” facilities were taking over his island, making Guam “an 
economic colony of Japan,” and said that he favored the seashore, with locally 
owned and operated concessions, as a move in the direction of economic di-
versification and freedom. By this time, some were calling this part of Guam 
“the Japanese Riviera.”⁶⁹
 More than economics was involved. The president of the Guam Envi-
ronmental Council, who described his group as being composed of “local 
residents who are dedicated to the maintenance of quality environment for 
the people and community of Guam,” asserted that his organization desired 
a national seashore because it would “enhance the social, economic, cultural, 
and natural environment of the island.” He noted in particular that it could 
protect “the people’s heritage” and Chamorro lifestyle. Much was seen as 
being involved in the creation of a national seashore. Indeed, a petition spon-
sored by the Guam Environmental Council, signed by sixty-five hundred 
Guamanians, captured well the sometimes conflicting thoughts. A National 
Seashore was needed, the petition to the secretary of the interior read, “for 
its potential contribution to knowledge of tropical Pacific ecology, and for its 
recreational benefits to local residents and to the large and growing number 
of tourists on the island.”⁷⁰
 Like Bordallo, most of the same Guamanians testifying in favor of the 
creation of a national seashore had reservations. Above all, they feared that 
its establishment might become an excuse for the federal government to 
seize more land. The example of the navy’s designs on Sella Bay was never 
far from their minds. A lawyer, who was at the time representing several 
Guamanians claiming that they had lost land unfairly to the navy, expressed 
such thoughts when he said that, if not done justly, setting aside land for the 
seashore would “force still more Guamanians off of their land and into the 
urban mold.” He called upon members of the subcommittee to “at least re-
quire that the individual landowners of this island be given the opportunity 
of acquiring land of like character and dimension in exchange for that which 
they must surrender” and pleaded, “Don’t give a man a handful of dollars.” 
A resident of Umatac was even more blunt. In a letter published in Guam’s 
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leading newspaper in  and then entered into the  hearings, he ad-
dressed the “Uprooted People of Guam.” He urged that they “let themselves 
be heard before they all wither and die from so many transplantings,” a ref-
erence to land losses attributable to the federal government.⁷¹
 The impassioned testimony of the Guamanians made its impression on 
the visiting congressmen. Representative Philip Ruppe of Michigan noted 
at the conclusion of the hearings that he was glad to learn that Guamani-
ans supported the idea of a national seashore and believed that they were 
“correct in expressing your concern over the land use that would be part 
of such a development.”⁷² Over the next few years, the measure creating a 
national seashore on Guam was reworked to embody many of the desires of 
the Guamanians. In , the U.S. Congress established a Territorial Seashore 
Park, encompassing , acres of Sella Bay and surrounding land from 
Agat in the north to Merizo in the south, thus setting up an area considerably 
smaller than the one that had been surveyed a decade earlier. Development 
was restricted and, according to the leading historian of Guam in , “Sella 
Bay remains uninhabited and pristine.”⁷³ A publication of the Guam Visitors 
Bureau noted in  that Sella Bay, the center of the seashore, “is acces-
sible only on foot, by way of a .-mile hike beginning south of the town of 
Agat.” The guide continued, “The bay has good corals and underwater caves, 
making it excellent for swimming and snorkeling.” Culture, as well as flora 
and fauna, might be enjoyed: “Hikers will discover ancient latte stones and 
pottery shards, which are all that remain of Sidya, a Chamorro village that 
was deserted nearly  years ago.”⁷⁴
The Establishment of the War-in-the-Pacific  
National Historical Park on Guam
Even as the Congressional Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation 
was conducting hearings on Guam about the creation of a national seashore 
there in , its members listened to testimony about a proposed national 
park for the island. To be called the War-in-the-Pacific National Historical 
Park, it would commemorate American military campaigns during World 
War II, especially the one to retake Guam from the Japanese in . Intro-
duced into Congress by Representative Richard C. White of Texas, who as 
a marine had landed on Guam to recapture the island, the park bill raised 
many of the same issues that the act to create a national seashore had stirred 
up, but contained some interesting twists. White’s measure envisioned the 
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establishment of a park encompassing beaches on which the marines had 
landed and a substantial inland region composed of places at which battles 
had been fought, for a total of about , acres in areas including Asan, 
Agat, and Mount Tenjo. It was proposed that a museum and commemorative 
markers would grace these lands.⁷⁵
 Nearly all Guamanians who testified said they favored the park’s cre-
ation. A member of the Guam legislature observed that the park “has met 
with favorable consideration from the people of Guam and the members of 
the Guam legislature.” It would be, he thought, “a fine tribute to the battles 
on Guam” and “a living memorial to the entire Pacific campaign.” He noted 
further that “Guam has developed into a key position of U.S. military activity 
in the Pacific” and that “the military personnel stationed on Guam would 
receive a sense of pride and historical perspective from a national park such 
as that proposed.” More was involved than patriotism. After discussing the 
increase in tourism on Guam, he supported constructing the park, because 
doing so “would be of substantial assistance to Guam’s developing tourism.” 
The director of Guam’s Department of Commerce made the same point, 
testifying that he thought a national park would aid “our budding tourist 
industry and our economy.” Others favored the establishment of the park 
more as a way to preserve increasingly scarce open space. A representative 
of the Guam Environmental Council praised the proposal for saving “open 
space needed to maintain the charm and dignity of Guam.” Quality-of-life 
matters concerned him the most. “For all of our construction, new highways 
and all of the growth that we see on your island of Guam,” he explained, “I 
hope we and certainly you never lose sight of the fact that the environment 
of the island should be one where it is very fine and very good for the people 
of Guam to live and enjoy.”⁷⁶
 Nonetheless, even proponents had questions. Many thought that the 
proposed park was too large and gave too much power to the federal gov-
ernment. The same Guam legislator who testified in favor of the park noted 
that “land on Guam is exceedingly dear” and called for a park of more limited 
size. He thought that the federal government should be allowed to acquire 
land only with the concurrence of the governor of Guam and the Guam 
legislature, and wanted provisions added to the legislation to provide the 
people of Guam with a say in the administration of the park. The director 
of Guam’s Department of Commerce noted that “our recent past has dem-
onstrated that we cannot allow a Federal agency to have carte blanche in 
Guam.” He, too, said that the government of Guam must have veto power 
over any land acquisitions and that Guamanians needed to be involved in 
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running the park. Even the member of the Guam Environmental Council 
who favored the park as a means of preserving open space cautioned, “We 
would like to see some publicity here on the island so that we will know that 
they are not going to include three-fourths of the area of Guam.” All made 
reference in their park testimony to the controversy over the plan to build a 
munitions wharf in Sella Bay, which was made with almost no local consul-
tation, as a poor way to conduct matters.⁷⁷
 Congress authorized the expenditure of $. million to create the War-
in-the-Pacific National Historical Park in , with all except $, to 
be spent on the acquisition of land. It included seven different units of land. 
A second park called the American Memorial Park was created on Saipan. 
However, for over a decade little was done. In the fifteen years after , the 
U.S. Congress actually appropriated only $ million to purchase land for the 
park on Guam. Of this amount just $. million were spent, enough to ac-
quire less than  percent of the private land within the park’s boundaries. 
Congressman Morris Udall, chair of the House Committee on Natural Re-
sources, visited Saipan and Guam in  with other committee members to 
try to drum up support for the parks, to little avail. Acres of privately owned 
land remained inside the park on Guam. Meanwhile, it was only in  that 
the National Park Service submitted a general management plan to con-
gressional committees. Federal government budgetary restrictions retarded 
park development.⁷⁸ Even in beginning to construct the park, the National 
Park Service, despite all of the voices of Guamanians heard at public hear-
ings, rode roughshod over some local desires. The government of Guam had 
planned to build a new small boat harbor at Agat. However, this location was 
one of the places where the marines had landed, and the federal government 
took it over, despite protests from outraged Guamanians, for the park. The 
Park Service seized the land by declaring a rusty World War II sewer pipe on 
the land to be a historic landmark.⁷⁹
 The park remained unfinished in the early s, a situation that dis-
mayed many as the fiftieth anniversary of World War II approached. To de-
termine how best to proceed, Congress held a new round of hearings on a 
measure to fund the park adequately in . The bill would appropriate $ 
million for the park on Saipan and $ million for the one on Guam. Held in 
Washington, DC, the hearings were a love feast, with no one dissenting from 
the park plans. The governor of Guam, representatives of the Guam legisla-
ture, members of Guam’s American Legion post, and many marine veterans, 
including a former commandant of the Marine Corps, testified either in per-
son or by correspondence in favor of the park. Gone were any doubts about 
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the acquisition of land by the federal government or any misgivings about 
how the park might be administered. Instead, a new element not present in 
the hearings two decades before rose to prominence—Chamorro culture. 
Many Chamorros had lost their lives during the Japanese occupation of 
Guam and in the fighting by Americans to retake the island.⁸⁰
 In , a proposal to include in the park on Guam a memorial to those 
Chamorros won overwhelming support. Typical was the handwritten letter 
of one Guamanian to the Congress, which argued that with a memorial “our 
unique Chamorro culture will be appreciated and will touch other people 
across the globe so this world can be peaceful that was meant to be [sic].” 
The chair of the Guam legislature’s Committee on Youth, Senior Citizens 
and Cultural Affairs went further in linking Chamorro lifestyles, economic 
development, and the need for the park. She began her testimony by observ-
ing that “the comfortable lifestyle we maintain today is tied to that period of 
turbulence in Guam’s history,” a reference to World War II. She then stated 
that in recent years Guam had “undergone an unprecedented frenetic rate 
of development . . . which has diluted the dynamics of our island culture.” 
She concluded that “the same economics that has upgraded our lifestyle has 
strained the cultural fabric that provides strength and blurs the identity of 
our people” and supported the measure to build the park “as a means of pro-
viding a tangible approach in the preservation of our culture.” Another Gua-
manian urged the construction of the park as a way of saving “our ancient 
artifacts like the latte stones,” which “the native Chamorros once used.”⁸¹
 In the end, Congress appropriated the necessary funds, and the War-in-
the-Pacific National Historical Park was completed, including a memorial to 
the Chamorros who had lost their lives during World War II. Covering , 
acres in seven units, the park has a visitor center at Asan, where there are in-
terpretive exhibits and audiovisual programs. Designed to “honor all people 
from all nations who participated in the Pacific War,” the park includes in its 
visitor center exhibits on Chamorro culture and history, as well as exhibits 
about the war. It also features environmental exhibits, including one on the 
brown tree snake.⁸²
The Invasion of the Brown Tree Snake
A government publication noted with pride in  that Guam was “com-
pletely free of poisonous snakes,” making the island “a virtual utopia from 
poisonous bites of any kind.”⁸³ A scant forty-three years later, a scientific 
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report prepared for the U.S. Congress observed the very damaging impacts 
the brown tree snake was having on Guam. “The brown tree snake (Boiga 
irregularis),” the document noted, “has been a major factor in a modern ex-
tinction episode beyond its native range that is unprecedented in its scope: 
the extirpation of most of Guam’s native terrestrial vertebrates, lizards, and 
virtually all of the island’s forest birds.” In addition, the report continued, 
brown tree snakes on Guam had caused “more than a thousand power out-
ages, damaged agricultural interests by preying on poultry, killed many pets, 
and envenomated numerous children.”⁸⁴ Journalists reporting on the dam-
age done by the brown tree snake were blunt. One titled his account “The 
Snake That Ate Guam.”⁸⁵
 Inadvertently introduced by the American military, the brown tree snake 
overran the island. Native to Indonesia, New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, 
and northern Australia, the snake probably entered Guam as a stowaway in 
a navy ship’s cargo shortly after World War II.⁸⁶ Having no natural predators 
on the island and proving to be very adaptable in its exploitation of habitat 
and food sources, the reptile reached a population density of thirty-five to 
fifty per acre in the mid-s. This meant that there were perhaps  million 
brown tree snakes on Guam, about , per square mile. The snake was 
more than simply another pest; it was the cause of a major ecological disas-
ter on Guam and a significant hindrance to the development of the island’s 
economy. Moreover, the brown tree snake threatened to spread to other 
Pacific Islands, including the Hawaiian Islands, where it could be expected 
to wreak similar damage.⁸⁷
 Julie Savidge, a doctoral candidate in ecology at the University of Illinois, 
who worked in Guam’s Division of Aquatic and Wildlife Resources (DAWR), 
was the first scientist to fully understand and publicize the harm the brown 
tree snake was causing. By the s, Guamanians noticed that birdlife on 
many parts of their island was becoming increasingly rare. Guam’s avifauna 
consisted of eighteen native birds, mainly forest dwellers such as the bridled 
white-eye, the Guam flycatcher, and the Rufous fantail. Many of these were 
unique to Guam, not even living on nearby islands like Rota. In , those 
with the DAWR proposed that ten of Guam’s native birds and two species of 
fruit bats be placed on the federal government’s list of endangered species. 
Two of these birds, the Guam rail and the Micronesian broadbill, lived no-
where else in the world. The agency also advanced a plan to try to discover 
the causes for the decline in the populations of the birds. Savidge was tapped 
for that investigation.⁸⁸
 Her work showed conclusively that the brown tree snake was respon-
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sible for the plummeting numbers of birds. Scientists and nonscientists alike 
had suspected other causes, for up to that time no snake had been impli-
cated in the wholesale destruction of birdlife anywhere in the world; thus the 
situation on Guam was a new one. Through extensive field work, Savidge and 
others at the DAWR had ruled out other possibilities: pesticide contamina-
tion, loss of habitat, competition from introduced birds, exotic diseases (avian 
malaria was at the time decimating bird species endemic to the Hawaiian 
Islands), and the depredations of rats. Then, through careful research in old 
newspapers and written reports and through the use of interviews and ques-
tionnaires with people throughout Guam, Savidge determined both when 
brown tree snakes were first noticed in different regions and when birdlife 
began disappearing from those areas. When it became clear that the arrival 
of snakes corresponded to the decline in birdlife, Savidge thought she had 
uncovered why the birds were disappearing. When additional fieldwork re-
vealed that brown tree snakes ate all kinds of birds—and lizards and fruit 
bats, which were also becoming scarce—she was sure of it.⁸⁹
 Savidge was able to determine how the brown tree snake had spread on 
Guam. Introduced through Apra harbor sometime in the late s or early 
s, the snakes spread to southern Guam in the s, to central Guam 
in the mid-s, and to Guam’s northern extremities in the late s and 
early s. By early , ten forest bird species managed to survive only 
in a small forest below the cliff line at the northern tip of Guam, a place the 
snakes could not reach. Birds also flourished on Cocos Island, a small islet 
just south of Guam—again, a place snakes had not reached. By this time, 
several of Guam’s bird species were presumed to be extinct in the wild. Some 
survived in captivity through the heroic efforts of zoo curators, and some 
of these birds were later reintroduced to the wild. Others were completely 
lost.⁹⁰
 The impacts of the brown tree snake were multiple. By , nine species 
of birds had been extirpated and others were endangered. At a time when 
the protection of their flora and fauna, including birdlife, featured promi-
nently in debates about where to build the navy’s ammunition wharf and 
where to locate parks, the depredations of the snakes alarmed Guamanians, 
especially as they came to see birds endemic to Guam as part of their natural 
and cultural heritage. There were also unexpected consequences. With most 
birds gone, growing swarms of mosquitoes might spread diseases such as 
the deadly dengue fever. Then, too, as they invaded buildings, the nocturnal 
snakes, which are mildly venomous, bit babies and children as they slept. 
By , some  snakebites had been recorded, including eleven serious 
 Guam, the Philippines, and American Samoa 
cases involving babies less than one year old. In addition, snakes climbed 
guy wires leading to poles supporting electrical power lines, often creating 
short circuits. Power outages became common just as uninterrupted electric 
flows were most needed for touristic developments. Between  and , 
there were twelve hundred such outages, and it was “conservatively estimated 
that power outages on Guam caused by brown tree snakes have cost mil-
lions of dollars a year.” These power disruptions had many ramifications. As 
a government report observed, “Snakes startle people, and power outages 
frequently cut short their enjoyment of Guam’s nightlife and shopping cen-
ters.” Power outages also shut down refrigeration units and computers. Not 
only were the snakes dangerous and spreading diseases, they were also bad 
for business.⁹¹
 Brown tree snakes threatened to become a problem throughout the 
Pacific. Very hardy, they could hitchhike to other islands in the wheel wells 
and cargo holds of airplanes and in cargo containers leaving Guam by ship. 
Biologists warned that “exotic snakes pose an enormous threat to other 
islands” and observed that it was “imperative that they be eliminated from 
interisland transport.” Brown tree snakes were repeatedly found on O‘ahu in 
the s and s, brought in accidentally by military airplanes. Closer to 
Guam, numerous sightings of brown tree snakes occurred on Saipan, Tinian, 
and Rota. It was deemed likely that a colony of the snakes was established on 
Saipan by the s. Kwajalein, Pohnpei, Wake Island, Okinawajima, and the 
Diego Garcia Atoll (in the Indian Ocean) reported less frequent sightings.⁹²
 Conceding that the snakes would never be completely eliminated from 
Guam, scientists and governmental officials hoped in the early s to re-
duce their numbers through an integrated management plan that would 
alter their habitat and use both chemical and biological controls.⁹³ Recog-
nizing the danger that the snakes might spread beyond Guam, in  Con-
gress added a section to the Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention 
and Control Act of  to authorize a cooperative program to control the 
snake. Representatives of the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, De-
fense, and the Interior, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands 
(in which Tinian and Saipan lay), the territory of Guam, and the state of 
Hawai‘i formed a Brown Tree Snake Control Committee in  to develop 
an integrated pest control approach.⁹⁴
 By the close of the s, the most stringent controls applied to the 
Hawaiian Islands. Working with the Brown Tree Snake Control Committee, 
the Hawaiian legislature established an Alien Species Action Plan in . As 
it was applied to brown tree snakes over the next few years, this plan meant 
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that all airplanes leaving Guam for Hawai‘i were inspected for snakes on the 
ground in Guam and were checked again once they landed at a Hawaiian 
airport. Finally, the state established Snake Watch Alert Teams (SWAT) to 
seek out and destroy any snakes that might somehow have gotten loose in 
the Hawaiian Islands. Fears that brown tree snakes might run wild on Maui 
contributed substantially to a decision not to extend the length of the major 
runway of that island’s main airport. A longer runway might allow airplanes 
to fly in directly from Guam, and those airplanes, many Mauians feared, 
might bring in brown tree snakes. Even so, in the summer of  some 
residents suspected that brown tree snakes had gotten loose in the Hana 
region of Maui. In the winter of , residents expressed similar fears about 
O‘ahu.⁹⁵
Developments in American Samoa
Developments in American Samoa, the only possession of the United States 
south of the equator, offer a valuable contrast to those on Guam.⁹⁶ Along 
with other European nations, the United States developed an interest in the 
Samoan Islands in the late nineteenth century for strategic purposes. The 
United States annexed the islands of Tutuila and Aunu‘u in  and the 
nearby island group of Manu‘a four years later, despite the desire of chiefs 
in the last group to remain independent. These annexations were confirmed 
by Congress in . The main goal was to create a naval coaling station 
and communications center at Pago Pago on Tutuila. To this end, American 
Samoa, like Guam, was placed under the administration of the navy, which 
gave tremendous leeway to local commanders. The naval administration 
lasted until , when administration was shifted to the Department of the 
Interior, just as took place on Guam.⁹⁷
 The land area of American Samoa comes to about seventy-three square 
miles and is mainly mountainous. The climate is tropical. Comprising about 
three-quarters of American Samoa’s land and  percent of its population, 
Tutuila is the most important island, home to the port of Pago Pago, which 
serves as the commercial center. Possessing several tuna-fish canneries, its 
harbor is, according to recent descriptions, “polluted and muddy.” On “bad 
tuna days” the stench “will take your breath away.” The three small islands of 
the Manu‘a group, about sixty-two miles east of Tutuila, are much less devel-
oped, “ years away” from the commercialization on Tutuila.⁹⁸
 As on Guam and Hawai‘i, indigenous inhabitants in the Samoan Islands 
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altered the landscape through their cultivation practices well before the 
coming of westerners, as a detailed study of Ofu Island in the Manu‘a group 
has shown. Bringing rats, pigs, dogs, and chickens with them, settlers reached 
Ofu about three thousand years ago. They exterminated five of ten native sea-
birds and one of three native land birds. Moreover, their cultivation largely 
modified Ofu’s coastal terrace, with their slash-and-burn agriculture con-
tributing to the loss of native birdlife through habitat destruction.⁹⁹
 By contrast, the naval administration, in the words of historian Steven 
Fischer, “transformed little in this part of Samoa.”¹⁰⁰ For the most part, U.S. 
Navy administrators ruled in consultation with established local leaders and 
tried not to upset established ways of doing things. When a consultative 
legislature was established, members were chosen from established village 
districts, and, not surprisingly, well-known local leaders won election. Nor 
did many changes come to the economies of the islands. Subsistence agricul-
ture and fishing continued as before, with copra about the only export. A  
naval report observed, “It is difficult to conceive of any nation gaining eco-
nomic or financial benefit from American Samoa,” for “the island resources 
have no potential.” In a major difference from the situation on Guam, the 
navy appropriated little land for military usage, just  acres, and enforced 
ordinances preventing the loss of land by Samoans to outsiders. Nor were 
many nonresidents allowed to set up businesses in American Samoa, for fear 
that they might exploit residents. Some  percent of the land remained in 
Samoan hands in . Even so, all was not harmony. In the s, a strong 
movement for autonomy developed among Samoans, including those in 
American Samoa. Called “Mau,” which means opinion, the movement called 
for the establishment of a civilian government. Those in the campaign ac-
complished little in the eyes of naval officers except to disrupt economic de-
velopment by their interminable meetings. Naval officers improved health in 
American Samoa, leading to a doubling of the population every twenty-five 
years after , until it reached about , in . They also established 
an elementary and secondary public school system enrolling about , 
pupils. Another , students were in private missionary schools. Techno-
logical advancements made Pago Pago obsolete as a naval station, and the 
navy pulled out in –. Here was a basic difference from Guam where, 
of course, the U.S. military increased its presence and its land acquisitions 
during the Cold War.¹⁰¹
 Only in the s did economic circumstances begin to change in 
American Samoa, but even then not nearly as much as on Guam. Under the 
administration of President John F. Kennedy, infrastructure improvements 
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were made: new roads, an international airport, sewage-treatment facilities, 
and so on. The number of tuna canneries increased. The first tourist hotel 
was constructed. Even so, tourism failed to develop into a mainstay of the 
economy. In , a leading guidebook still described accommodation op-
tions as “very limited” and labeled the largest hotel, which was government-
run, as “infamous.” There was one national park in American Samoa, with 
three units totaling nine thousand acres on the islands of Tutuila, Ta‘u, and 
Ofu. One of the park’s goals was to help preserve native society, and vil-
lagers were allowed to continue gathering plants from park areas for cultural 
and medicinal purposes. Nonetheless, traditional society eroded, and alco-
hol, juvenile delinquency, and crime problems surfaced. Moreover, civilian 
administrators created “a small welfare state.” Appropriations to American 
Samoa from the U.S. government came to about $ million annually in the 
early s. Per capita income reached $, annually.¹⁰²
 Even as Samoan society began to become commercialized, traditional 
titles and land tenures remained largely unchanged, and outside entrepre-
neurs were restricted in their access to American Samoa. The establishment 
of the tuna canneries was the exception, not the rule. Unlike native Hawai-
ians, American Samoans benefited handsomely from American subsidies 
and spoke little of seeking independence from the United States. In , 
American Samoa remained an unincorporated, unorganized territory of 
the United States—by choice, not coercion. Unlike what occurred on Guam, 
American Samoan leaders opted not to try to win an organic act from Con-
gress. To do so, they realized, would force them to give up racial preferences 
in landownership, which are unconstitutional under American law. An 
organic act might also force them to adhere to minimum-wage laws, thus 
undercutting advantages enjoyed by the tuna canneries.¹⁰³
 In fact, American Samoa became (and is) a prime example of a MIRAB 
economy, dependent on the migration of its people abroad and their remit-
tances home, as well as on congressional appropriations. One-third of the 
workforce is employed by the territorial government. About sixty-two thou-
sand American Samoans lived beyond their islands in the s, mainly in 
California and Hawai‘i, considerably more than the forty thousand residing 
in American Samoa.¹⁰⁴ Author Tom Conger captured well the “push” and 
“pull” forces that led many to leave American Samoa. Writing in , he 
observed that the only major business in Pago Pago, the tuna-packing plant, 
imported its seasonal workers from Japan, and that most of the fishing boats 
were crewed by non-Samoans. “There’s a bit of government work . . . and a 
few work in the hotel,” he noted. However, in general, there was “Nothing for 
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the Samoan kids to look forward to. That’s why so many head to the U.S. as 
soon as their families can arrange.”¹⁰⁵
 World traveler Paul Theroux, perhaps a bit jaded, has left an equally 
vivid and dispiriting picture of life in American Samoa. Commenting on the 
congressional subsidies, he concluded, “Life in American Samoa is one long 
Yankee boondoggle, and the people are so hoggishly contented that they can-
not stand the idea of ever forming an independent political entity.” He called 
residents “corrupted” and “fat jolly people, with free money, having a won-
derful time.” Samoa, Theroux believed, “had become part of the American 
family and was content.” “Samoans,” he thought, “were generally unenthusi-
astic, but similarly they were uncomplaining.”¹⁰⁶ What Theroux missed, of 
course, was the lack of opportunities available in American Samoa, which led 
to the massive involvement of American Samoans in the Pacific diaspora.
Conclusions
Events on Guam in the years after World War II amply illustrate some of the 
difficulties involved in trying to reconcile economic development matters, 
environmental protection issues, the rights of indigenous peoples, and the 
desires of the American military in the Pacific. Developments on Guam also 
showed, however, that compromises could be reached. Navy officers initially 
approached matters such as the location of its new ammunition wharf from 
a technical and economic viewpoint but, pushed by other groups, widened 
their outlook to include environmental considerations. The growing sensi-
tivity of navy officials coincided with the problems they faced in the Hawai-
ian Islands with regard to Kaho‘olawe, and to similar problems elsewhere 
in the Pacific. Because CINCPAC was ultimately responsible for the navy’s 
stances on local issues in Guam and the Hawaiian Islands, it is likely that the 
thinking of navy officers about issues in both regions was related, although 
no “smoking gun” in the way of documentation exists.
 As in most other areas dealt with in this study, compromises were ar-
ranged in the political arena, and the political process on Guam grew more 
pluralistic as time went on. More and more people and their organizations 
had effective access to political decision making. That process, as in other 
Pacific areas in which the United States had influence, was tinged with a dis-
like of federal government authority, leading to increased questioning about 
the roles of the American military on Guam.
 Decisions to establish a national park and seashore on Guam were, like 
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that involved in siting the ammunition pier, made through political debate. 
Guamanians, including those favoring the preservation of the Chamorro 
culture, were active in shaping the contours of the enabling legislation. The 
situation on Guam provides a contrast to the much more inhumane treat-
ment meted out to Native Americans in the earlier creation of many national 
parks on the American mainland. Largely because of the input of Guamani-
ans, Chamorro rights received attention in establishing the parks and in de-
ciding on a location for the ammunition wharf on Guam. Circumstances 
on the island resembled the growing attention Alaskan Natives received in 
planning for the Beringian Heritage International Park. Times changed as 
new groups demanded and received places at the political table.
 The park, seashore, and wharf issues contributed to the development of a 
Chamorro rights movement on Guam. Like indigenous peoples’ movements 
throughout the Pacific, such as the native Hawaiian renaissance, that move-
ment sought to restore native culture (including language), political influ-
ence, and economic power.¹⁰⁷ The Chamorro rights movement also aimed at 
the restoration of lost lands. Underlying specific concerns was again the issue 
of sovereignty. In the s and s, Guamanians, especially Chamorros, 
renewed their quest to regain lands lost to the navy right after World War II. 
In , the United States Justice Department offered to settle the claims with 
a total payment of $. million. Most claimants accepted the settlement, 
and the money was distributed to fifty-two hundred former landowners or 
their heirs. About two hundred disgruntled claimants held out for larger 
settlements, and the issue has not yet been resolved.¹⁰⁸ In a related move, in 
 Congress agreed to take another look at claims for compensation for 
property, personal injury, and deaths. By , a commission set up by the 
House of Representatives had collected more than five thousand question-
naires from Guamanians and was considering what actions to take.¹⁰⁹
 While the issues swirling around decisions about where to place the 
parks and the munitions wharf could be divisive, there was unanimity of 
opinion about the need to control the brown tree snake. The damages caused 
by the snake hurt Guam’s environment and its business climate. The snake 
even threatened to bite into tourism, upon which many Guamanians banked 
to free themselves from the economic grip of the American military. In this 
case, the problem was not lack of consensus, but lack of knowledge. Until Julie 
Savidge conducted her research in the s, no one really understood what 
the snakes were doing to their island, and even in the early s no fully 
effective control mechanisms had been devised. Like other Pacific Islands, 
 Guam, the Philippines, and American Samoa 
such as Kaho‘olawe, Guam possessed a fragile environment, in which one 
change could quickly “cascade” to create other alterations: it took less than 
a generation for most of Guam’s birds to disappear. Invasive alien species, 
while certainly a global issue, had perhaps their greatest immediate impacts 
on small Pacific islands such as Guam.


Conclusions
 It is worth repeating in closing that the Pacific—one-third of the globe, en-compassing millions of square miles and millions of people—has always been, and remains, a large, complex region composed of subregions. Even 
Oceania, one of the subregions, is itself conventionally divided into Mela-
nesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia. The complexity of the Pacific makes gen-
eralizations difficult and fraught with possibility for error. Restricting the 
scope of investigations to some of the regions owned or controlled by the 
United States helps a bit, but even within these areas considerable diversity 
remains. Nonetheless, my work supports several important conclusions.
 America’s Pacific possessions, from the Aleutian Islands in the north to 
American Samoa in the south, and from Seattle and Silicon Valley in the east 
to Guam and the Philippines in the west, may be considered as one region, 
especially in modern times. Distinctly Pacific issues have been played out 
in these territories in decision making about economic development and 
environmental protection matters. World War II was certainly a watershed 
for all of these territories, but the issues that have arisen since then have also 
been closely related to the long history of the region. While current events 
have affected the choices people have made, the historical roots of those 
choices have been of equal import. History matters. Of course, each of the 
areas covered has had its own long history, and those local histories have 
shaped events in discrete ways. Still, several matters have transcended local 
developments as Pacific phenomena.
 The political and economic colonialism of the region has been of par-
ticular significance in shaping the parameters within which decisions have 
been made. Control by westerners was preeminent in the recent history of 
much of the Pacific, and that history greatly affected developments. Among 
America’s Pacific possessions the legacy of colonialism was perhaps most 
obvious in the cases of Hawai‘i and Guam, but colonialism was also influ-
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ential elsewhere. Residents in all of these regions harbored the feeling that 
they were being treated as second-class citizens—or worse—in America’s 
Pacific empire. Their rebellions against that position fueled some of the en-
vironmental efforts to control economic growth on their own terms. Pacific 
peoples particularly had misgivings about America’s military presence. From 
the opposition to the use of Kaho‘olawe as a bombing range, to disdain for 
federal regulation of fishing in Alaska, to efforts to revise plans for the am-
munition dock in Guam, a desire to cast off perceived colonial standing 
motivated local residents. These feelings persisted as the twenty-first century 
opened.
 World War II served as a catalyst for the development of many eco-
nomic and environmental improvements in America’s Pacific possessions. 
Pacific peoples were generally glad to have the American military rid their 
region, especially Micronesia, of Japanese influence and control. They also 
welcomed the economic growth that accompanied America’s increased pres-
ence in the Pacific, as military spending for World War II and the Cold War 
boosted local economies. The conflict and its aftermath opened the Aleutian 
Islands to new types of fishing, brought economic growth to Hawai‘i as ser-
vicemen later returned as tourists, helped spur the development of Guam, 
and brought major changes to America’s Pacific Coast cities and to southern 
Japan’s urban centers. However, people had short memories. Remembrances 
of World War II faded, and with that dimming went many favorable opin-
ions of the U.S. military. Moreover, with economic growth came new envi-
ronmental challenges. Pacific peoples soon found themselves at loggerheads 
with the American military, especially the U.S. Navy, and with some of the 
courses developments were taking. Even as some benefited from develop-
ment, they questioned the various costs it entailed. Developments increased 
fishing pressures along the Aleutians, created the military ground that be-
came pivotal to Hawaiian protests, altered Guam’s ecosystem, and intensified 
urban growth in the Seattle and Silicon Valley regions.
 However, conflict was not a simple matter of locals against outsiders. 
Divisions existed within the ranks of those living in the various regions. No-
where were these divisions clearer than in the splits separating indigenous 
peoples from Euro-Americans moving into their areas. Environmental con-
tests regularly came to involve the rights of indigenous peoples, most obvi-
ously in the efforts of native Hawaiians to halt the bombing of Kaho‘olawe, 
but also in the work of Chamorros to modify park plans on Guam and the 
desire of Alaskan Natives for input into schemes for an international park 
for Beringia. Similarly, efforts by Native Americans, especially the Duwamish 
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Indians, to affect land-use and waterway issues in Seattle became important 
in the s and later. One exception to this generalization may be Japan, 
where the native Ainu of northern Japan had little say after the early s. 
Even in Hiroshima, however, minorities mattered, at least for a short time, as 
Koreans and burakumin influenced the reconstruction of the city for a few 
years. Nor were outsiders united. In Guam, for example, navy officers some-
times found themselves at odds with other federal government officials on 
park and dock issues.
 What comes through in these controversies is the importance of the state 
as the arena in which the disputes were resolved. More than that, the state 
itself was often one of the most important actors on the scene and helped 
to structure the developmental activities. The U.S. Navy greatly affected de-
velopments over much of America’s Pacific, especially Guam and Hawai‘i. 
As scholars studying modern American history for twenty years or so have 
been reemphasizing, state actions matter. My study reaffirms the need to 
bring the state back into the big picture of economic and cultural develop-
ment. People as agents of change also deserve attention, however. Individu-
als were influential in shaping events across the Pacific: Noa Emmett Aluli 
in Hawai‘i, Frederick Terman in Silicon Valley, Lowell Wakefield in Alaska, 
Shinzō Hamai in Hiroshima, and Paul Bordallo on Guam. People work in 
modern societies within the frameworks of state organizations, and they 
often do so through the formation of voluntary bodies, a mark of the devel-
opment of civil societies. They frequently then use state agencies to achieve 
their goals. Aluli helped start the voluntary private organization of the PKO 
but later employed the state agency of the KIRC to restore Kaho‘olawe. My 
study shows how the state interacted with the emergence of numerous cul-
tural and social groups on a wide variety of developmental and environmen-
tal issues.
 In looking at the Pacific, this study has revealed relationships between 
urban and rural issues, emphasizing similarities rather than differences be-
tween the two types. In all of the areas, with again perhaps the exception 
of Hiroshima, environmental justice issues were important. The rights of 
minority peoples often intersected with environmental and developmental 
issues. From Filipino women dealing with chemical solvents and polluted 
water supplies in Silicon Valley, to native Hawaiians grappling with land-
use matters on Kaho‘olawe, to Chamorros reasserting claims to their lands, 
environmental justice issues cut through the lives of city dwellers and rural 
peoples alike. Even in Hiroshima, the rights of minorities called for, but did 
not receive, justice in the reconstruction of the city. Throughout America’s 
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Pacific possessions, economic growth was uneven. Parts of regions benefited 
more than others, and different groups had varying experiences.
 What transpired in the Pacific, and especially on Pacific islands, reso-
nates with developments in other regions. Large as it is, the Pacific is, of 
course, only part of the globe. In his Something New under the Sun, histo-
rian John McNeill has emphasized that the rapidity of global population and 
economic growth in the twentieth century created environmental challenges 
not known in earlier times, a discontinuity with the past. As he has explained, 
“There is something new under the sun . . . the place of humankind within 
the natural world is not what it was.” In terms of the scale and scope of en-
vironmental changes caused by people, he has written, “there has never been 
anything like the twentieth century.”¹ That was certainly true of the Pacific, 
especially after the Second World War, when the pace of economic and en-
vironmental changes accelerated. Economic growth and the integration of 
the Pacific with other parts of the world altered lifestyles and forced Pacific 
peoples into making increasingly difficult environmental choices—choices 
similar to those people were having to make elsewhere in the world; and 
the types of decisions arrived at by Pacific peoples resembled those made by 
peoples in some specific parts of the globe.
 Many of the same economic development and environmental protection 
matters Pacific peoples faced were played out in the American West. Here, 
too, perceived colonialism—often exemplified by the federal government 
and especially the U.S. military—irked, to put it mildly, Americans moving 
westward. Moreover, in the American West, as in the American Pacific, out-
side business enterprises, which provided much of the capital and expertise 
needed for development, were viewed by many residents as evil predatory 
interests. It was to counter such perceptions that Wakefield Seafood moved 
its headquarters from Seattle to an island near Kodiak after Alaska became a 
state.
 The efforts of indigenous peoples in America’s Pacific possessions have 
also resembled in important ways the work of some Native Americans to 
protect their environments, often by ending or limiting military use of their 
lands, especially in the West. In the American West, some tribes found them-
selves opposed to the military over land-use issues. The Western Shoshone, 
for example, successfully worked with non-Indian groups to derail plans to 
base a proposed mobile MX missile system in the Great Basin region in the 
s.² Yet, one must be careful not to push this analogy too far. While well 
aware of these matters, and while sympathizing with the Native Americans, 
native Hawaiians took little part in these protests against the military, view-
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ing themselves as a Pacific people and most concerned with developments 
in the Hawaiian and other Pacific islands. Protests on Kaho‘olawe connected 
more directly with changes taking place in other parts of the Pacific, espe-
cially with attempts to stop the use of Pacific islands as nuclear-testing sites 
and military bases.
 Beyond the American West, other regions call for direct comparison to 
the Pacific. The circumpolar Arctic has in recent decades shared major simi-
larities with parts of the Pacific in its development. Both regions have had 
very fragile environments; both have suffered from extractive industrial de-
velopment at the hands of colonial powers, including the Soviet Union and 
Russia; and in both regions indigenous peoples have been harmed and are 
now reasserting their rights, especially to aboriginal lands.³ Certainly, one 
important issue running through Pacific and Arctic environmentalism has 
been the fate of native flora and fauna under pressure from alien species. This 
problem is, of course, global in scope, but it is probably most pronounced in 
the Pacific, especially on Pacific islands, and in the Arctic.
 Possessing especially fragile environments, these regions face situations 
in which one environmental change can very quickly “cascade” into many 
others. Thus, brown tree snakes devastated Guam. Nor was this circumstance 
unusual. In , the Pacific harbored  percent of the world’s threatened 
birds, many at risk because of the introduction of invasive species. A Re-
gional Invasive Species Programme devised for the Pacific in  belatedly 
recognized the problem.⁴ Similarly, the introduction of fox farming to the 
Aleutian Islands in a misguided attempt to create a vehicle for economic de-
velopment there led to the decimation of native bird populations when hun-
gry foxes escaped into the countryside. Exactly how to revegetate Kaho‘olawe 
became an important issue in the s and early s. It was decided, at 
first, to remove all tamarisk trees, an alien species. However, when it was 
discovered that they provided shade in which many native species thrived, 
tamarisk trees were retained. Ideology played a role in this and similar de-
cisions made throughout the Pacific, as culture and economics went hand 
in hand. Writing about native species in his poem “Native Plants” in , 
activist botanist Rene Sylva observed:
The Hawaiian plants are social plants.
If you go look underneath the Hawaiian tree
There’s all kinds of plants that grow under them. . . .
But the non-native plants are antisocial trees. . . . 
Nothing grows under there. . . .⁵
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